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Encountering Statues: Object Oriented Ontology and the Figure In a Sculptural 
Practice 
Lisa Osborn  
 
This study reappraises the role and value of statues (i.e. the figure as sculpture) 
in order to determine what happens when we encounter these objects. The 
consideration and construction of statues in my studio practice has generated 
specific insights into statues as person-shaped objects and into our encounter 
with these objects. From the perspective of a practice making statues this study 
addresses how, through the encounter, statues both stimulate and obscure our 
perceptions of them as objects.  
My practitioner’s understanding of statues is articulated and enlarged by 
developing methods which allowed me to gain an expanded perspective of my 
practice, through data collected from conversations about statues, and via a 
subsequent diffractive dialogue with concepts gleaned from other disciplines.  
This research process has revealed specific characteristics of the encounter, 
and of statues themselves, that have been excluded or obscured by familiar 
assumptions and theories, such as a tacit consideration of statues that allows us 
to be unsettled by their nudity, or the role touch plays in considering statues, 
and ultimately the history of the object itself. 
These findings are considered through a sustained engagement with Object 
Oriented Ontology (after Harman). Through this process, my initial findings are 
subsequently expanded and further enhance a re-conception of the encounter 
and of statues as objects. Finally, I argue for the importance of considering this 
reappraisal of the role the encounter with statues could play in revealing and 
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[Artists] who deny themselves the representation of life and limit 
their language to purely abstract forms, are depriving themselves 
of the possibility of provoking more than an aesthetic emotion. 
(Freud, 1996, p.219) 
 
I first read Lucian Freud’s suggestion of ‘provoking more’ twenty-five years ago, 
and copied it at the bottom of my artist statements. I was already focused on 
the figure in my work, but what I found in Freud’s essay was confirmation of 
my experience that the figure as a subject activated additional layers of 
consequence to an encounter with art, although not why that was so.  
 
Accordingly, this study has taken the form of an examination of statues as art 
objects from the perspective of a studio practice concerned with the figure. The 
central question specifically considered has been, what happens when we 
encounter a statue? Addressing this question has been led by my particular 
experience of that encounter through studio practice, which is also its origin, 
and how others speak about their encounters. In order to address the more that 
Lucian Freud suggested is provoked when we encounter an art object in human 
form: statues and the encounter, once defined, are brought into dialogue with 
Object Oriented Ontology as a method to indicate how, through our encounter, 
statues can be made use of as a philosophical actant.  
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Freud goes on to argue that in order to be moved, we cannot merely be 
reminded of life by a copy of life, the work ‘must acquire a life of its own, 
precisely in order to reflect life’ (Freud, 1996, p.220). In short, interpreting life 
in a figure rather than copying life increases the life in the figure. This was 
further verification of my experience. I was making alterations to my figures 
that seemed necessary. I used the term emotional anatomy to speak about these 
adjustments. My approach to the figure is to subtly alter and reform 
anatomy⎯with attentiveness to human structure⎯acknowledging and 
considering, rather than copying, the body. This study has included an 
articulation of an approach to the human figure that makes use of anatomy to 
signal how life feels rather than to replicate the body.  
 
The significance of our encounters with statues is often exhibited in the way we 
speak about them, and I have documented and analysed this way of speaking in 
others and myself as part of this study. My curiosity is further stimulated by the 
position the figure has come to inhabit in contemporary art, which I will expand 
on in this chapter. This leads me to make a distinction (for the purposes of this 
study) between figure sculpture that is a copy of a person’s body, and sculpture 
that is concerned with and informed by the structure of the body.  
 
Although not articulated until performing this research, the question: What 
happens when we encounter a statue? has been a part of my practice for 
decades. The stimulus and capacity to address this concern through an 
established practice has come through the refining of this question, in tandem 
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with determining methods for articulating practice as research, and applying 
these insights to work made toward this study. I completed eighteen life scale 
figures, and twenty smaller figures and objects during this study, which is not 
an unusual number, but it has been the adjustment of applying expressed 
methods of research to practice that has allowed this work to inform, enlarge, 
and articulate my encounter with statues.  
 
This exploration through practice was achieved using a methodology designed 
to acknowledge and facilitate my particular practice as a means to conduct and 
document research. This approach enabled methods already in place in my 
practice to be expressed and made use of, toward appropriately revised and 
articulated goals. These methods were used to both draw theory⎯or concepts 
from outside my practice⎯into practice and make use of them there, and to 
articulate the results. My methods were further expanded and enhanced 
through analysis of recorded documentation of my encounters with statues in 
the studio, as well as the encounters of others, manifested through 
conversation and writing on the subject of statues.  
 
Background  
Going beyond the above quotation from Lucian Freud, I can locate the origins of 
this study, in embryonic form, in my artist statements over the past twenty-five 
years. A statement from 1995 expresses how desire and an eccentric longing 
had informed my work. I began by recounting how, at nine years old, I had tried 
to will a homemade doll to respond: 
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I yearned, wished, willed, stared-at-pulling-the-universe-up-
through-my-feet-and-out-my-eyes this doll to life. She remained a 
doll, unresponsive, ungrateful, in a world unavailable to me. 
 
In the same statement I described how, at eleven I was engulfed in an obsession 
for a horse that turned out to be much too big for me to control, although I rode 
him anyway. Connecting that desire to my work, I wrote that: 
 
My work comes from this same big desire or compulsion. It is 
overwhelming and I have very little power over it. I will my 
figures to life and I feel betrayed and annoyed when they do not 
climb out of the kiln on their own, and live. I begin another 
though they are oblivious and unmindful of me. 
 
This writing suggests that I experienced my relations with the doll and statues 
as controlled by wilful objects, and not specifically by me. I add here that I did 
not, and have not, ever actually wanted my work to live, although this was 
effective shorthand to describe vague and illogical expectations about my work 
in the world once it was completed.  
 
It is curious to have felt expectation of these figures, to feel something akin to 
what existential philosopher Emmanuel Levinas explains as the summons 
implicit in the approach of the other, or the encounter, and to receive no 
response. Finally understanding this summons and how Levinas defines it is 
where this study took hold. While I will revisit Levinas in greater depth in 
chapter four, here, I want to discuss his influence on this study in terms of 
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defining the encounter with statues. Levinas writes that the other defines us,1  
‘the face speaks to me and thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate 
with a power exercised’ (Levinas, 2011, p.198).2 University of Montreal 
Professor of Philosophy Bettina Bergo summarizing Levinas’ call of the other 
on us, writing that the other ‘does not even have to utter words in order for me 
to feel the summons implicit in his approach’ (Bergo, 2015). It is Levinas’ 
concept of the other and how we encounter relations that led me to choose 
Object Oriented Ontology as a means for discussing the encounter and objects. 
Levinas description of the idea of the other resonated (for me) with what 
Graham Harman describes as the sensual object. In these terms, Levinas says 
we are wrong to ever think we know the real other. It is only our idea of the 
other or our sensual other—in Harman’s terms—which we respond to. When 
we think we know the other and judge accordingly, we cut off the flow (that is 
what life is about for Levinas) between us.  
 
 
I have experienced the impression that the lack of response from an object 
shaped like a person is a subtle rebuff. In an article titled, Acts Of Stillness: 
                                                        
1 Martin Buber also writes about the encounter as a meeting between either I and thou, or I and 
it:  
‘The one primary word is the combination I–Thou. The other primary word is the combination 
I–It; wherein, without a change in the primary word, one of the words He and She can replace 
It. Hence the I of man is also twofold. For the I of the primary word I–Thou is a different I from 
that of the primary word I–It.’ 
‘(Buber, Martin, I and Thou, Trans. Smith (Kindle Locations 125-129 OR Part one; 4, 5, 6, and 7)  
Buber, like Levinas argues that our lives are meaningful through our relationships. That 
supposing thou to be an it is to merely experience and not to acknowledge a living relationship.  
2 Similarly, Philosopher Paul Ricoeur quotes Levinas when he discusses the implied 
responsibility the self owes the other, that there is ‘no self without another who summons it to 
responsibility’ (Ricoeur, 1992, p.187). 
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Statues, Performativity, And Passive Resistance, art historian David Getsy 
assesses ‘the effects of statues acting on us by standing there, motionless’ 
(Getsy, 2014, p.2). This stillness is one of several defining characteristics of 
statues. We can easily manage this kind of snub from a doll or statue (i.e. a 
person shaped object), but it is rare to feel this passive resistance from similar 
things, such as a marble arch, a vase, or a painting. 
 
When I was even younger, perhaps four years old, I began to adore the life-
sized bust of a girl, attributed to Clodion3.  (See Figure 1, page 231).  She sat on 
a low table, in front of a mirror in a hall at my grandmother’s house.4 I thought 
this girl to be beautiful and I felt she was kind to me, though she was not a 
portrait of anyone I knew. I remember feeling pleasure at finding her, every 
time I returned to the hall, right where she should be. She allowed me to be 
with her, look at her, to study her. She was, I thought, what I wanted to be. I 
admired her. She seemed lovely, deep and knowing. I resolved that as I grew up 
I would be like her, I was grateful and I admired her. 
 
                                                        
3 Cloudion (Claude Michel) was the ultimate French 18th century rococo sculptor. (I do not know 
if the bust is a real Clodion, but it is signed C. MICHEL) 
4 My grandmother died in 1983. The bust was packed away when my father’s sister inherited 
the house, although the hall with the low table and mirror remained. For over 30 years, as I 
attended parties or visited my aunt I would pass the table and think of my lost “friend.” 
Recently, my brothers and I divided my father’s “things” from a storage unit. I chose an 
unopened, very heavy, wooden box without really knowing what was inside. It did turn out to 
contain the bust. We are reunited, although what I find pretty, deep, and wise seems to have 
altered for me.  
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Again, this ‘girl’ is a marble, rococo-style bust, which, as a form, is only a head 
and upper part of the chest. That projection, of how I wanted to model myself, 
how I wanted to appear to others, the gratitude I felt, and what I wanted to 
elicit in others, was a series of complex feelings for a head and shoulders to 
evoke in a child. I have recently been reunited with the bust. It is evident that I 
was lonely and in need of friendship and guidance as a child, as I find resolve of 
neither in the bust today.  
 
Following on this, Getsy defines statues as ‘a three-dimensional figurative 
image [ . . . that] both depicts a body in space and is a body-in-space’ (Getsy, 
2014, p.2). What is implied by Getsy’s definition is the subtle complexity of an 
object that is concurrently portraying and being. This dual nature is defined 
through indicating that statues depict a body-in-space and are objects shaped 
like a body-in-space at the same time. It is a real object shaped like a person but 
not a real person, suggesting a third or dual position for statues.  
 
Getsy points to a statue as present, as an object, although it is ‘an image of 
something not actually present, and perhaps never seen in everyday life’ (p.2). 
In this Getsy both articulates and illustrates a key issue of consideration when 
addressing statues. The encounter is between a person (active viewer) and a 
person shaped object (passive statue), and is positioned in terms of a physical 
object that both is and is not present. Therefore, in the encounter with statues it 
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is only the form that provides the something that is not present.5 This is the 
revealing moment in the encounter with a statue. The contrast of knowing it is 
not real and yet that it is a real object at the same time.  
 
That Getsy considers ‘the sculptural encounter as a theatre of power relations 
between active viewers and passive statues’ (Getsy, 2014, p.1), assumes 
something about both relations and statues, and those assumptions illustrate a 
characteristic of the encounter this study addresses. It is my encounter with 
statues through practice that presents me with the particular perspective on 
and evidence about statues that informs the desire to somewhat amend Getsy’s 
definition, and points to the subtle and historical iconoclasm⎯here meaning 
literally to invest and possibly condemn statues with significance, or to see 
them as merely a lesser form of ourselves⎯that Getsy unintentionally 
indicates.  
 
I have positioned iconoclasm in this study as a fundamental unease with the 
graven image that influences our encounter by veiling the actual object. It is the 
conceptual denial or literal destruction of an image, in this case a statue. A kind 
of iconoclasm is illustrated in Baudrillard’s description of the simulacrum 
(Baudrillard, 1994, pp.3-7). 6 Baudrillard writes that the image is the murderer 
                                                        
5 As I indicate in chapter one, this is repeated somewhat in Heidegger in The Origin of the Work 
of Art, Heidegger makes the point, important to this study, that the ‘work of art is still 
something else over and out of the thingly aspect. This other that is in it makes up the artistic’ 
(Heidegger, 2006, p.4).  
6 I do not follow Baudrillard further in his argument that the ‘something else’ the simulacrum 
indicates, finally and ironically, replaces reality. In the essay Object-Oriented Seduction: 
Baudrillard Reconsidered (Harman, 2016), Graham Harman explores Baudrillard and explains 
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of the real. For example, he suggests that iconoclasts destroy images of God 
because of a ‘metaphysical despair that came from the idea that the images 
didn’t conceal anything at all’ (Baudrillard, 1994, 5). While the danger of the 
simulacrum is a complex discussion, briefly stated the image becomes 
shorthand for something no longer based in reality, it distorts or it replaces 
reality. This suggests the necessity of situating iconoclasm for this study. First, 
statues are partly an image of something not real and yet are real. The presence 
of the real object (statue) is obviously fundamental to my practice, but it is in an 
effort to keep a focus on the real object beyond the studio that iconoclasm is 
framed for this study. I suggest a further definition of iconoclasm for use here 
that identifies the dismissal or negation of the object through having not fully 
addressed what happens in the encounter. Iconoclasm here suggests an 
incomplete or disjointed appraisal of the object encountered. 
 
My evaluation or estimation of statues and my questions about the encounter 
come through fluency in the concepts, materials, and skills required to craft and 
to consider the figure or (my particular kind of) statues through my practice. 
This fluency has offered me a specific view of the nature of an object shaped 
like a person, and the way we speak about or appear to consider what happens 
                                                        
that his interest in Baudrillard’s idea of the simulacrum is found ‘in the new compound real 
made up of the simulacrum and its admirer, who is seduced by it’ (Harman, 2016 p. 135). 
Seduction versus desire plays a role in defining the sensual object of OOO. The sensual object is 
not withdrawn as is the real object. Harman writes: ‘But for OOO, the inwardness of things can 
never be brought to light, and thus the reality to be had is not the unattainable one hidden 
behind the sensual waterfall or rose but the new compound reality of the beholder seduced by these 
objects plus the objects themselves’ (Harman, 2016, 134). The simulacrum is similar to the sensual object, 
it is as deep or as meaningful as we allow it to be, it is the real object, in the case of this study a statue, 
which is an unfathomable and significant reality. OOO and Harman are revisited in chapter four. 
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when we encounter objects shaped like people.  Figurative sculpture is often 
judged in comparison to our body, or as a lesser imitation of us. My figures are 
intentionally distorted in order to impart without the veiling of direct 
comparison. My figures remain both real and not real, openly offering that 
other or third option. It is specifically through practice that I have authority to 
undertake this study. Statues, as objects, occupy space and are real things, 
although they are not real people. A statue may, however, be a portrait of a real 
person, or the personification of an ideal. A statue is a real object that indicates 
a reality, but is not a real person or ideal. This is where this study begins. 
 
Considered generally, statues occupy an ambiguous position in relation to the 
broader fields of Contemporary Art. The statue, as an art form, is regularly 
welcomed back into the fold without ever quite holding its position there. As an 
example of this tenuous grip, the final sentence of each of the five essays 
contributed by contemporary art critics, gallery directors, and art historians for 
the 2014 The Human Factor exhibition at the Southbank Centre all present a 
similar quality. Their common tone is at odds with the definitive heralding of 
the figure (back) into the arena of contemporary art that this exhibit seemed to 
suggest was imminent.  
 
The final sentence of Hayward Gallery director Ralph Rugoff’s introductory 
article for the catalogue reads as follows: 
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The sculptures in The Human Factor, on the other hand, involve 
us in working through our cultural memory of the figure in order 
to reach an understanding of how this most familiar form ⎯ once 
regarded as an artistic anachronism ⎯ can still be reconfigured 
in ways that enhance our questioning and our understanding of 
our present time. (Rugoff, 2014, p.18) 
 
Similarly, the Director of Tate Britain, Penelope Curtis, writes in her essay 
Standing Sculpture at the Turn of The Century: Exchange Values and 
Metamorphoses: 
 
This nearly haptic exchange between figure and ground, between 
body and material, unites an apparently eclectic range of 
artwork, and discourages us from making any simple conclusions 
about figurative sculpture in the early twenty-first century, other 
than to accept that it is being as abstract as it is figurative. (2014, 
p.24) 
 
While in Post-Abstract and Data-Mapped; The Conditions of 
Contemporary Figure Sculpture art critic Martin Herbert states that: 
 
If where we are now has never before had so much then in it, and 
nor, perhaps, so much scary and thrilling futurity, we’ll see it in 
the images we build of our bodies and each other’s before ⎯ a la 
Rondinone’s nudes⎯ our patchwork selves fall apart at the 
seams. (2014, p.33) 
 
On a similar note, Co-Director of Artangel, James Lingwood ends his article 
After The Fall; The Re-Emergence Of The Figure In Sculpture, as follows: ‘Only 
two decades after its fall from grace, the figure had found its way back into the 
field of contemporary sculpture’ (2014, p.40), however, Lisa Lee, Assistant 
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Professor of Art History at Emory University, adds the caveat: ‘Yet through 
disjunction, crudeness frivolousness and savagery, this contemporary mode of 
figuration has achieved formal and rhetorical power’ (2014, p.47).  
 
 None of these statements (or the completed essays from which they are 
drawn) allude to a resounding re-emergence or conclusive position regarding 
the standing of the figure⎯or the figure, itself⎯in contemporary art. There is a 
politeness about the figure, but I am forced to draw the conclusion, that the 
new era of the figure in contemporary sculpture has not dawned. However, I 
would argue that the contemporary importance and relevance of the statue lies 
outside the spotlight of blockbuster exhibitions and biennales. 
 
I adopt a philosophical approach to and slightly expanded definition of statues. 
When, as art critic and philosopher Arthur Danto points out, in his book After 
The End Of Art: Contemporary Art And The Pale Of History, ‘an artwork can 
consist of any object whatsoever that is enfranchised as art [the question raised 
is], "Why am I a work of art?" (p.14). With this question in mind, my aim has 
been to locate statues in the present as art objects able to be approached 
philosophically with their history as objects intact. The objective is to consider 
and regard statues and their histories in the present and to explore the 




In 1969 the artist Joseph Kosuth writing under the pseudonym Arthur Rose 
proposed that ‘Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is 
questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art’ 
(Arthur R. Rose, “Four Interviews,” Arts Magazine, February, 1969); (Kosuth, 
1969, p.4). Kosuth is petitioning for a new conception of art in the context of 
1960s, when, as Danto points out, ‘artists pressed against boundary after 
boundary, and found that the boundaries all gave way’ (Danto, 2014, p.14). 
Kosuth argues specifically against examining and critiquing art through the 
paragone convention of sculpture against painting, which has veiled the nature 
of statues for centuries by comparing sculpture to painting. 
 
John Dewey wrote that ‘the existence of the works of art upon which formation 
of an esthetic theory depends has become an obstruction to theory about them’ 
(Dewey, 2005, p.1). Dewey’s purpose was to emphasize that the ‘esthetic 
theory,’ or the art is in the experience of the object and not in the object itself. 
While locating art solely in the object or the encounter is not the aim of this 
study, Dewey has made the distinction between object and encounter.  
 
In this there are three points to address in the structure and ontology I 
propose. First, statues as art objects have particular enduring historical 
intricacies, which even further complicate and obstruct theory about them. This 
study addresses these and both the precepts and conventions that may 
influence our encounters with statues, and further what statues themselves as 
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objects may be. Second, I have made use of Object Oriented Ontology7 (OOO) as 
the larger perspective for this study and as the framework for conceiving of 
both statues and the encounter. This ontology supports the encounter and the 
object as distinct and further promotes allure and aesthetics as first 
philosophy8 but OOO holds the position that art without our encounter, or art 
without humans ‘is like human society without humans or basketball without 
humans’ (Harman, 2015, @2:30), suggesting the encounter is a key element. 
Therefore the focus of this study is on the encounter with statues rather than a 
discussion of the location of art.  
 
Finally, conceiving of the encounter and the statue as identifiable and separate 
objects allows this study to consider the location of shifts or differences that 
appear in either object or encounter and to locate the conclusions and 
contribution this study anticipates. 
 
Defining ‘Statue’ 
That there is no “truth” as to what art is seems quite unrealized 
(Kosuth, 1969, p.6). 
 
                                                        
7 Object Oriented Ontology suggests that aesthetics is first philosophy. This is well laid out in 
Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-Human (Harman, 2012) 
(see  http://dar.aucegypt.edu/handle/10526/3073)  Also see in bibliography: (G. Harman, 
Dante's Broken Hammer 2016) (G. Harman, Object-Oriented Seduction: Baudrillard Reconsidered 
2016)(G. Harman,   2015) (Harman, The Third Table 2012) (G. Harman, The Road To Objects 
2011) (G. Harman, The Quadruple Object 2010)(G. Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: 
Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things 2005)  
8 See Harman, Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-Human, (2012) Accessed on 
line 2/2015    (http://www.nakedpunch.com/articles/147) 
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This study concentrates on a category of figure sculpture that has also been the 
particular focus of my practice. I will define and name this type of sculpture 
now. This is not to suggest a formalist view of the evolution of western 
sculpture, but a tool to isolate a particular kind of sculpture, which is the study 
of the figure, and not the reproduction of it. This kind of sculpture usually 
requires the artist to find a significant interest and perhaps some schooling in 
anatomy and the subtle entasis9 like abstraction required to correct, modify, or 
abstract the human form with an (incongruously) inconspicuous and informed 
coherence.  
 
Artist Keith Wilson⎯discussing the definition of sculpture⎯borrows a 
formulation from philosopher Bernard Williams and proposes that ‘sculpture is 
what the history of sculpture is the history of’ (2011, @11:07) (Williams, 2006, 
p.212). A specific quality that delineates the category I propose is that figure 
sculpture makes use of and employs the history of sculpture. When Arts 
Research Professor, James Hall discusses the ‘very different body language’ of 
contemporary sculpture, he writes, 
 
While modern art works have few qualms about invading the 
viewer’s own space, Old Master sculpture and painting prefer to 
occupy a more distinct realm. Paintings usually consist of flat, 
seamless expanses of paint, neatly cordoned off by a frame; 
                                                        
9  Entasis is the application of a particular convex curve to a surface of a column for aesthetic 
purposes. Generally the lower third of the column is straight and vertical, and the upper two-
thirds are then diminished one-sixth of the diameter at the neck. 
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statues tend to be made with a framing wall, niche or pedestal in 
mind. (Hall, 1999, p.1)  
 
Accordingly, Hall suggests that sculpture before the 20th century was focused 
primarily on the figure. Similarly Henry Moore writes in 1961 that we ‘shall 
[n]ever get far away from the thing that all sculpture is based on, in the end: the 
human body’ (Moore, 2002, p.200).  
 
As a method to delineate the category of sculpture that is the focus of this study 
I will acknowledge and allocate a domain for each of three types of sculpture 
that are relevant, related and adjacent to the field I propose. This delineation is 
situated at the approximate start of the twentieth century when sculpture could 
no longer be defined as primarily concerned with the figure. I imagine the first 
of two divergent paths as the parting of sculpture that continues to focus on the 
human form, from sculpture that moves away from the human form. This 
second variety of sculpture⎯that moves away from the human form⎯ would 
include Marcel Duchamp, Sol Lewitt, Dan Flavin, Rosalind Krauss’ Sculpture in 
the Expanded Field (1979), much of the work of Robert Morris, as examples.  
 
The other, figurative path, upon which this study is focused, is also divided. This 
second departure is in the approach to the human form. One course makes use 
of the human shape through casting directly from life. For example the life-cast 
works of Marc Quinn, Drawn From Life 2017, Ugo Rondinone, wax Nudes 2011, 
Bruce Nauman, Fifteen Pairs of Hands, 1996, Ten Heads Circle 1990, and others 
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which is the literal form or shape of a particular human; or the space of and 
around the figure (the work and intention of Antony Gormley); or mannequins 
or literal human forms such as Yinka Shinobare MBE (RA), Scramble For Africa 
2003 or How To Blow-Up Two Heads At Once 2006, Thomas Hirschhorn’s work 
using mannequins, Paul McCarthy, That Girl 2012-13, and John Miller, Now 
We're Big Potatoes 1992.10  (Figures 2-7). Further focus in this category of using 
the shape of the figure in sculpture is the work of Juan Munõz, who is, like 
Gormley, curious about the space, scale and a suggestion of the figure, rather 
than the body itself; while Ron Mueck and Duane Hansen focus on the curious 
and literal details of the everyday person.  
 
A further example of this second variety of contemporary figure sculpture, 
which makes literal use of the human shape, rather than employing human 
form and structure, is Thomas Schütte. Schütte is described by Frieze editor 
Quinn Latimer as having a ‘partial focus on the figure and [an] ambivalent 
relationship to it’ (Latimer, 2009, p.3/5). She describes several of Schütte’s 
figures as ‘melty, molten and reflective, [which] evince both menace and levity: 
part Darth Vader, part Pillsbury Doughboy’ (2009, p.3/5). Melty and molten do 
not particularly evidence concern with the structures of the body⎯nor do 
Darth Vader or the Pillsbury Doughboy⎯although interest is clearly exhibited 
in the suggestion of the shape of a body.  
                                                        
10 Many of these artists were in The Human Factor: The Figure in Contemporary Sculpture, in 




Adrian Searle describes the heads Schütte makes as ‘riffing on basic problems 
and opportunities [such as] how to form noses, or eyes in their sockets, 
eyebrows, ears, hair, character and expression. He has no set method, 
approaching each anew’ (Searle, 2012, p.2/3). It is evident that Schütte in 
particular is not concerned with the details of Mueck or Hansen, nor the history 
or traditions of modelling the body, which include a vocabulary of structure 
acquired through study of anatomy and the structure of the body that does not 
draw attention to the resolution of these particular issues. While dealing with 
the human form, this branch of figure work is focused on direct casting (Quinn) 
or a scaled detail from the body (Mueck) or an informal suggestions of the body 
(Juan Munõz makes use of both, while Schütte indicates the latter), or space the 
body contains or displaces (Gormley). In short, these figures are an indication 
of ⎯but not a study of⎯ the figure.  
 
The domain of figurative work that is the focus of this study and of my practice 
incorporates and acknowledges the traditional history of statues, as traditional 
subject and as monument. This category embraces and acknowledges the Greek 
and Roman statues of antiquity, Rodin, the Statuemania of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, recumbent tomb figures, gisants11 (including the Dead 
                                                        
11 A gisant is a recumbent statue. These figures are usually made as 
part of the sepulchral monument for a particular person portraying that individual in effigy, but 
not always. A transi, or the standing or recumbent statue of a decaying corpse is sometimes 
concurrently made use of as a contrast to the effigy.  
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Hippie of Paul Thek, 1967 (Figure 8), although it incorporates life-cast parts), 
and the effigies of Westminster Abby.  
 
The approach of sculptor Auguste Rodin to the figure is perhaps a clarifying 
example. There is a story repeated in Rodin: Sex and the Making of Modern 
Sculpture, (Getsy, 2010, p.32) about Rodin’s statue, The Age Of Bronze 1877. 
(Figure 10). The statue was modelled in such a way that Rodin was accused of 
making a life-cast of his model. The sculptor produced the model and the 
number and type of sittings required to make the statue and was eventually 
vindicated. The Age Of Bronze was made after Rodin returned from a trip to 
Italy to study the work of Michelangelo. David Getsy writes that what Rodin 
saw in Michelangelo’s exaggerated forms was  ‘what he believed to be evidence 
of another artist who blended the emotional and the sexual in his expressive 
rendering of the body’ (Getsy, 2010, p.30). The revelations and effect of a 
Michelangelo’s figures on the anatomy of The Age Of Bronze was evident, but 
the impact of charges of life casting The Age Of Bronze was that Rodin began to 
alter scale⎯to avoid further accusations at first⎯but which further ‘activated 
and amplified’ (p.63) his figures. This provided confirmation that life scale 
differs from life size, and Rodin continued to make use of both altered scale and 
anatomy. These abstractions or subtle alterations of the figure that allow the 
shape of the body to be something more than a body, are a defining quality of 
this approach to the figure. 
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Examples of this subtly altered approach to the figure in contemporary art can 
be seen in specific work but is rarely adhered to conceptually as an overall 
position of practice. Returning to the 2014 Southbank Centre exhibition, The 
Human Factor: The Figure in Contemporary Sculpture, artists whose particular 
works can be said to be about the body rather than a body copy are Pawel 
Althamer, Monika and Pawel, 2002, Huma Bhabha’s work, particularly The 
Orientalist 2007, which is barely human while the seated pose is clearly but 
quietly convincing. Also, Paloma Varga Weisz’s Fallede Frau doppelköpfig 2004, 
which makes use of casts of the artist’s body translated into wood and then 
positioned with a vague but compelling “body” made of cloth. Finally, Rebbecca 
Warren’s She 2003 (Figures 11-14), a series based in realizing the female 
figures in Picasso’s Les Demoiselle D'avignon as three dimensional objects. 
While Warren’s exercise is not specifically anatomically considered, it is an 
experiment in material, form, and the space of previously translated figures. 
Other artists working with interest in the structure and form of the body are 
often found in more craft based categories, outside Contemporary Art.  
 
Many ceramic and woodworking artists concentrate on the figure. A brief 
sample of this alternate arena can be witnessed through comparing and 
contrasting the work of two wood sculptors.  Aron Demetz’s piece Advanced 
Minorities 201212 (Figure 15), is a group of ideal figures made of lime wood 
which has been milled before the wood is dry. The roughing of the wood calls 
                                                        
12 Aron Demetz  http://www.arondemetz.it/works.php?gall_id=36&lang_id=1  Dementz does 
show and work in more than wood, but his wood pieces show interest and skill in both the 
figure and wood.   
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attention to the material and the person shape at the same moment (real wood 
not real figure). While the expert craft and skill of Bruno Walpoth13 avoids the 
uncanny by never hiding the material, or making use of the bust form, his 
figures sometimes do appear to be too like us and uncomfortably naked. 
Walpoth, obviously aware of this awkwardness, often addresses the issue with 
underpants to soften the experience, perhaps exposing his discomfort with 
objects shaped like people rather than speaking to it. Expert skill especially in 
relation to this kind of figure sculpture can veil or complicate the most 
interesting issues. 
 
The category of statue is expanded beyond the standing figure to include the 
recumbent, the seated, the hunched, the squatting, the partial (bust) and 
partially architectural figure. In short, figurative work that can be bound to the 
word or described as a statue for this study can now include figures that are 
concerned with some awareness, interest and knowledge of human structure 
and the history and traditions of statues.  
 
A part of the accumulated history of statues is that the word itself has acquired 
connotations. Oxford classics professor, Peter Stewart, suggests that by the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries statues had come to be perceived as 
having a social function, rather than an artistic one. Stewart writes that ‘the 
word statue has all but vanished from the vocabulary of artists and critics. Few 
                                                        
13 Bruno Walpoth  http://www.walpoth.com/wood.html 
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contemporary sculptors would be happy to have their work called statuary’ 
(Stewart, 2003, p.8). He suggests that statue has come to indicate a mediocre 
and misinterpreted public figure-sculpture. Stewart also points out that the 
word statue is associated with portraiture and likeness, which, in the early 
twentieth century was ‘at odds with the broader concerns of modernists’ 
(Stewart, 2003, p.8). Statues are further linked to particular traditions and 
some degree of acquaintance with anatomical structures and how these 
configurations inform the shape of the body. 
 
The word statue, having fallen out of favour, now subtly implies a pompous14 
object outside the sphere of contemporary art. With awareness and in full 
embrace of the contemporary connotations that accompany it, I have used the 
word statue, a sculptural object shaped like a person, to indicate and expand a 
category of historical and contemporary figure sculpture which includes the 
figurative work constructed in my practice and that is the focus of this project. 
The history, social functions, and public figure-sculpture nature of the human 
figure as a statue, will be called on in this study, and I will argue for these 
aspects as a portion of the value and consequence of these objects.  
 
Reflection and Methods 
                                                        
14 Adding to pompous is the pejorative Pompier as used by the poet C. Baudelaire. Fred Licht 
expands the definition in his book Sculpture, (Licht, 1967, p.21) using the word to describe a 
slavishly imitative artist who plays to taste and convention. It derives from the French word for 
Fireman, who, in the 1890s wore hats similar in form to those in portrayals of the Greek Gods in 
art at that time.  
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Introspection has no privileged access to reality even though it is we 
ourselves that are looking at ourselves. (Harman, 2013, @11:10) 
 
A primary concern throughout this study has been reflection, or in this case, 
reflecting upon. A manifestation of this difficulty is the double position of being 
both a part of the encounter with statues, and attempting to fully realize that 
encounter. This double, or contrary nature quickly resulted in a third 
understanding: that being part of some thing does not equate to knowing about 
it. While we are part of our encounter with statues, we do not always appear to 
fully perceive what happens during that encounter, the nature of that 
encounter is not always fully available to us. This led to accepting that although 
I am the architect of my studio practice, I am also an integral part of it, and 
therefore have a constrained perspective on what happens there. While we are 
part of our encounter with statues, we do not always appear to fully perceive 
what happens during that encounter, the nature of that encounter is not always 
fully available to us. The concept that being a part of an encounter does not 
directly equal full understanding of that encounter, is expanded on by Tim 
Morton (2013) (2013), and Harman (2005) (2010) (2016).  
 
In order to promulgate and broadly contextualize this study, I have critically 
engaged with the general field of philosophy known as speculative realism15, 
and more specifically with Object Oriented Ontology, and also with theories of 
embodiment and access as defined by Professor of Neuroscience, Psychology 
                                                        
15 Speculative Realism is the name given to the group of philosophers that met at a conference 
of the same name at Goldsmiths College in 2007.  
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and Philosophy Antonio Damasio and Philosopher Alva Noë. As noted earlier, I 
have made use of Object Oriented Ontology16 as the larger context and ontology 
for this study and as a structure for conceiving of both statues and the 
encounter. I will focus on the encounter and the statue as separate objects in 
order to suggest a shift or difference in one or the other and to locate the 
conclusions and contribution this study anticipates. 
 
With the understanding that I am part of my practice and that no work is made 
in the studio without me, and equally that I am unable to make work without 
the studio, the methods for conducting this research manifested from methods 
already in place in practice. In this way the encounter with making statues in 
the studio was placed at the centre of the approach to methods. These methods 
were refined and focused by engaging four concepts.  
 
First, as an initial and general approach, I have made use of Bricolage17, which 
is described by Anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss in his book, The Savage 
Mind (1966). Levi-Strauss describes two approaches to acquiring knowledge, 
the scientific and the bricolage. The Bricoleur or handy man has collected the 
                                                        
16 See bibliography: (G. Harman, Dante's Broken Hammer 2016) (G. Harman, Object-oriented 
seduction: Baudrillard reconsidered 2016)(G. Harman, Graham Harman: Anthropocene 
Ontology 2015) (G. Harman, Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-Human 2012) 
(Harman, The Third Table 2012) (G. Harman, The Road To Objects 2011) (G. Harman, The 
Quadruple Object 2010) (G. Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry 
of Things 2005)  
17 Further, bricolage both supports and is supported by Karen Barad’s concept of diffraction 
rather than reflection. Diffraction is further addressed in chapter three.  
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tools and materials for addressing the problems that arise in his world. Levi-
Strauss explains: 
 
The elements are collected or retained on the principle that they 
may always come in handy. Such elements are specialized up to a 
point, sufficiently for the bricoleur [handy man] not to need the 
equipment and knowledge of all trades and professions. (Levi-
Strauss, 1966, p.24). 
 
The ‘piecing together’ aspect of this method (bricolage) was an apt and fruitful 
approach and supported relying on my practice as a place that had attracted 
relevant tools and ideas.  I identified with the bricoleur character, which 
provided a framework for me to consider what had been collected and 
presented through practice over the last several decades. Second, an 
understanding of reflection on practice, as discussed by Donald Schön, 
addressed complex issues of reflection,18 and thirdly, feminist theorist, Karen 
Barad’s (2007) concept of diffraction. Barad gains her initial ideas of diffraction 
as a useful tool from Professor at University of California, Santa Cruz and fellow 
feminist, Donna Haraway. Both maintain that, rather than comparing the 
reflections of ideas, which transfer the same image or idea to a different place, 
we should look for the differences in similar ideas.  
 
                                                        
18 As I discuss in the projects section, I did not find that phenomenology as a specific method 
effected change in what I understood about what I do in my practice. 
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Diffraction defined in this way allowed the ideas collected through practice to 
expand rather than endlessly reflect and bolster an initial theory, and usefully 
models an alternative to a direct reflection. Finally, diffraction was enhanced 
and put into practice by following Grounded Theory Data Analysis (GTDA) 
guidelines throughout this research. GTDA offered particular methods, as per 
(Glaser, 1992) for organizing, comprehending, and recognizing as data things I 
had done through practice for many years, as well as an approach to data that 
delayed conclusions and assessments, or assumes the data has more to offer 
than proving a preconceived theory, which further complimented diffraction 
and Object Oriented Ontology. 
 
 Through employing GTDA ⎯for example on recorded conversations, slides of 
years of work, video of myself working in the studio ⎯I found a method to 
apply a diffractive view19 to specific data. This included working to understand 
Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, which has supplied a platform from which 
to test and compare actions and ideas, and has facilitated the expression of 
knowing through practice.  
 
Confirming the usefulness of such a platform, and substantiating that the 
knowledge generated by performing practice ‘is inevitably difficult to 
                                                        
19 I literally viewed the slides and the videos. Furthermore, although I attempted to work from 
transcripts of conversations, subtle meaning and metaphorical speaking was lost. Rather, I 
listened repeatedly (in the car, on walks, etc.) to the conversations, and found the coding to be 
generated more naturally and the theory made its self known through the repetition. 
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articulate’ (MacLeod, 2000, p.5), fine art and research theorist Katy Macleod, 
posits in Functions Of The Written Text In Practice-Based Research, that this 
knowing ‘is theory which is not written; it is made or realised through artwork. 
This theory is the result of ideas worked through matter’ (MacLeod, 2000, p.5). 
This definition draws attention to both the issue of reflecting on and 
articulating what happens in practice while practicing, and subsequently 
indicates the discrete consequence of both the encounter with statues, and 
statues as art objects themselves.  
 
One of three animating ideas in Noë’s book, Strange Tools: Art and Human 
Nature, is that ‘art is a philosophical practice’ (Noë, 2015, p.xiii). Just as Dewey 
separates the art object from our encounter with it, Noë’s point is made though 
conceiving of art practice as comparable to philosophical practice, or as a tool 
we use to put the ‘complexity of our own activities of thinking on display’ (Noë, 
2015, p.16). The result (or the object) is not a ‘positive knowledge, or settled 
agreement’ (p.17). The outcome of practice is knowing how, or an 
understanding that. Therefore, the object is not an illustration of thinking or a 
specific knowledge.  
 
A framing for these less than specific ‘results’ (as per Noë above) is suggested 
by the concept of tacit knowledge, as introduced in scientist and philosopher 
Michael Polanyi’s book, Personal Knowledge (1974). Polanyi correspondingly 
posits that this knowledge is generated through doing, through a practice, and 
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is often difficult to directly articulate. Polanyi writes, we ‘know more than we 
can tell’ (Polanyi, 2009, p.4). Articulating an embodied, tacit knowing that 
resists expression introduces the structural concern this text addresses, and the 
role it plays in the expression and effecting of this study. 
 
This is understood in arts-based research. Analogously defining these 
outcomes, philosopher Mark Johnson points out in his essay, Embodied 
Knowing Through Art, (included in The Routledge Companion To Research In The 
Arts), that arts research is focused on ‘the process of knowing, as contrasted 
with knowledge as a body of true statements’ (p.145). Conceiving of what is 
gained through art practice as comparable to a philosophical approach to 
knowledge, and further, that knowing through practice is the less explicit 
objective gained through an embodied process, begins to establish the 
approach to articulating the form of knowledge gained in the studio. This 
indicates how knowledge is conceived of and made use of through practice, 
throughout this project, and how knowing versus knowledge influences the 
shape of the contribution this study finally endeavours to make.  
 
Berlin University of the Arts professor, Kathrin Busch states particularly that 
‘artworks do not need to be a kind of research themselves, nor do they have to 
adhere to certain scientific standards’ (Busch, 2009, p.2). Busch is working to 
move the template for arts research away from that of science research and 
away from a specific outcome. Busch, further indicating the boundaries of this 
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project, allows that the artwork (statue) is not specifically the locus of this 
knowledge writing that ‘knowledge generated through art cannot as easily be 
brought to a precise point, as might be implied by the phrase “art as science” 
(Busch, 2009, p.5).  
 
Busch then puts forward a number of definitions of outcome for artistic 
research. In a 2009 Art & Research article titled Artistic Research And The 
Poetics Of Knowledge, definition number six suggests ‘Art as a different form of 
knowledge’ (Busch, 2009, p.4). Art, she suggests, ‘can thus reveal the concealed, 
flipside of knowledge’ (p.4). Busch positions art as able to point to what is 
obscured or concealed by the structure of other forms of knowledge. I contend 
that this revealing of the flipside, or the revealing of assumptions, is what this 
study has aimed to achieve. Statues therefore, the physical result of practice, 
are positioned as a means through which knowing can be both displayed and 
provoked, revealing what is frequently masked or veiled.  
 
This study has been designed to express the more (as per Lucian Freud) that 
statues offer, what is understood through practice about the human form as an 
object, and how that more critically engages particularly with concepts in 
embodiment and Object Oriented Ontology revealing ways in which we 
approach objects and consider our relations. The objects I make through 
practice both are and are not where this knowledge and knowing is contained. 
While the work produced during this study has substantiated the conclusion, it 
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is not the locus of the contribution. This is reaffirmed in Busch’s allowance that 
artwork or statues may not specifically be the locus of this knowledge and is 
repeated when Noë, making a similar point, explains that the value of money is 
not actually an element of⎯or found in⎯the physical bills (2013). This is the 
position addressed through making the distinction of the encounter from the 
object in this project. It is the making, and reflecting on that making, and 
reflecting on the resulting work using methods designed for this study, that 
house what this study contributes. The work cannot be said to be the specific 
documentation and result of research, and the outcome of this study is not a 
single, bounded conclusion. 
 
My perception of the encounter, statues, and practice, has altered through this 
research, which supports the desired outcome. This study acknowledges and 
addresses issues of reflection, representation, and materials related to statues 
generally, as well as the object’s history and position in a contemporary art 
practice. What is proposed through this study is a revised assessment of statues 
as objects, and philosophical actants, what is readily revealed about objects to 
us through them, and what they silently expose about us.  
 
Chapters 
Chapter one identifies and positions statues as objects beyond my practice and 
addresses several of the challenges statues as art objects present to our 
contemporary encounter with them. It begins with the varieties of encounters 
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with statues, moves to discussion of the historical and conceptual background 
of statues, and begins to situate statues contemporarily, for this study.  
 
Chapter two outlines my encounter with statues through my practice. This 
includes craft, materials, and the figure. The chapter then moves on to explore 
how my practice informed and bounded the methods that make up the 
methodology of this study, and includes a discussion of how the methods of this 
study functioned. 
 
Chapter three considers reflection on practice in the studio and examines 
embodiment and mirror neurons as means through which we recognize and 
respond to other bodies. Several of the projects constructed and performed as 
research through studio practice are drawn and considered. The Conversation 
Project, which differs from the studio projects in that I recorded conversations 
about statues with others, is outlined, and discussed and reveals a duality in 
how we speak about our encounter with statues.  
 
Chapter four begins by demonstrating statues as a philosophical actant through 
the work of Graham Harman. This is attained through situating statues as art 
objects in philosophical or conceptual terms by considering our encounter with 
them and the practice-based research performed for this study through the lens 
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of Object Oriented Ontology. The conclusion this study arrives at and the 

























Thinking About Statues 
"Sculpture is what you bump into when you back up to see a 
painting," Barnett Newman said in the fifties (Newman quoted in 
Krauss (1979, p.34). 
 
This chapter aims to position statues as objects beyond my practice and to 
identify and consider several of the challenges statues as art objects present to 
our contemporary encounter with them.  
 
A characterization of uneasiness with the human figure is the uncanny, as 
defined by Lucian Freud’s grandfather, Sigmund Freud. Sigmund Freud wrote 
about issues of expectation or the customary and setting in his 1919 essay The 
Uncanny. Freud began by clarifying that, as a psychoanalyst, he was addressing 
aesthetics as meaning ‘not merely the theory of beauty, but the theory of the 
qualities of feeling’ (Freud, 1925, p.219).  He outlined his description of the 
uncanny as the familiar in a context of uncertainty (in this case, appearing 
human but obviously not human), which he suggests usually causes eerie 
feelings and revulsion.  
 
Drawing on Freud’s writing, Roboticist Masahiro Mori charts an uncanny valley 
(Mori, 1970), illustrating the points at which human-looking robots (moving or 
still) cause alarm or repulsion, cancelling out an empathic response which is 
imperative to human/robot interactions. In a 2012 interview with journalist 
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Norri Kageki, Mori provocatively points out that we still can’t fully ‘explain why 
we feel eerie to begin with’ (Kageki, 2012).  
 
While Mori’s too-human robots cause alarm or repulsion, the same 
verisimilitude can cause a statue to appear inert or pompous, as I will describe. 
It is perhaps the response of the uncanny⎯to a copy of life⎯that accounts in 
part for the necessarily intentionally abstracted anatomy of a figure required to 
allow a statue to exceed being merely a body. This understanding further 
supports use of the descriptive coinage emotional anatomy to communicate the 
impetus to alter the body when making statues, which further requires some 
knowledge of human anatomy.20  
 
However, art historian and presenter Waldemar Januszczak referring to Ibeji 
twin figures, expresses his own unease with statues. The twin figures are 
images of children not present, and although they do not appear lifelike, the 
uncanny is present partly as the imperative that these statues must be cared 
for. ‘That’s sculpture for you,’ says Januszczak, ‘it frightens the parts other arts 
can’t reach’ (The Sculpture Diaries, 2007, @21:07). That the uncanny appears 
in the statues need to be cared for or in the encounter and not in the statue, 
proposes the impetus to separate and investigate both the encounter and the 
statue.  
                                                        
20 It is relevant to note that just because we are a body does not mean we have a grasp of 





A traditional challenge or threat to statues is iconoclasm. This rejection or 
destruction of actual objects, particularly ones shaped like people, is commonly 
linked to the concern that the object represents, or actually is, an authority that 
is false or pernicious, or the embodiment of a rejected idea. There is the 
hacking, breaking kind of iconoclasm where images are destroyed and statues 
are defaced and broken, but there are further varieties of conceptual 
iconoclasm that have an equally disfiguring impact. In philosophy, iconoclasm 
frequently rises from assumptions about the definition of art or aesthetics and 
therefore, in defining art. 
 
Philosopher Michael Kelly, in his book, Iconoclasm In Aesthetics (2003), asserts 
that it is an assumption of philosophy that there is a deficiency written into the 
conception of art. His aim is to expose the iconoclasm that results from these 
assumptions, and to provide alternatives to the ‘philosophical conceptions of 
art which generate it’ (Kelly, 2003, p.xii). While Kelly points to assumptions 
about truth in art and considers iconoclasm in other philosophers, his first 
discussion concerns Martin Heidegger’s lecture and essay, The Origin of the 
Work of Art. Kelly refers to Heidegger’s disinterest in the van Gogh painting of 
shoes, (made use of as an example in the essay), through critic Meyer Shapiro’s 
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1968 attempts to engage Heidegger, but I will make use of Kelly’s indications of 
iconoclasm to point to a specific approach to overlooking the art object. 
 
In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger makes the point, important to this 
study, that the ‘work of art is still something else over and out of the thingly 
aspect. This other that is in it makes up the artistic’ (Heidegger, 2006, p.4). In 
short, the art is more than the ‘thing’ alone. Moreover, Kelly interprets 
Heidegger as warning that each concept we bring to interpret the object ‘does 
violence to things because each projects our way of understanding onto them’ 
(Kelly, 2003, p.23).21 Additionally, Heidegger suggests that to discover the 
essence of art in the work, ‘we seek out the actual work and ask the work what 
and how it is’ (Heidegger, 2006, p.3). However, when Heidegger then moves to 
a description of the painting of shoes, he writes  ‘Under the soles slides the 
loneliness of the field path as evening falls’ (Heidegger, 2006, p.17). This is not 
a description of the van Gogh painting, or any painting of shoes. The object 
itself, a painting of shoes (not shoes), is lost to poetic projections about shoes.  
 
In a similar vein, Harman contends that ‘most western philosophy and science 
is actually an attempt to get rid of objects’ (2017, @3:02). Harman points out 
that most objects can lose a significant number of pieces such as atoms and still 
be the same object. This idea dissolves objects into a mass of atoms or any 
other tiny but fundamental thing. The object itself is lost. ‘A thing is not that 
                                                        
21 This echoes Levinas’ cautions about our encounter with the other. 
 54 
dependent on its tiniest pieces, which can change’ (Harman, 2015, @6:02). 
When we work to discover the thing that things are made of, we forgo the thing 
itself. Harman submits that: 
 
We find it easy to talk about things like Amsterdam being the 
same city from one century to the next even when people die and 
are replaced [ . . . ]or when the city annexes new territory and 
gets bigger, or builds new structures. (2015, pp.5:43)22 
 
Similarly, I can lose a finger, or cut my hair and be the same person. There is 
more to an object than what we conceive of it being made of. This is an 
iconoclasm of fundamental assumptions. Kelly points to this abstract 
iconoclasm, writing that Martin Luther worked to assuage people of the 
concept that images and statues could heal or perform miracles of any kind. 
Luther’s focus was to alter the way statues were conceived of as a means to 
disempower, rather than destroy them, ‘since any individual images destroyed 
can be replaced’ (Kelly, 2003, p.5). Luther aimed at a permanent solution to the 
losing of religious authority and focus to statues.  
 
Another more subtle example is provided by the way in which University of 
Toronto Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature, Rebecca Comay 
approaches several varieties of iconoclasm in her article Defaced Statues: 
                                                        
22 This argument as well as that things must exist outside of our thinking can be found in The 
Road To Objects (Harman, 2011) and The Quadruple Object (Harman, 2010) as well as many of 
Harman’s other works. I expand on our position in the world, and OOO is fully addressed in 
chapter four. 
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Idealism And Iconoclasm In Hegel’s Aesthetics23. To briefly explore one 
repetition of image breaking in particular, Comay clarifies Hegel’s employment 
of Greek statues, ‘stripped of paint through centuries of erosion (Comay, 2014, 
p.124), as ‘bleached-out tabula rasa’ (p.137), to critique the justifications of a 
rising German nation in the nineteenth century.  
 
Comay suggests that Hegel’s point is that Greek statues, representing the 
perfected form of the body politic the Germans worked to co-opt, are 
reproductions and inferior. Hegel implies that because statues are merely 
reproductions of people, and therefore a simulacrum, they are merely 
reproduction, and without the substance of the original, real thing. The statues 
are both Roman copies of Greek statues and copies of people, they are then 
copies of copies, and therefore meaningless as justification for a more 
convenient or contemporary story.24 This certainty of the meaninglessness of  
what is conceived of as a copy, a reproduced person and artwork, already of 
lesser value, occurs before the statue as an object is ever considered.  
 
                                                        
23 The Greek statues are representations of toned athletes, representing the perfected body 
politic. Comay points out in part that Hegel takes issue with the statues as both copies of people 
and copies of statues they are copies and that the German state of the nineteenth century is 
justifying itself by simulating what it has decided the statues mean, co-opting the perceived 
meaning of copies of statues. 
24 The Elgin Marbles, scrubbed and bleached to “return” them to their snowy purity in 1938-39, 
at the request of Lord Duveen. ‘But as representative of the culture of ancient Greece, as the 
genesis of the ideal of humanism and beauty in art, there is also the argument that the 
Parthenon frieze belongs to world culture, to all of us who even unknowingly derive something 
of our democratic aesthetic from it’ (Hitchens 2008, pp. vii-viii).  
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Writer Susan Sontag suggests that because we historically think of and 
therefore, read artwork—or a statue—as mimetic or realist, we have learned to 
remove the content from the form. This is a ‘well-intentioned move, which 
makes content essential and form accessory’ (Sontag, 2001, p.4). We encounter 
statues with a variety of historic assumptions in place. We see the statue as a 
lesser, and perhaps disappointing copy of a person, and in stopping there miss 
the further implications an object shaped like a person might offer us. The 
following section works to further reveal this subtle iconoclasm, or ways in 
which statues are ignored, or dismissed in our encounters. 
 
Touch and Tactility 
The plea “Do not touch!” was (and still is) the consequence of the 
triumph, in the “work of art,” of the image over the thing, the 
continuation of a consecration of its unreal side. Images, as we 
know, are different from the rest of the world: they do not exist. 
(Stoichita, 2008, p.1) 
 
Sculpture initiates the problem of touch. Philosopher Hagi Kenaan writes about 
how the detaching of touch from sight, (sculpture from painting) veils the 
importance of sight to our encounter with a statue.  
 
In other words, sculpture does not address our tactile 
sensibilities independently of vision; on the contrary, its tactility 
manifests itself precisely within the confines of what the eye 
reveals to us (Kenaan, 2014, p.46).  
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Tactility, or seeing materials and imagining or knowing what they feel like or 
are like, begins with previous experience and is partly achieved through seeing. 
We see an object and in seeing know the object occupies space in our world, 
rather than knowing this through touching or another autonomous sense. 
While we may occasionally have permission to touch sculpture, this is not 
usually the case.  
 
Tactility is found in Noë’s account of our access to knowledge, which advances 
that we are conscious of both more and less than we experience visually. He 
says that if we see a tomato on the table we do not actually see the other side of 
it, but we know it is there. Our access to the knowledge of previous tomatoes on 
tables informs what we see (Noë, 2015, p.151&187). Our sight is informing our 
brain which is informing our sight which is informing our brain. Noë submits 
that consciousness is embodied (Noë, 2015, p.68). He argues that 
consciousness is something you do in the world, not something that happens 
inside of you. Noë is further advancing that we bring our past experiences with 
objects and knowledge of them to our encounters with them (Noë, 2009), (Noë, 
2013). It would follow that we also do this with statues. We bring our history 
with materials, objects, and people to the encounter. It is these collective and 
personal histories that sketch out the boundaries of our encounters. 
 
Tactility is closely related to touch, but is focused more on the form of a statue 
as opposed to touch, which might consider the material of a statue. If we touch 
Proserpina’s thigh in the statue Rape of Proserpina, (fig. 28) by Bernini 1622, 
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we will feel marble, which differs from the experience of seeing Pluto’s fingers 
gripping her skin. In his book, Falling In Love With Statues (2008), art historian 
George Hersey proposes that Ovid (writing in the year 1 AD) in Pygmalion25 
introduced the sculptural virtue of tactility as ‘a work's ability to make the 
viewer feel in his or her own body what the portrayed figure would be feeling if 
it were real’ (p.19). However, when this additional virtue was revisited in the 
mid-twentieth century, it had been influenced by the Renaissance Paragone 
(comparison) Debates. These comparisons usually found painting to be the 
superior art form, and led to the examination and interpretation of sculpture 
principally in terms more suited to painting. 26 Tactility, as it evolved in the 
early twentieth-century, was a method used particularly by art historian and 
collector Bernard Berenson, and English art historian and critic Herbert Read 
for discussion and critique of painting and, to some extent sculpture. As it 
developed and matured in the mid-twentieth century, the translation of the 
illusion of touchability into a theory of sculpture focused on materials, quickly 
                                                        
25 It may be interesting to note that the Pygmalion story is a story. No sculpture was actually 
made in order to convey the point of the story. Furthermore, a confusing and perhaps remnant 
element from older versions of the story is that Galatea is made of ivory. Very few pieces of 
ivory are large enough to be even the life-scale limb of a person.  
26 Arts Research Professor, James Hall recounts Leonardo Da Vinci making clear in his 
notebooks that painting should be considered superior to sculpture because:  
‘Sculpture is missing the beauty of colors, it is missing the perspective of colors, it is missing the 
perspective and confusion of boundaries of things distant from the eye, because the boundaries 
of things nearby will be known just like those which are distant. The air interposed between a 
distant object and the eye will not fill the space around that object more than it does around a 
nearby object’ (Farago, 1992, p.275) #41 reiterate.  
One of the arguments in favour of painting was that painting can recreate the forms of nature 
more perfectly, and a large part of this perfection is the ease of correcting mistakes, which Da 
Vinci suggests, is not possible with sculpture. Hall points to where Da Vinci writes that, 
‘Sculpture is not a science but a very mechanical art, because it causes its executant sweat and 
bodily fatigue’ (Hall, 1999, p.13). The thought was also that God painted the world into 
existence, with all the perspective that implies, and as such painters had to exert their minds, 
rather than their bodies, to achieve the perspective, colour, and the light convincingly, while 
sculptors only had to work their bodies. 
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dismissing statues as an art form that concealed or disregarded the true nature 
of the physical materials from which they were made. 
 
Berenson had introduced tactile values in his essay Florentine Painters of the 
Renaissance (1896), as a method to systematize authentication of old master 
paintings through designating those conditions in a painting that stimulate the 
sense of touch, and are therefore, masterful. Berenson explained that because 
our minds have practiced since infancy to give ‘tactile values to retinal 
impressions’ (Berenson, 1896, p.11), we are primed to see and feel the space 
invented by the skill of particular artists.27 Berenson’s focus was on the skill in 
the performance of the illusion of tactility in paintings, the quality of the object 
appearing solid, touchable, real and dimensional. According to Berenson we 
‘realise objects when we perfectly translate them into terms of our own states, 
our own feelings’ (Berenson, 1896, p.84).  His argument was that the quality of 
the illusion in art could augment life, writing that if a figure is ‘represented so 
as to be realised more quickly and vividly than in life, [it] will produce its effect 
with such velocity and power, and so strongly confirm our sense of capacity for 
living’ (Berenson, 1896, p.85). In short, the more convincing the illusion, the 
more quickly we benefit from what is ‘directly life-confirming and life-
enhancing’ (p.87) in art. 
                                                        
27 In 1305 Giotto curiously illustrates a difficulty with sculpture in the Arena Chapel. He paints 
twelve trompe-l’oeil statues of virtues and vices. Over each he writes the name of the virtue or 
the vice the statue personifies. At the same time, Giotto covered the walls of the chapel with 
frescos showing the stories of Medieval Christian tradition, including the life of Christ. None of 
these character-filled, bustling illustrations required a label except the (faux) statues. Hall 
writes that Giotto implies the sculpture, for all its bulk and presence, is a less effective visual 
language. (111) It is as if even a painting of a statue were a mute, solitary object. 
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Berenson warned that in sculpture there is the danger of anthropomorphizing 
the object, as when we speak of trains running or the legs of a table. He writes 
that there is ‘only one object in the visible universe which we need not 
anthropomorphize to realize’ (85), and that is ourselves. He argues that the 
more we bestow an object ‘with human attributes, the less we merely know it, 
the more we realise it, the more does it approach the work of art’ (Berenson, 
1896, p.84). While Berenson insists that there is no visible object of such 
artistic possibilities as the human body’ (85), he has been sure to impart 
something of the peril that a statue and the associations of the real that tactile 
values might impart are in excess over the painting of a person. 
 
Sculptural tactility appears again as an illusory form in the mid-twentieth 
century, by Herbert Read in The Art Of Sculpture (1977). Read writes about the 
tactile imagination as touch-space.28 However, while Berenson is interested in 
the quality of the illusion of touchability in painting,29 Read is speaking about 
sculpture, where tactility is not an illusion of the real, but ‘a reality to be 
conveyed’ (Read, 1977, p.49). Tactility or touch was opposed to sight and 
vision, and positioned by Read to introduce a distinct identity and method of 
criticism for sculpture that was disengaged from painting. Read’s solution, after 
                                                        
28 Read quotes William James on tactility, citing ‘only through the association of ideas do we know 
what a seen object signifies in terms of touch’ Wm. James, Psychology 1892, P. 339 (Read, 1977, 
p.47) 
29 Read, writing about Botticelli’s Pallas Taming A Centaur, declared that it ‘appeals so vividly to 
the sense of touch that our fingers feel as if they had everywhere been in contact with his body’ 
(Berenson, 1896, p.72) 
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wrestling with a conceptual and metaphoric sense of touch was, suggests David 
Getsy, ponderability (p.106). Ponderability for Read, is the implied mass and 
volume of sculpture which, Read believed, was disconnected from visual 
engagement with sculpture and known through embodiment. (Getsy, 2011, 
p.105). 
 
However, Read makes the argument that statues specifically were subject to a 
Renaissance ‘convention based on the ideals of the Hellenistic decadence’ 
(Read, 1977, p.72), which was to obscure sculptural material under an illusion 
of cloth or perfect skin, which discounted the natural physical and material 
traits of the substance used to make the statue. David Getsy points out that it 
was for this reason that ‘the figurative traditions of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, in particular, are subject to [Read’s] frequent scorn’ 
(Getsy, 2011, p.106). Read did not draw out tactility to mean knowing what it 
was like to touch a figure, his concern was that materials not be obscured by 
form. Read’s great support of British sculptor Henry Moore suggests it was not 
the concept of the figure, but concealing the natural ‘ponderability’ of materials 
that attracted his contempt.  
 
That statues were argued against because the illusion of the form obscured the 
materials, was an attempt to bring modernist critique to sculpture. However, 
sculpture—including statues—performs in the world like other everyday 
objects, albeit in an art context where touching is rarely encouraged. As an 
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example, for this project, in 2014, I constructed copies of my ceramic and steel 
work in lightweight foam. One of the seven-foot tall (2.1M) figures would 
normally weigh about three hundred pounds (136K). The tactile 
experience⎯especially for those familiar with my work⎯ was in reading the 
label and discovering the weight of the piece to be thirty-five pounds (11K). We 
don’t need to touch everything we see to experience it tactilely, seeing is often 
enough or all that is appropriate. We come to objects with a tactile vocabulary. 
 
Hersey’s understanding of tactility,30 presented more than two thousand years 
ago in Ovid’s Pygmalion, supports Berenson’s Tactile Values theory (Berenson, 
1896), which, in short, defines how we might have a sympathetic sensation or 
know what it would feel like to caress the flesh in a work of art.  
 
These conceptions of the role of touch in statues would seem to align with what 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio suggests as the function of neurons that fire in 
the brain, both during an action and when observing an action performed by 
another, called mirror neurons. Damasio writes that the ‘fact that a body state 
simulated by mirror neurons is not the subject’s body state amplifies the power 
of this functional resemblance’ (Damasio, 2010, p.110). It is possible that 
mirror neurons are the mechanism by which we empathize or understand what 
                                                        
30 ‘Tactility is a work's ability to make the viewer feel in his or her own body what the 
portrayed figure would be feeling if it were real’ (Hersey, 2008, p.19).  
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someone else might be experiencing and possibly, what something else might 
be feeling. 
 
Furthermore, both Damasio (2010) and neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran 
(2012) discuss these neurons as a means through which we communicate and 
interact with others. Ramachandran suggests that mirror neurons ‘perform a 
virtual reality simulation of the other person’s action,’ and that this replication 
dissolves ‘the barrier between you and other human beings’ (Ramachandran, 
2009, @6:00). Again, the importance of what it is supposed mirror neurons do, 
for this particular study, is that those barriers ‘between you and other human 
beings’ dissolve without actually touching. As Berenson defines the realising of 
objects, as opposed to the anthropomorphizing of objects, it becomes relevant 
to this study.  
 
Our encounters with statues perhaps point to a more intricate concession than 
merely attributing human motives and thoughts to an object shaped like a 
person. Noë writes that we make the assumption ‘that the membrane dividing 
brain and environment is somehow the causally critical division between self 
and world’ (Noë, 2015, pp.124-25). He continues by observing that art objects 
are ‘opportunities or affordances’ (p.124) for an encounter, rather than a 
didactic and specific prompt. There is more to touch than touching in the 
engagement or encounter with statues; we experience touch without having to 
specifically touch, in the moment, because we have touched and bring this 
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knowing with us to the encounter. Moreover, we have touched metals, wood, 
rocks, other materials, and people before. We arrive at the statue already 
knowledgeable about what is unusual about this object from previous 
encounters with people and materials. Furthermore, specifically what the 
material feels like may not be the isolated central issue.  
 
Touching as a means to judge sculpture is misused as something literal. That 
touch is possible with sculpture is a feature of the real thing in the world, that 
when we touch the statue’s hand, we are not touching a real hand is a feature of 




Images are without life, and sacrifices do them no good. The 
lowest animals are better than any statues (Clement, 1960, p.vii). 
 
 Herbert Read, grappling to articulate a theory of tactility, writes, ‘Ideally each 
reader of this volume should be provided, at this stage, with a piece of sculpture 
to hug, cuddle, fondle—primitive verbs that indicate a desire to treat an object 
with plastic sensibility’ (Read, 1977, p.72). This ‘unfortunate point in The Art Of 
Sculpture’ (Getsy, 2011, p.108), indicates Read’s noted inclination toward the 
soft lines of Henry Moore’s figures, but also suggests something more profound 
about touch in this context. Touching is obfuscated by words. What happens is 
resistant to, is not easily penetrable through specific language. Read tells us 
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that the words at his disposal to speak about his imagined experience were 
primitive and perhaps hazardous.  
 
The pull of aberrant touching and the dangers of unendorsed and unfettered 
touch are found in the many versions of the Pygmalion story.31 Ovid’s 
conventional version, made use of by Hersey (2008) to indicate tactility and the 
sense that a statue can incite real emotions and feelings in us and that these 
feelings might be rewarded, is an optimistic adaptation. Classics scholar Rachel 
Bruzzone points out that, ‘like every other story involving sex with a statue 
(agalmatophilia32) [the story remains] one of perversion and violation of the 
divine’ (Bruzzone, 2012, p.65).33 Correspondingly, the language Herbert Read 
assembled to communicate his thinking about touching sculpture (cuddle and 
hug), was awkward enough to attract derision. However, it is similar to Ovid’s 
                                                        
31 Three further sources: Philostratus, life of Apollonius 6:40; Lucian, Imagines 4 – ‘of the man 
who fell in love with the statue, and contrived to get shut into the temple alone, and there 
enjoyed such favours as a statue is able to bestow.’ (Lucian 1905); ‘So the well-known 
Pygmalion of Cyprus fell in love with an ivory statue; it was of Aphrodite and was naked. The 
man of Cyprus is captivated by its shapeliness and embraces the statue’ (Philostephanus, Frag. 
13 Hist. Graec. iii p.31)(Butterworth n.d.)(p. 131) (Clement, 1960, p.131). 
32 For more about Agalmatophilia, see Guys and Dolls, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=pxCkULUnVH0 
33 The familiar story of the sculptor who desires his creation calls up two particular points: one 
is the second commandment and the other is a warning about the longevity of this 
transgression. In the story the statue Galatea and Pygmalion have a child Paphos, who has a 
son, who has a daughter named Myrrah, who desires her father. She tricks her father into sex 
and then runs away, becoming the Myrrh tree just before giving birth to Adonis. Her offense is 
in some ways the mirror opposite of her great-grandmother. Probably because Myrrah was the 
mother of Adonis, who also has many guises, there are several versions of this story but the 
most familiar is in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Myrrah is also seen in Dante’s Inferno, (canto XXX, 
verses 34-48) in the eighth circle of Hell. The incest theme recounted in Mary Shelley’s 
Mathilda—who was known to be familiar with Mirra (1786) by Vittorio Alfieri—was influenced 
by or cloaked in the story of Myrrha. 
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unsettling but stimulating account of Pygmalion’s blatantly iniquitous touching 
of his statue. 
 
The best art, they say, 
Is that which conceals art, and so Pygmalion 
Marvels, and loves the body he has fashioned. 
He would often move his hands to test and touch It, 
Could this be flesh, or was it ivory only? 
No, it could not be ivory. His kisses, 
He fancies, she returns; he speaks to her, 
Holds her, believes his fingers almost leave 
An imprint on her limbs, and fears to bruise her (Ovid, 1983, p.242). 
 
This is not the customary or usual encounter with statues, although it is known 
to occur. It is clear what Pygmalion is feeling and how he is touching, and this 
signals that he has stepped away from his role as sculptor. Touch here is 
explained through recounting extremely intimate and direct contact, using 
suggestive words. As a contrast to Pygmalion, a fictitious sculptor, my contact 
with my figures in the studio is concrete, and while the contact with the 
material could be considered intimate, a motivating recognition in my practice 
is that the figures are not actually people. My purpose in practice is to transmit 
an intention, the idea or feeling I have, whether it is of the pathos of an old man, 
or a persuasive calming in a tall, columnar woman figure, through the figure.  
(Images 2-3) 
 
In both Herbert Read’s suggestion that each reader have a sculpture to fondle, 
and the Pygmalion story, where a man made and loved a statue of ivory, no real 
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life touching has or had actually occurred. Both are theoretical. Read was 
attempting to define a concept and to clarify a point in art criticism; Pygmalion 
is only a story about an aberrant sculptor, yet we are aware of how the intimate 
touching of a statue, and the suggestion of cuddling and fondling of sculpture 
elicits the awkward and untoward.  
 
L’Oeuvre, or the Masterpiece, a novel by French writer Émile Zola published in 
1886, is about artists in turn-of-the-twentieth-century Paris. Zola describes an 
incident concerning touch in the studio of the sculptor, Mahoudeau. Mahoudeau 
is working on a standing figure of a bathing girl in clay. It is winter and the 
studio is very cold. The clay of the bathing girl has frozen, but his friend, the 
painter, Claude, has come to see the statue. Mahoudeau lights the studio stove 
and the statue begins to thaw, eventually crashing to the ground. 
 
Dreading to see her finish herself off on the floor, Mahoudeau 
remained with hands outstretched. And the girl seemed to fling 
herself on his neck. He caught her in his arms, winding them 
tightly around her. Her bosom was flattened against his shoulder 
and her thighs beat against his own, while her decapitated head 
rolled upon the floor. The shock was so violent that Mahoudeau 
was carried off his legs and thrown over, as far back as the wall; 
and there, without relaxing his hold on the girl's trunk, he 
remained as if stunned lying beside her (Zola, 2009, p.212). 
 
Zola clearly illustrates this accidental moment of intimate touch of statue and 
sculptor as surprising and unusual. The story goes on to inspect how the 
sculpture’s collapse touched something discomfited in the painter Claude. 
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Claude recounts to his wife, Christine, the story of the collapse of the Bather Girl 
he witnessed in Mahoudeau’s studio.  
 
Christine washed the scratch on his cheek, which had begun to 
bleed again, and it seemed to her as if the mutilated bathing girl 
had sat down to table with them, as if she alone was of any 
importance that day; for she alone seemed to interest Claude, 
whose narrative, repeated a score of times, was full of endless 
particulars about the emotion he had felt on seeing that bosom 
and those hips of clay shattered at his feet. (Zola, 2009, p.214) 
 
Claude’s story of seeing Mahoudeau and the statue touch in faux impropriety 
had inspired a jealous feeling in the painter’s wife. Claude never touched the 
statue, and the statue was not a real girl. Mahoudeau’s intention was to make a 
statue of a bathing girl, traditionally, an acceptable subject of desire34, and that 
intention was perhaps the initial source (translated though Claude) of 
Christine’s jealousy, but it is clear that Mahoudeau, illustrated by the frozen 
state of the statue, had no thought the statue was a girl or that she was alive. 
 
The actual touching of statues appears to be more aligned with our real-world 
experience of touch, we are not moved to, nor do we need to touch everything 
and everyone we encounter and yet we are influenced and affected.  
 
Apotropaism 
                                                        
34 As an example, see stories about Actaeon who was punished for watching the goddess Diana 
bathing. 
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There are conditions where touching statues and other objects can be 
sanctioned, and carried out repeatedly. For many years, through work in the 
studio, I pursued an interest in Herms. Herms are a form of ancient Greek 
statue, the remnants of which are still found in surviving nineteenth and early 
twentieth century architecture. They are apotropaic, suggesting they provide 
‘protection’ and are touched for luck.  
 
The ancient Herm is a flat-four sided column with a head of the trickster 
messenger god Hermes, and a phallus, associated with fertility, life force, 
protection and good fortune. The phallus as part of the Herm probably 
descends from the baboons associated with the Ancient Egyptian god Thoth. 
There are several murals of baboons with erect phalluses in the tomb of 
Egyptian Pharaoh Tutankhamen who died in 1323 BCE. One of the murals is of 
twelve baboons (Figure 9) each watching over one of the twelve hours the king 
would have to travel to the Afterlife. English zoologist, Desmond Morris 
discusses these baboons shown in the tomb in his book, Primate Ethnology 
(1969). Morris writes: ‘Wild males keeping watch beside the group sit . . . facing 
away from the group members, but the penis is usually erected’ (Morris, 1969, 
p.150). Morris suggests that in these Baboons, when the males stand guard as a 
sentry, the erect phallus signifies a power that is more than arousal. The Greek 
Herms are a similar kind of guardian, conducting wishes and prayers to the 
gods while bringing safe passage at crossings. Herms were considered 
apotropaic, meaning they protected against or averted evil, or brought luck and 
were therefore positioned at points of transition, such as crossroads or 
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doorways. The form has carried through many centuries. While origins can be 
traced to ancient Egypt, it began in ancient Greece, was adapted by the Romans 
and reappeared in the Renaissance as the Term figure, Telamon or Atlantes, 
was usually represented as half figure or statue and half architecture 
supporting a doorway, or a roof line.  
 
Herms hold together several ideas that equal Hermes and his duties and nature. 
It is these abstract concepts, which perhaps account for the longevity of the 
form. The herm addresses the anxiety and trepidation of transition, whether it 
is the transition of a garden—where the chaos of nature has been altered—or 
as an intermediary when asking for a change of fortune from gods, going from 
inside to outside of a building, or from life to death, the Herm is the arbiter of 
providence in these places.  
 
As the Herm form passed through Roman culture the head of Hermes is 
replaced by a portrait head of, perhaps a public figure or other venerated 
person. The portraits became full upper bodies or busts, altering the Herm 
enough to become the Term figure, which is real only elaborately decorative 
but is an echo of the apotropaic Herm. Even in this shift the form maintains 
specific attributes and particular, quiet relevance to the enhancement of a place 
of transition.  
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The benefit of having worked with the form allows me to have had the 
experience of understanding it as a multi-part thing. Head, column, and genitals 
all come together as pieces of a unified object, the Herm. Changing a head or 
replacing the phallus speaks to us even now. As an example, a recent series of 
three herms I constructed had abstracted animal skulls as the heads. In place of 
the genitals I hung respectively a bone, an old spring from a tractor, and an iron 
gear. The form has parameters and a range of freedom inside those boundaries. 
While the form of a herm is not well known today, it is recognizable and read as 
a figure. The objects hung in place of the phallus became phalli. There was a 
warning about adult content on the door of the gallery although a bone, a 
spring, and a gear would not have needed caution in most other positions.  
 
This particular transformative power of even the most ambiguous statue is 
further presented in the Balloon Project in chapter three.  
 
Statue As Corpse  
A bronze, life-sized, recumbent statue by Aimé-Jules Dalou marks the grave of 
Victor Noir in Père-Lachaise Cemetery. Victor Noir the person⎯was shot and 
killed in 1870 by Pierre-Napoleon Bonaparte, first cousin to Napoleon III, and 
the murder aided in precipitating the overthrow of the second empire 
government in France. Victor Noir the statue was commissioned of Dalou, ‘who 
was emerging as the official sculptor of the Third Republic’ (Pierre, 2010, 
p.178), twenty years after Noir was killed, as a monument to the inaugural 
incident. (Figures 16 and 17). 
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In her paper published in Sculpture Journal, Caterina Pierre quotes journalist 
Charles Chincholle, who wrote about the inauguration of the tomb and 
sculpture or gisant,35 or tomb effigy of Victor Noir in 1891, which was twenty-
one years after Noir’s murder. ‘And you see what a statue is! It is a new proof 
that one can make something great in making something real’ Charles 
Chincholle, as cited in (Pierre, 2010, p.179). The statue of Noir is not a real dead 
man, or corpse. However, the statue effectively inspires real feelings of 
sympathy about the idea of Victor Noir, and the circumstances of his death; a 
life cut short by irresponsible authority, and this stirring of empathy was what 
the statue was intended to do.   
 
The Victor Noir effigy continues to inspire, even after the specific purpose of 
the memorial is no longer foremost. The statue is currently visited and touched 
on the face, in the chest, and on the groin. An informal online survey of graves 
in Père-Lachaise indicates that one can quickly gain a mate, become pregnant, 
and enjoy a better sex life by kissing Noir on the lips, rubbing his genital area, 
and placing flowers in his upturned top hat. An online travel blog indicates 
Noir’s ‘popularity is not because of his talent as a journalist, nor his symbolic 
role in the overthrow of the Second Empire, but lies in the notorious lump in his 
pants’ (2014); although, perhaps it was Dalou’s ability to recognize the 
                                                        
35 Gisant: (French; meaning recumbent) a recumbent tomb effigy of the deceased. 
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indications and abstractions that allowed the figure to perform its duty as a 
sympathetic martyr.           
 
Pierre’s article explores the touching of the genital area and why Dalou may 
have so endowed the statue through relating emphasized accounts from the 
time of the murder. Noir was very young and apparently well liked, and was to 
be married in a few weeks. That Noir’s approaching marriage was ‘neither 
consecrated nor consummated’ (p.180), is mentioned in some guide books to 
Père-Lachaise, and this misfortune, also stressed at the time of his murder, may 
serve to arouse further amorous empathy, as well as suggest the impetus for 
sexual contact being made with the statue.36 Looking to explanations for the 
prominent genital area, Pierre first suggests realism. 
 
‘in the process of rigor mortis, much of Noir’s blood had pooled 
towards the centre of his body, and, as happens in the natural course 
of this state without modern embalming practices, Noir’s penis filled 
with blood and may have seemed partially erect during his funeral’ 
(Pierre, 2010, p.180). 
 
She then suggests that Dalou’s statue of Noir is ‘dressed to the left,’37 which 
‘could be read as a political statement of the sculptor, of his and the deceased’s 
                                                        
36 For example, http://jaquo.com/scandal-in-the-graveyard-laffaire-victor-noir  AND  
http://www.theculturemap.com/victor-noir-sexiest-tomb-pere-lachaise-cemetery/ 
37 From The Desperate Man blog of Stephen Metcalfe:  
Dressing left and dressing right are terms that most men, at least those who 
wear suits, know. It's a term used by tailors when fitting suit pants.  To 
"dress left" means that one keeps one’s male appendage shifted in the 
general direction of the left trouser leg, likewise, for the right. According to 
medical researchers, most men should dress left.  This is basic biology. The 
left testicle is lower than the right.  It was made to swing to the 
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leftist politics, rather than an accurate anatomical representation’ (p.181). A 
political statement is a possibility, but even suggesting it to be an accurate 
anatomical representation of the corpse of Victor Noir, is not likely. The statue 
was made two decades after Noir’s death, and that the ‘accurate’ version of a 
man recently murdered in the street would look romantic, elegant, and be 
conveniently endowed in a manner symbolic of the leftist politics, even at his 
funeral seems unlikely. Dalou, the sculptor has reimagined Victor Noir’s death 
as pure, romantic, and empathetic.   
 
Dalou’s statue is of a dead man, but it is not a dead man. The cause of Noir’s 
death is important to the monument—the wound is even apparent on the 
statue—but that wound did not kill the statue. While we know this is true, we 
still easily speak about what rigor mortis does to a penis, and then touch⎯or 
more⎯a hump of bronze knowing it is not a dead man’s penis beneath suit 
pants—which we probably would not be moved to touch were it a real dead 
man in real pants. Yet we do touch in the abstracted hope that touching a 
bulge—that is real but is not the result of the real penis of Victor Noir or even 
the penis of the statue of Victor Noir—will grant us luck in love and all that love 
brings. This is apotropaic magic, and although we know the statue is not real, 
we touch anyway.  
                                                        
left.  Swinging right is uncomfortable.  Perhaps this is why right dressers are 





In my practice⎯before embarking on this study, which has served to articulate 
some of knowing more than I can tell as per (Polanyi, 2009, p.4)⎯witnessing 
the reactions of others to a nude statue, a herm or even a tractor spring was 
puzzling from the perspective of making. The studio experience is similar to 
that in a Life Class, it isn’t at all vulgar or even sexual. I still often find what was 
said about the herms, or “naked” statues embarrassing. Clarifying that the 
statues or their genitals are not real has never worked well in convincing 
others, but it has had an effect on my recognition of the transformative power 
of a herm form on say a tractor spring.  
 
A statue in herm form of the Greek god, Priapus, by Scottish Sculptor Alexander 
Stoddart was erected in in Vincent Square, London, 2007, but the phallus is 
detachable, and is kept in Stoddart’s studio. In a 2011 BBC film called Fig Leaf: 
Biggest cover up in History, Stoddart says that ‘we cannot erect an entire image 
of the God [Priapus], we live in a strangely puritanical world now, yet it is 
overflowing with a hyper sexuality in the most inappropriate places ’ (Stoddart 
as quoted in (Smith, 2011, @56:13)). That a statue of Priapus is different from 
‘inappropriate hyper-sexuality’ is a subtle point, yet the statue with phallus is 
deemed inappropriate for public consumption, although Priapus, himself 
acceptably stands in Vincent Square.  
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There is a doubled, parallel nature to touch and the touching of statues. The 
encounter with statues is to some extent similar to a painting of a figure and to 
a story about someone, real or imagined, in that there is someone designated, 
but not at hand. The difference statues summon is that there is an object 
present, with the difficulties and dimensions objects present. Pierre argues in 
her conclusion ‘that the human impulse to touch sculpture is not only innate, 
primal and sexual, but is also often linked to one’s making a physical connection 
with something magical or spiritual’ (Pierre, 2010, p.181). In this case, the 
something magical or spiritual is the abstracted concept of Victor Noir, an idea 
about youth and love, hope and politics.  
 
The French writer and philosopher Maurice Blanchot writes about the 
strangeness of writing. He argues that words are abstract concepts that 
probably inhibit our understanding of the world ‘just as the image seems to be 
the absence of the object’ (Blanchot, 1982, p.47). We are used to the absence of 
the object that drives or empowers our idea about it. This points to touch and 
statues having a more curious relationship than actual touching of the material 
or even the concept of tactility appear to incorporate. Furthermore, speaking 
about touching statues appears to reveal more about our concepts of hope, fear, 
and desire than about the materials we touch.  
 
Blanchot considers that in reading, the words, the writer, and the writing are 
lost. The story exceeds⎯or differs⎯from the words it is made of, and neither 
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refers to the writer nor to itself. He writes⎯under the heading The Statue 
Glorifies the Marble⎯about ‘The obscurity of this presence which escapes 
comprehension’ (Blanchot, 1982, p.223). He goes on to point out that we 
suppose the material is the statue, we are confused by the duality⎯ the 
material (real) and the form (not real)⎯of its presence: 
 
⎯all this we try to bear in mind and define appropriately by 
saying: the work is eminently what it is made of. It is what makes 
its nature and its matter visible or present, it is the glorification 
of its reality: (p.223) 
 
We lose sight of the full implication of the object by defining it as the material it 
is made of or the person shape it exhibits. Blanchot considers the object (or the 
art) to exceed or differ from the materials it is made of. He too uses the example 
of money⎯writing that coins are not the raw metal from which they are 
cast⎯they have become something different. Blanchot says it is the material 
disappearing into money or the marble disappearing into a statue which points 
to what money is or a statue is. There is something similar in Blanchot’s 
indication of the disappearing into that echos the something more of Lucian 
Freud. That disappearing into⎯here defining statue⎯is a concept 
acknowledged but not defined. However, when Blanchot writes ‘the work 
makes what disappears in the object appear’ (p.223), he is arguing that the 
materials bring forward what the object is, material is a key component of the 
statue but the marble or material is not the statue.  
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By saying this we are still attempting to indicate what 
distinguishes the work from the object and from productive 
undertakings in general. For in the usual object (this much we 
know), matter itself is of no particular interest; and the more the 
matter that made it made it right for its use⎯the more the 
material is appropriate⎯the more it nears nothingness. And 
eventually all objects become immaterial, a volatile force in the 
swift circuit of exchange, the evaporated support of action, which 
is itself pure becoming (Blanchot, 1982, p.223). 
 
When material is shaped like a person and we consider the implications of the 
person shape alone, we miss the material. When we speak of the material, we 
miss what the form advances.38 The ‘material is appropriate’ to artist and 
context or practical concerns, the form differs from the material but is also tied 
to it. Here again is the real of the material (and the statue) and the not real of 
the form bound together. It is in the disappearing into, in that seam between the 
two, that there is an indication of what a statue is. 
Finally, Blanchot speaks about the body after death or as a corpse as something 
both present and absent, or real and not real. This similarly dual nature of the 
corpse reflects the way we speak about the Victor Noir gisant as both real and 
not real or that Victor Noir is designated by the statue, but neither the man nor 
his corpse are at hand.  
   
 And we might bear in mind the thought that idealism has, finally, no 
guarantee other than a corpse. For this indicates to what extent the 
apparent intellectual refinement, the pure virginity of the image is 
originally linked to the elemental strangeness and to the formless 
weight of being, present in absence’ The Space of Literature 
(Blanchot, 1982, p.258). 
                                                        
38 Heidegger speaks about this as thingly-ness in Origin of The Work of Art. (Heidegger, 2006) 
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A man’s corpse is not a living man, it is a likeness of the living man. The corpse 
is no longer the living man although it is literally his image. This is carried out 
further in a statue. For example, the Victor Noir gisant is not the corpse of 
Victor Noir, nor a copy of Victor Noir the actual man or corpse, at all. A mold 
was not made of the corpse and cast into bronze (although, this underscores 
the difference between life cast and statue). It is not a portrait of Victor Noir, 
though it is a representation, or an effigy of him. There are two issues here, one 
about materials and objects, and one, pertinent at this point, which is that 
Victor Noir the statue is not Victor Noir the man, but the statue is real, and 
continues to carry its own powers or meaning, or mimesis of larger life issues 
separate from Noir and Dalou.  
 
It is perhaps, Dalous’ ability as a sculptor that makes the continued purpose of 
the statue possible. Art copying life is not what Dalou has achieved however. 
Dalou has made a better than real copy of life. The statue representing the 
elegantly composed dead body of Victor Noir, and the corpse of Victor Noir 
have very little in common except a thin veil of our consideration, allowing the 
statue to become, or stand in for the corpse. Furthermore, while the politics 
that were once the motivation for the statue do have contemporary parallels, 
they are no longer what primarily draws people to the statue, or informs their 
interest in it. It is almost certainly not the reason the statue is touched. That 
Noir was young, and to be married when he was murdered, that he is presented 
in a vulnerable position and that guide books to Pere-Lachaise mention this, 
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and that 39 ‘Many women who come to the tomb, sit on the statue, a rite which 
is supposed to bring them a good lover within a year‘ or that, ‘It is said that by 
rubbing this area and leaving a flower in Noir’s hat, a woman is guaranteed a 
husband within the year’ best explains the motivation for touching the statue of 
Victor Noir’s corpse.40  
 
Mimesis 
                                                        
39 ‘This statue has since become something of a fertility symbol. Due to the naturalistic style of 
the sculpture there is a rather prominent fold in Noir’s trousers, which make him appear to be 
aroused. It is said that by rubbing this area and leaving a flower in Noir’s hat, a woman is 
guaranteed a husband within the year. While the rest of the statue is covered with verdigris, 
Noir’s crotch gleams, proving the popularity of this particular myth’ 
(http://listverse.com/2011/10/27/top-10-fascinating-graves-in-pre-lachaise/) ‘A destiny of 
the journalist from the 19th century, Victor Noir was sad. He died when he was 21 years old, 
being a messenger to the prince Bonaparte who killed him without any reason. This event was 
a last drop in the full glass, an uprising started which lead to the Parisian Commune. During the 
Parisian Commune there were fights also in the Père Lachaise cemetery, since the cemetery 
was built on a hill. More than 200,000 people came to the funeral of Victor Noir. The statue on 
his tomb is very masculine, it represents his youth, his strength. Victor Noir was about to get 
married when he died. Many women who come to the tomb, sit on the statue, a rite which is 
supposed to bring them a good lover within a year. And so the statue of Victor Noir has become 
a toucing place such as Dalida’s breast on Montmartre or the foot of Montaigne by Sorbonne’ 
(http://www.paristep.com/en/articles/life/lachaise.html).  
40 Dalou has another gisant that has been described this way:  
In the ninety-first division of Paris’s Per Lachaise cemetery, the tomb of 
August Blanqui shivers with an undercurrent of angst-riddled vigor. A bronze 
funerary shroud covers the sculpted body of the controversial revolutionary, 
responding with folds and wrinkles to the angles and undulations of Blanqui’s 
pained frame. His lean right arm, vitalized by its throbbing musculature, 
emerges from the cloth, extending beyond the space defined by the sculpture’s 
simple rectangular plinth. Blanqui’s head falls jarringly backward and to the 
right. An engorged vein swells in the center of the revolutionary’s forehead. 
His seemingly animated body and psyche complicate his presumably 
posthumous state. (Eschelbacher, 2016, p.299) 
(See Figure 18)  
August Blanqui was also part of deposing Napoleon III, and although there are other similarities 
to the gisant of Victor Noir, Blanqui is not touched or visited as often or as intentionally. (His 
seemingly animated body and psyche complicate his presumably posthumous state) Just to be 
clear, this is a description of bronze, which is mostly shaped like cloth with a person shape 
underneath. 
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Westminster Abbey houses the remains of elaborate funeral effigies41 of kings, 
queens, and royalty from about 1327 (Edward II) through 1625 (James I), when 
the formal practice of using an effigy at these funerals was replaced with a 
‘crown on a tasselled purple velvet cushion’ (Harvey & Mortimer, 1994, p.17). 
The use of these funeral effigies is specific and limited. The effigies were in 
place of the body for the funeral and transition of power, but remained at 
Westminster Abby to be stored unceremoniously,42 their function concluded. 
The statues had a prescribed and limited use, and were not permitted to take 
on a public life of their own, as Victor Noir has, as this would be counter to their 
prescribed use.  
 
Michael Davis, a translator of and commentator on Aristotle writes that 
Aristotle’s Poetics is mimetic in that while it is apparently about poetry, it is 
also an ‘explanation of ourselves to ourselves’ (Davis, 1999, p.3). Davis explains 
Aristotelian mimesis as an abstraction or embellishment of the object it is 
aimed at. The object is singled out and highlighted in a way uncommon to 
everyday experience. 
                                                        
41 ‘Making an extravagantly turned out and convincing effigy to stand in for the anointed and 
therefore more than human royal person suggested that although dead, the King is not gone or 
powerless. The coffin contained the earthly remains, while the effigy suggested the divine body, 
(Harvey & Mortimer, 1994, p.4), as well as aiding in avoiding the experience of a transi body in 
public, and intimidating and maintaining a strength through sumptuous display of wealth and 
power any usurpation plot through a potentially vulnerable transition. 
42 The head, in particular, of the effigy of Henry the VII is attributed to the sculptor Pietro 
Torrigiano to whom the terracotta bust of Henry VII in the Victoria and Albert Museum is also 
attributed. Torrigiano was a (wonderful and moving) sculptor working primarily in terracotta 
during the Renaissance. He was apparently banished from Florence for breaking Michelangelo’s 
nose when they were both students. His banishment perhaps influenced the attitude and set the 
tone for sculpture, particularly in terms of materials, of the Italian Renaissance. 
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 Imitation always involves selecting something from the continuum 
of experience, thus giving boundaries to what really has no 
beginning or end. Mimêsis involves a framing of reality that 
announces that what is contained within the frame is not simply real. 
Thus the more “real” the imitation the more fraudulent it becomes 
(Davis, 1999, p.3). 
 
A statue, a gisant, or effigy of the corpse of a person is mimetic, but rarely an 
exacting replica. However, in 1967 artist Paul Thek made a statue of a corpse as 
part of a work called Tomb. Thek life-cast his own hands and face, and created 
an effigy of himself dressed in a pink suit. The statue was reportedly placed 
inside a pink tomb, surrounded by drug use paraphernalia. As he was making 
the piece, he was photographed with the casts of himself; creating an image of 
himself and his figure, or documentation that Thek himself was not the corpse. 
(Figure 8). 
 
Whitney Museum curator, Elizabeth Sussman, spoke about Thek’s piece in an 
interview, during a 2010 retrospective of his work, saying that: 
 
There is no doubt that by casting his own body he had some 
sense of what it was to make a funerary monument of himself; 
and therefore, the Peter Hujar photographs that you see, have an 
uncanny quality to them because you see the very much alive 
Thek in his tee-shirt, next to this dead effigy that is exactly him. 
So to come so close as to be able to touch your own dead body 
even if you’re doing it through your own imagination, is very, 
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very risky territory and that’s where he wanted to be with his 
art.43 
 
Life casting to make a statue of a corpse seems exactly right. The direct cast of 
the body is only the body, although Thek only cast his face and hands. In 
October 2014 I constructed a similar effigy of myself. It was displayed on the 
top shelf of a glassed vitrine, with a transi or skeletal image below cast from a 
skull carved from a cast of my head. The piece became part of a larger work 
made with artist Mary Morgan, for a show called Trivial Pursuits: Obsession’s 
Allure. The choice to use my own image came about primarily because I had 
moulds of my own face and hands available to cast from, as well as my own 
worn out shoes, but I was not completely comfortable making a corpse of 
someone else, either.44 I used a life cast of my face, matching it with my hands 
and a pair of my battered boots.  
 
The object I made had a head and hands that were my form and the boots were 
ones I had worn out, and yet it was not me. Although the figure was never 
confused with a real corpse, the vitrine was moved from the front of the gallery 
because the curator particularly found it disturbing. Although the statue was a 
real object, it was not a real corpse, yet it was disturbing enough to be moved to 
                                                        
43 Dialog from the Whitney Musem of Art video TOMB! (In conjunction with a retrospective of 
Thek’s work at the Whitney 2010)00:33-1:09 Whitney Museum of American Art. TOMB! The art 
work, was shown at the Whitney in 1968, but was later lost. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Pr4TjYZjS4      
44 Others were readily available to cast, but I did not like the idea of making the life cast of 
someone else ⎯even a pretend corpse⎯ a feeling I did not have about myself. I knew it was not 
my body, but would I know it was not theirs? I further did not want to make a choice of whom 
to cast, as it was not a specific part of the meaning of the piece. 
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a less prominent location in the gallery. While I constructed the figure in the 
gallery, and was present at the decision to relocate the vitrine, the statue or 
gisant quietly indicated something stronger, the suggestion of a corpse that my 
actual living presence did not relieve. (Image 1). 
 
I had no trepidation or difficulty with the figure. The territory did not seem 
risky, perhaps because, for me, it is well trodden. I have taken many life casts 
from my own body (and many other peoples bodies as well), and subsequently 
used my own⎯albeit altered⎯face and hands in many statues. I have studied 
anatomy, which, among other lessons, has involved dissection of corpses. This 
experience, to some degree, allows me to be particularly aware of the 
differences between life cast corpse and a true corpse, just as a statue and real 
person differ. While the piece was a kind of petrified, or preserved corpse 
image, I never felt it to be my own corpse, although I did avoid using a cast 
other than my own. The original intent was to speak about preservation and 
incorruptibility after death as obsession, however I also witnessed the 
authority of the image of a corpse to discomfit and distress, even when it is 
constructed from plastic wrap, old clothes, a wig, and fired clay life casts of a 
specifically living and present person.   
 
A durable concern in sculpture, particularly in the nineteenth century, was 
actuality. It is described by David Getsy as ‘the potential for equivalence 
between sculptural representation and the material constitution of sculpture as 
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an object’ (Getsy, 2005, p.75). Actuality is well played out in the pairing of a 
romanticized body of the memorial gisant of the poet Shelley (1893) by Edward 
Onslow Ford (Figure 20), with the stillness and colour of the marble. It is 
conceptually ideal and satisfying, but the criticism that followed the piece (and 
Ford’s work, generally) was that Ford made portraits, that he copied his models 
and held too closely to a copy of the body, and that Ford did not employ 
abstraction or idealism toward his intentions. The reports of finding Shelley’s 
body were that he was completely clothed—including boots. The writer John 
Edward Trelawney describes finding Shelley’s body: 
 
The face and hands, and parts of the body not protected by the dress, 
were fleshless. The tall, slight figure, the jacket, the volume of 
Sophocles in one pocket, and Keats's poems in the other, doubled 
back, as if the reader, in the act of reading, had hastily thrust it away, 
were all too familiar to me to leave a doubt on my mind that this 




There is perhaps a misunderstanding of where the abstraction, or idealism 
Ford employed in this piece lies, but his work was criticized all the same.  
 
Nudity 
(Critias speaking to Socrates about Charmides) 
‘That men of my age should have been affected in this way was 
natural enough, but I noticed that even the small boys fixed their 
eyes upon him and no one of them, not even the littlest, looked 
at anyone else, but all gazed at him as if he were a statue’ (Plato, 
1992, p.59).  
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Ian Jenkins, senior curator of ancient Greek collections at the British Museum, 
points out that ‘the Greek kouros was a mannekin, or formulaic figure, 
composed to exhibit the essential elements of ideal manhood’ (Jenkins & 
Turner, 2009, p.11). The anatomy is not mimetic, but idealized to underscore a 
point about the possession of Arete or physical and moral perfection.  In ancient 
Greek art it is usually the Greek warriors who are naked and victorious, their 
enemies defeated, clothed, and ashamed.  
 
That we are faced with naked statues is probably from Greek tradition but 
naked statues are not always acceptable. When in the Renaissance naked male 
statues made a brief reappearance, such as Michelangelo’s David, 1504 and 
Risen Christ, 1521, the nudity was deliberate and symbolic. The Risen Christ is a 
nude, and recently resurrected Christ. He is perfect and naked to express that 
he is⎯like Adam before the fall⎯sinless. This Christ had the stigmata added 
later, and was made modest in the eighteenth century by a bronze loincloth, 
suggesting that even a sinless, marble penis is too difficult to contemplate. In 
the eighteenth century, the nude statues of Greece were being dug up and 
rediscovered, having, as Henry James observed, ‘survi[ved] their long earthly 
obscuration in this perfect shape, and coming up like long-lost divers from the 
sea of time’ (James, 1883, p.163 ). They continue to quietly influence our 
perception of perfection, the figure and statues.  
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Further examining the effect of the naked statue, Calvin Tompkins wrote in the 
New Yorker Magazine about sculptor Charles Ray.45 Ray was commissioned by 
the Whitney Museum in New York to make a statue for the public plaza at its 
new location. He dutifully began work on Huck and Jim, two characters standing 
side by side, from The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, (1884). Jim is ‘nine feet 
tall, a handsome black man in the prime of life’ (Tomkins, 2015, p.54), and Huck 
who is fourteen year old boy. Both figures are nude as they are in the story. Ray 
told Tomkins he believes the author, Mark Twain, is the American Homer and 
that Huck Finn is the equivalent Ulysses. Ray showed his design to the director 
and the curator of the Whitney, Donna De Salvo and Adam Weinberg 
respectively, and both felt the piece promised to be ‘a great work of art’ 
(Tomkins, 2015, p.58). Currently, writes Tompkins, the site in front of the 
museum has been ‘ruled out because passers-by would have to look at full-
frontal male genitalia’ (p.58). The Whitney eventually declined the statues 
altogether out of a ‘growing concern that . . . a naked African-American male 
and a naked white teenager in close proximity’ (p.56) would be an affront to a 
New York public. The nine-foot, over-life scale, the cast stainless steel material, 
and even Getsy’s noted passive resistance of statues, which further argues for 
the impossibility of physical threat, were not enough to secure the commission. 
 
The statue is not a person, therefore a statue’s nudity⎯a taboo we oddly 
extend to statues but not to dogs or horses or other animals⎯ will never be 
                                                        
45 New Yorker Magazine, Profiles, MAY 11, 2015 ISSUE, Meaning Machines, The sculptures of 
Charles Ray. By Calvin Tomkins 
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anything other than a conceptual or intellectual danger. The genitalia of a 
statue are equally as still and unlikely to move as the body, yet Ray’s figures 
appear to pose a threat to passers-by in New York City, where, presumably, 
passers-by have been exposed to less considered images. I designed a small 
project to investigate reactions to the nudity of statues, and to perhaps discover 
how abstracted genitalia could be made and still be realized. I began by 
showing pictures of nude female statues, for example, Rodin’s Crouching 
Woman, Gaston Lachaise’s Standing Woman, several Ancient Greek examples to 
several people. The pictures were usually received well and stories or opinions 
about the work would follow. I then handed around a bag of balloons and asked 
the participant(s) to take one, and everyone was asked to say what it was: An 
un-blown-up balloon, was the most common answer. I then showed the same 
series of pictures with a balloon Photoshopped onto it. (Figures 21-24) 
 
In most cases, the balloon would be put down or dropped, and reactions ranged 
from disgusted to amused. The balloon had been altered. The real balloon in 
hand was the same but now somehow embarrassing to hold. The concept or 
idea of the real balloon was transformed through suggestion, the real balloon 
remained the same.  
 
Scottish sculptor Sandy Stoddart suggests that speaking about art⎯especially 
where the context and meaning of artworks require explanation⎯is a kind of 
iconoclasm, and that it is a means through which we lose sight of the object we 
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may be speaking about. Stoddart is uncomfortable particularly with sculpture 
that needs words to situate it, saying that ‘it is very dangerous when you start 
talking about art, because sooner or later you’ll find yourself seeing with your 
ears’ (2014, @2:09). Language, perhaps through calling on our ideas and 
assumptions, transforms objects for us in a way that is akin to seeing balloons 
Photoshopped onto a statue; while still just a balloon, it has also become 
something less comfortable to hold, although the balloon itself has not changed 
at all.  
 
The encounter shifts from the object outside in the world into ourselves. 
Stoddart argues that a statue particularly is ‘famously still, no matter what you 
do you can’t get a reaction out of it’ (@6:20), statues are ‘never joining in’ 
(@7:13), or explaining themselves, which leaves us without an inter-action. We 
get no response. In this way a statue ‘commits sins against life’ (Stoddart, 2014, 
@8:07), they are a ‘still thing’ and they do not take part, which we require of 
others, although not of objects. Stoddart claims encounters with sculpture or 
the aesthetic experience ‘stills the will’ (@3:26)⎯as per philosopher Arthur 
Schopenhauer46⎯ and counteracts and defies the imperative of the will to life, 
which compounds the ‘sin’ of the graven image. 
                                                        
46 For Arthur Schopenhauer the will to life is the cause of our difficulties in a way similar to 
Buddhist philosophy. Schopenhauer suggested two ways to rise above the will to life were a 
complete rejection of society, which suited only some, and the contemplation of art, or aesthetic 
experience.  
 ‘It is especially these natural means of furthering the cerebral nervous activity 
which bring it about, certainly so much the better the more developed and energetic 
in general the brain is, that the object separates itself ever more from the subject, 
and finally introduces the state of pure objectivity of perception, which of itself 
eliminates the will from consciousness, and in which all things stand before us with 
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I have experienced a statue in an art context as offensive or perhaps aggressive. 
In 1995, I saw Jake and Dinos Chapman’s Zygotic Acceleration, Biogenetic, De-
Sublimated Libidinal Model (enlarged x 1000) (Figure 25) and it was difficult for 
me to look at. I judged it harshly. When I revisited the piece for this study, I 
initially found it unsettling, but I read a bit of an interview with the Chapman 
brothers about the piece: 
 
This thing is inanimate, it's made from resin and paint. It bears 
90% relationship to a mannequin, and maybe less than 10% to 
things that you can buy in Ann Summers. There's no point at which 
you can say this is a little girl. It might look like a child from the 
back, but from the front it doesn't. And then the idea that 
something with an erect p*nis on its nose could ever be female is 
also another problem... 
The whole point of these objects was actually to back people into a 
corner with their strange morality. You make an object and put it in 
a gallery and people don't really see it; they see what they think 
about things reflected in the object. You might as well put a mirror 
in the gallery because they're not looking at the object. It's an 
attempt to force people to take into account their bad thinking. 
'Zygotic acceleration...,’ for example, it doesn't work if you say it's a 
child or it's children; I've never seen 20 children fused together 
with adult gen*talia on their faces (Chapman, 2007, p.3) 
 
This writing about the sculpture altered my experience of it, and in a way 
that I found useful. My attention was shifted to the actual object and away 
                                                        
increased clearness and distinctness, so that we are conscious almost only of them 
and scarcely at all of ourselves; thus our whole consciousness is almost nothing 
more than the medium through which the perceived object appears in the world as 
an idea. Thus it is necessary for pure, will-less knowledge that the consciousness of 
ourselves should vanish, since the consciousness of other things is raised to such a 
pitch’ (Schopenhauer, 2012, p.126). 
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from myself. My judgments were played back to me, and I was given an 
opportunity to amend and consider my position. 
 
The Turner Prize-winning potter Grayson Perry pointed out in his third Reith 
Lecture47 that, all the things ‘that were once seen as subversive and dangerous, 
like tattoos and piercings and drugs and interracial sex, fetishism’ (Perry, 2013, 
p.7), have become normal and fit for family viewing in movies and TV. He says 
there is one thing you won’t be shown, though, ‘underarm hair. The last truly 
dangerous thing’ (p.7). Perry points out that our position⎯or thinking about 
what is dangerous and subversive⎯changes, the acts do not. It is about the 
fashion or current mode of thinking, not specifically the piercings, the drugs or 
the sex. That this morality can be played out through statues positions them as 
objects to which we extend some of the social taboos and attitudes indicating 
that we both understand and do not understand the object. A statue is not a 
person and cannot be naked. We are offering it rights we usually reserve for 
ourselves. We don’t put pants on dogs or tables or horses, but statues are 
covered and made modest. Naked objects, or statues without pants are too 
much to ask of passers-by to have to look at. 
 
Affect 
                                                        
47 Reith Lectures 2013: Playing To The Gallery Presenter: Grayson Perry Lecture 3: Nice 
Rebellion: Welcome In, Recorded at The Guildhall, Londonderry TRANSMISSION: 29th 
OCTOBER 2013 RADIO 4 
 92 
In Puppeteer and Director Roman Paska’s Dead Puppet Talk, Actor Bill Irwin as 
the Puppet Talker says, ‘this thing we call a puppet is meant to interpret, not 
simulate, reality’ (Paska, 2009). That puppets interpret reality, but are not real, 
suggests that there is a reflected quality about the puppet that we can recognize 
as ourselves. We read and interpret the feelings and behaviour of puppets. 
While we usually consider that we can witness what happens to others and feel 
empathy for or the feelings of those others, this is not the case with puppets. 
Beyond dismissing this as simple anthropomorphizing, affect theory (as per 
Teresa Brennan, (Brennan, 2004) and others (Gregg, 2010) 48) suggests that 
there is a kind of transmission of feeling that is empathic and that does not 
originate specifically from within us.  
 
                                                        
48 The more recent affective turn has been described as privileging, ‘human and animal bodies, 
sensation, and potentiality’ (Mian, 2011). Susan Kozel, a professor of new media at Malmö 
University and a dancer, says in her video, ‘Phenomenology In Five Acts, that affect is liminal, 
that it is what is conveyed in between gestures, [that affect is a] shimmer or ripple’ (Kozel, 
2013). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes about affect as ‘aspects of experience and reality that do 
not present themselves in propositional or even in verbal form alongside others that do’ 
(Sedgwick, 2002, p.6). In Cruel Optimism, Lauren Berlant talks about ‘the affective structure of 
an optimistic attachment,’ which outlines the tendency to do the same thing over and over and 
expect different results, ‘to expect that this time, nearness to this thing will help you or a world 
to become different in just the right way’ (Berlant, 2011, p.2). The 2010 Affect Theory Reader 
editors open with this definition of affect.   
Affect is in many ways synonymous with force or forces of encounter. The 
term ‘force,’ however, can be a bit of a misnomer, since affect need not be 
especially forceful (although sometimes, as in the psychoanalytic study of 
trauma, it is). In fact, it is quite likely that affect more often transpires within 
and across the subtlest of shuttling intensities: all the miniscule or molecular 
events of the unnoticed. The ordinary and its extra. Affect is born in in-
between-ness and resides as accumulative beside-ness. (Gregg, 2010, p.2)  
It may be useful to note here that an initial focus as I began this study was affect. I assumed it 
was a means to suggest how feeling and emotions might be transmitted without being 
specifically generated by an object. I eventually found affect to be too insubstantial a subject to 
be useful in concretizing a position for what happens when we encounter a statue. 
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Speaking at a UK conference focused on Live Interface, Paska notes that the 
subject of magic is often used in place of something more specific. Paska says,  
 
The area of magic that is most important to puppet theatre is the 
notion of magic as an affective science. Magic is meant to have an 
effect, so when you perform an act of magic the idea is that 
something will happen, not maybe. Like when you flick the light 
switch, the light goes on. (Paska, 2016, pp.7:00) 
 
He continues, advancing that puppetry is related to statuary, and iconic 
representations of the Gods, and that it is a very old form of theatre. The role of 
the puppeteer is as an intermediary between the gods and the human 
community, the puppeteer is part of the mechanism of transmission or 
transferral between them. (Paska, 2016).  
 
Similarly, affect is defined principally in terms of bodily communication, and 
although it appears to be comparable to emotions or feelings, affect is not 
interior or personal in the way our feelings are. Feelings, writes Philosopher 
Teresa Brennan are ‘sensations that have found the right match in words’ 
(Brennan, 2004, p.5). Feelings are brought about by thought through sensory 
input, and lead to action. Affects, on the other hand, are not feelings. Affects 
interject from outside of us and are much more basic and raw. While affect is 
considered transmittable from one body to another, for example, in the way one 
can feel another’s sadness, or anger running through a mob or crowd of people. 
Affect is intrinsically, physically unrepresentable, making it difficult to 
specifically characterize and to isolate it from feeling or emotion.  
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According to Brennan, affect is primarily transmitted by an interpretation of 
feelings, suggesting that the source of the feelings is significant. She argues that 
when affect is transmitted, whether it is anxiety, fear, pleasure or anger, that 
our biochemistry is altered. She writes that this is measurable in hormone 
levels detectable in blood. She means we literally carry the influence of the 
other in our blood. Interestingly, she then writes that the best source of love 
and living attention which moderate the influence of affect would be: ‘To find 
an utterly pure soul within, something untouched by human error, one would 
have to sustain living attention through a process of complete exsanguination’ 
(Brennan, 2004, p.139).  
 
Positioning puppets as endowed with a perfect and exsanguinated nature, 
Paska recounts in his essay, The Inanimate Incarnate (Paska, 1990), an 1810 
essay about the puppet theatre by Heinrich von Kleist. Von Kleist posits 
puppets to be superior to human dancers. The puppet has no conflicted human 
soul to inhibit, so when it dances, the dance is pure dance49. ‘The spirit cannot 
err where there is none’ (von Kleist as quoted in Paska) (p.417). He indicates 
that the exsanguinated—the puppet or sculptural body—is unassailable and 
pure in purpose. This superior otherness is, perhaps, part of the puppet or the 
statue’s attraction. Statues and puppets are uncompromised by blood, they are 
                                                        
49 Kleist is also quoted in Hersey, Falling In Love With Statues (pp.141-42) 
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ideal and ultimately unaffected by us, though we are moved and altered by 
them.  
 
Comay writes that no actual eye contact can be either represented by the 
sculpture or sustained between work and spectator, ‘the statue relinquishes the 
gaze precisely because it has no need of it’ (Comay, 2014, p.135). Statues do not 
need to rebuff our gaze or actions, or protect themselves or their goals, 
ambitions or fantasies. In this respect the sculptural body is superior to us in its 
singleness of purpose.  
  
Statues as a form and a subject respond to deeper consideration of how we 
perceive them particularly in terms of our senses and conceptually. Reflecting 
on touch, or death, or the curious aspect of ourselves that touches the crotch of 
Dalou’s gisant—an object that both is and is not actually what we are touching 
(and we know it isn’t) to get our heart’s desire—suggests that our encounter is 
subtly compound. It is easy to overlook the complexities of behaviour we 
exhibit when we encounter statues. Touching statues, given the nature of touch, 
does not fully consider what a statue is. A statue is exactly not the material it is 
made of. It is the form of the material, which, for example, suggests that marble 
is a statue. It is both marble and figure shaped. However, the figure cannot be 
said to be the marble and the marble is not the figure.  
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Touching and tactility exemplify the material and form of statues. The material 
of the object and what we see as the appearance or representation of a statue. 
Statues as objects are veiled from us, but in plain sight. We see them as 
simulacra or shallow, empty replica of us. We have thousands of years of 
collective history with objects shaped like us that accompany our encounters 
with them. We encounter statues with experience and history, both personal 
and social. We are quick to judge some anatomy to be incorrectly sized while 
oblivious to the abstraction of other appendages. We easily equate the shape of 
a person to be a person⎯a lesser person⎯ we can easily know and dismiss, 
when we also know that these objects have nothing but form in common with 
us. We know a statue is not a dead person, and we know statues do not actually 
have a gender⎯that goes beyond the surface⎯ nor can they see or move. 
Statues are not people in any way other than form. Statues interpret and reveal 
this encounter to ourselves, but they do not really simulate much about us at 
all. They can more correctly be said to stimulate us to thoughts both considered 
and deep or habitual and usual. Statues are objects that are real and not real at 
once, perhaps making them a third kind of object, one that has the capacity to 



















This chapter begins with a brief descriptive overview of my studio practice and 
its evolution and locates my work, both material and form, and practice 
contemporarily. The encounter is explored through materials and through 
considering statues historically. The overall approach to both the work and the 
theory is demonstrated through methods already functioning in the studio, 
enhanced by an understanding and application of reflective and diffractive 
methods as understood through Donald Schön and Karen Barad respectively. 
The aim of this chapter is to articulate, and argue from an augmented 
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perspective, how my practice has both informed me about encounters with 
statues as art objects and how the methods and practice have further informed 
and shaped this study.  
 
My Studio Practice 
Sculptor Antony Gormley says of his own studio that it ‘is in the world, but not 
of it’50 (2014, @2:10). The framing or boundaries set out by the physical 
equipment and agreed conventions of my studio, are a world in which a 
particular bordered and specific practice takes place. The studio is the centre of 
my practice and mediates my work primarily with clay and the other materials 
I employ. The space informs actions through years of small choices and specific 
decisions. I have brought my history, my skills and education, and the record of 
my interactions with the world to the studio.  
 
In the early 1980s, I attended Boston University’s School for the Arts, an art 
school that focused on the figure. I learned anatomy and learned to 
knowledgeably draw and comprehend, and to construct the figure in a western, 
classical tradition of transforming a clay model up, making a mould to plaster, 
then to wax, and finally to bronze or another material more permanent than the 
wax or clay original. In this tradition it is the form alone that is of importance, 
                                                        
50 Quote from What Do Artists DO All Day?  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJ8UAlLQv6A 
(2:10) 
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materials are used in service to the final piece, which is a cast, and is specifically 
not the material in which the piece was originally made.  
 
This training left me skilled, but ill equipped to work on my own. I subsequently 
attended the Worcester Center For Crafts, a craft school where I trained in 
ceramics. Clay quickly proved a worthy sculpture medium for me in itself, as 
well as a compelling agent51 for constructing the figure. I wanted to work 
alone,52 and to build at a relatively large scale. Clay and ceramic tradition 
allowed me to organize a studio in which I could do both. I earned an MFA from 
Massachusetts College of Art in 1995, where my subject was the figure, my 
medium was ceramics, and I worked inside a contemporary sculpture 
department. I taught both sculpture and ceramics at Mass Art, and ceramic 
sculpture at Harvard University Office for the Arts.  
 
I have conducted an active studio practice since 1988 and continued with clay 
and the figure. I have had a variety of studios in schools, co-ops, and buildings 
of my own, and since 1991 my studios have been set up for ceramics. I make my 
own clay and glazes with dry materials bought through a ceramic supply house 
and fire my own work. I also have a wheel and a changing number of moulds. In 
addition to ceramics, my current studio also supports small welding, forging 
                                                        
51 From the Bible: O LORD, You are our Father, We are the clay, and You our potter; Isaiah 64:8 
From the Quran: And certainly did We create man from an extract of clay. 23:12; From Greek 
mythology, Prometheus created man from clay; from Chinese mythology Nüwa molded figures 
from the yellow earth. Etc . . .  
52 Working alone allowed me to work out ideas and forms neither tradition supported.  
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and cutting of steel, as well as moulds and a mixer for concrete, and the 
capacity for plaster.  
 
I work alone, I do not direct others to make, and therefore physically I am a part 
of the limitation of the studio. I am not able to, for example, arrive in Berlin53 
from Louisiana on a three-week course and make my work. I am a part of my 
studio and my work comes from the studio. I could, of course, set up a studio in 
Berlin. This would require tools and space and electricity and kilns and other 
machinery. It would take a month or so, and I could begin to make work, which 
would take a few further months, but it is possible. While this arrangement is 
not unusual for an artist, by identifying and articulating this aspect of my 
practice in particular I am made aware that the studio, comprised of its various 
tools, machines, and materials, is the primary tool of my practice and is of 
corresponding importance. The studio is as important to my practice as I am. I 
cannot make my work without the studio. 
 
Situating Work and Practice 
An argument can be made for my statues being appropriately defined as 
sculpture in the present through Art Critic and Theorist Rosalind Krauss’ 
definition of sculpture in her article Sculpture In The Expanded Field, (1979). 
Krauss, writing about what constituted sculpture before her concept of the 
expanded field, suggests that our perception of sculpture is that of the 
                                                        
53 The residency requirement for this course was: three one-week sessions in New York City, 
and three three-week sessions in Berlin.  
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monument, or a ‘commemorative representation’ (Krauss, 1979, p.33), where 
the work is specific to the site and ‘speaks in a symbolic tongue about the 
meaning or use of that place’ (p.33). Further, she addresses the importance of 
the pedestal as a mediator between the place and the sculpture as the 
‘representational sign’ (p.33). As is the case with monuments, the statue that is 
part of a monument becomes a focal point for the literal embodiment of 
commemoration. 
 
Jacey Fortin reports in her New York times article: Toppling Monuments, a 
Visual History (2017), which documents several notable statues being unseated, 
that in Manhattan a statue of King George III was torn down in 1776, as the 
American revolution came to a close. Statues of the disgraced Josef Stalin were 
removed by the Russian people, and confederate statues⎯as monuments to 
post-reconstruction racism⎯in New Orleans and other parts of the US are also 
being removed.54 While a monument can be a statue, a statue does not have to 
be commemorative, or a monument. Krauss suggests that the ‘logic of the 
monument’ (p.34) is done away with through the loss of the specific site of 
commemorative representation. It is through the redemption of the pedestal, as 
something other than mediator between site and sculpture that modernism 
                                                        
54 New Orleans is working to remove confederate monuments 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/24/new-orleans-takes-down-confederate-
monuments   as are the rest of the United States. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-virginia-
protests-statues/u-s-cities-step-up-removal-of-confederate-statues-despite-virginia-violence-
idUSKCN1AV0XE  . Statues of Stalin were also removed in the Soviet Union.  
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arrives and sculpture can be declared ‘nomadic’ and therefore free from place 
or monument. 
 
My work is not commissioned and is not a monument, nor is it tied to any 
particular site. The pedestals I make, rather than tie the work to a site, 
announce the work as self-contained and, while in our world, the figures are 
not of us or of our world, which indicates they are not meant to deceive but to 
reveal. The pedestal is not separate from the piece. Often it is a hemisphere, 
which suggests a world apart from ours. Furthermore, the feet of my statues 
are anchored to the base or pedestal, which then only mediates between the 
figure and the ground or floor in our world, rather than the specific site in 
which the work is displayed. My work is nomadic, although it is heavy and 
awkward to move around, it is not pinned to a particular site, nor is it ever 
made only for gallery or garden or other place. My work does not specifically 
belong anywhere, except my studio, although it becomes a burden there once it 
is finished.  
 
My work is, as Krauss describes in her initial diagram (p.36), both not-
landscape and not-architecture and therefore, it is sculpture. It is sculpture 
separated from landscape and architecture. My statues do express the 
fragment, which Krauss suggests ‘also testifies to a loss of site’ (p.37), where 
she has indicated the body as site. An example of this fragmenting or 
abstracting of the body is shown in Image 2 and Image 3 (Pp. III and IV). The 
body of the tall figure (26) is held up by a cage or skirt and has no human lower 
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half, and the shoulders and upper arms of the Old Man figure (27) are also not 
human. Each statue only retains a fragment of similarity to a human body. 
However, the statues I make maintain the history and form of sculpture once 
tied to both landscape and architecture although they are constructed as 
isolated objects, and not actual or even conceptual fragments removed from 
either. While my work does not fall comfortably into any of the other categories 
of Krauss’ expanded field (site-construction, axiomatic structures, or marked 
site), it does argue for an expansion of Krauss’ original sculpture category in the 
expanded field. This is how my work and practice can be said to occupy a 
position in the contemporary. 
 
Craft 
Writer James Lord recounted the following conversation as having taken place 
between himself and Artist Alberto Giacometti, when Lord sat for Giacometti in 
1964. 
 
I said, “It’s difficult for me to imagine how things must appear to 
you.”  
 
“That’s exactly what I’m trying to do,” he said, “to show how 
things appear to me.”  
 
“But what,” I asked, “is the relation between your vision, the 
way things appear to you, and the technique that you have at your 
disposal to translate that vision into something which is visible to 
others?”  
 
“That’s the whole drama,” he said. “I don’t have such a 




Here, Giacometti confesses to the well-documented55 restless drama he 
endured through supposing he had no (or not enough) technique with which to 
show how things appeared to him.  Bearing in mind that technique, while it can 
become a dull rut if ill used, is the translation process of the urge to make into a 
satisfactory harvest and is a significant facet of making. Technique, (or a way 
forward in the studio and freedom from the critical self to work)56 becomes the 
crucial device or contrivance of my artistic practice57. 
 
Through technique I enter the studio oriented; I am ready to skilfully engage 
familiar material at a level where we⎯the materials and I⎯ move beyond what 
I can think about alone, without the collaboration. Technique is the possibility 
of moving beyond my vision, to something visible to others. Technique, as it has 
manifested in my studio, is an important tool for the making I do; specifically, 
the value of the historical craft of both the figure and clay in my practice, 
although I adhere to neither as a defining title or practice.  
 
                                                        
55 ‘Giacometti's art was thought to powerfully capture the tone of melancholy, alienation and 
loneliness that these ideas suggested’ (Wolf 2017). (Google Giacometti and this is also a top hit) 
56 Phillip Guston said that John Cage said, “When you start working, everybody is in your studio, 
the past, your friends, enemies, the art world, and above all, your own ideas- all are there. But 
as you continue painting, they start leaving, one by one, and you are left completely alone. Then, 
if you are lucky, even you leave.” (Jones 1998, 11).  
57 I was able to articulate the importance of technique to my practice through performing GTDA 
in the Slide Project. 
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Drawing a parallel between mastering language as a tool to write, embracing 
the history of the figure as a subject of study, and as an art object, as well as 
ceramic technique, has given my solitary practice centuries of skills and 
solutions to call on, limitations to press against, and a medium to express with. 
When Danto recounts that new definitions for art appeared because, ‘artists 
pressed against boundary after boundary, and found that the boundaries all 
gave way’ (Danto, 2014, p.14), I recognize that the techniques I have chosen 
have historic limits, and that I only need to consider those boundaries 
differently in order to step over what was once taboo and use that former limit 
to subtle advantage. Using the figure or statues models employing a boundary 
that has given way. Statues are⎯to paraphrase Grayson Perry⎯one of the last 




There are difficulties with breaking away from the techniques and constraints 
of a craft or a subject as exhibited by the insecurity Giacometti invokes. There 
will be a new vocabulary that artist and viewer alike have not fully assimilated, 
or traditional inferences and connotations will overshadow the new method of 
engaging material or subject.  
 
Grayson Perry, in his third Reith Lecture, points out that ‘contemporary art, is 
almost synonymous with the idea of novelty’ (2013, p.2). He contends that 
contemporary art or art today is usually described as ‘cutting edge,’ and the 
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artists are said to be ‘radical;’ the shows are described as game changers, and 
the work is spoken about as ‘revolutionary, [while] a new paradigm is always 
being set’ (p.2).  
 
In contrast Perry speaks about two similar drawings found on a cave wall in 
France. When the two drawings were carbon dated, it was discovered that they 
were separated by five thousand years. Perry quotes the archaeologist as 
saying; “You know these look like they could have been done by the same 
person on the same day” (p.2). I suggest that my work occupies a small portion 
of the space between a new paradigm and five thousand similar years. There 
has been very little alteration in the material or in the subject I have chosen, but 
often the histories of both material and form overshadow the minute shifts 
with which each might be addressed. 
 
Materiality addresses the medium through which the sculptor produces the art 
object. The statue is a negotiation of material and form through to a third object 
of, in my work for example, clay and figure as unified art object. The figure is, 
again in my work, rarely fully representational. It is recognizable, and my goal 
as artist is to use an understanding of anatomy as a tool and not as a template. 
 
 Bernini’s Pluto and Proserpina, or The Rape Of Proserpina, 1622 (Figure 28), 
exhibits representational anatomy and the illusion of soft flesh, but it is not real 
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anatomy or flesh. In this same way, Pluto and Proserpina are represented and 
not real. Bernini, as Waldermar Januszczak says of Giotto in The Renaissance 
Unchained, ‘has found a way to imagine the unimaginable. In the real world, it 
can’t happen but in art, it can’ (2015, @10:47-11:27).  
 
Pluto and Proserpina are not real in the real world, but there they are as 
sculpture, the lord of the Underworld grasping the soft thigh of the daughter of 
the earth goddess Ceres. The material, or in this case the stone, is the medium 
through which the figure is expressed. Getsy posits that ‘the sculptor must 
negotiate to some degree the integration of or interference between figuration 
and materiality when creating a representational sculpture’ (Getsy, 2015, p.10). 
He goes on to suggest that the viewer must also ‘see the statue as a combination 
of matter and figure’ (p.10). The negotiation of statues includes an important 
merging of material and figure, to understand both, simultaneously. The 
encounter with statues holds the dual nature of material and figure but 
contained in a unified object. 
 
Sculptor Henry Moore has often been quoted about truth to materials. The 
Oxford University Press Reference Web site provides the typical Moore quote: 
‘Each material has its own individual qualities . . . Stone, for example, is hard 
and concentrated and should not be falsified to look like soft flesh  . . . It should 
keep its hard tense stoniness.’ (Oxford, 2017) This implies that Moore believed 
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stone should always look like stone and never appear to be flesh. The OUP 
Reference goes on to suggest Moore eventually rescinded his hard-line stance.   
 
Moore later admitted that the idea of truth to materials had 
become a fetish and in 1951 he conceded that it should not be 
made into a criterion of value, ‘otherwise a snowman made by a 
child would have to be praised at the expense of a Rodin or a 
Bernini’ (Oxford, 2017). 
 
 Reading the first quote in full from Unit One, I interpret Moore as suggesting 
something slightly different about truth to materials and doing that very much 
in the language of a sculptor. The full quote reads as follows: 
  
Each sculptor through his past experience, through observation 
of natural laws, through criticism of his own work and other 
sculpture, through his character and psychological makeup, and 
according to his stage of development, finds that certain qualities 
in sculpture become of fundamental importance to him. For me 
these qualities are: 
Truth to material: Every material has its own individual qualities. 
It is only when the sculptor works direct, when there is an active 
relationship with his material that the material can take its part 
in the shaping of an idea. Stone, for example, is hard and 
concentrated and should not be falsified to look like soft flesh – it 
should not be forced beyond its constructive build to a point of 
weakness. It should keep its hard tense stoniness. (Moore, 1934, 
p.29) 
 
Two points stand out here: The first is that Moore is speaking about the 
sculptor’s experience and that this is what he has found to be of primary 
importance to himself, as an artist. That important thing is this: an active, 
engaged relationship with the material, so ‘that the material can take its part in 
 109 
the shaping of an idea’ (p.29), which, I contend has more to do with Moore’s 
relationship to stone than stone and the softness of flesh. His work, I suggest, 
was altered by his studio experiences with stone. Moore was not tasked with, 
for example, a portrait of Louis XIV as Bernini was, he was making something 
that more resembled his feelings about the figure, or how figures feel, or how a 
reclining woman made of stone feels to him, rather than indicating a particular 
figure.  
 
Clarifying what Moore finally considered truth to materials to evoke, reveals 
more of an issue of craft and training, than material. In a typewritten set of 
notes that Moore gave to editor Myfanwy Piper in 1970, now in the archives of 
the Tate, is a section called Extracts From Various Notes Written In 1951 (Moore, 
2015). It is from the writing here that Moore has been characterized as 
changing his mind about truth to materials. When Moore began to make work 
that broke away from the constraints of craft and tradition, it was essential to 
create a framing for the new kind of work he was embarking on. Thirty years 
later he recounts, ‘many of us tended to make a fetish of [truth to materials]’ 
(Moore, 2015, p.4). As his style of working became more broadly accepted and 
understood, Moore clarifies his position writing that ‘rigid adherence to the 
doctrine results in domination of the sculptor by the material. The sculptor 
ought to be the master of his material. Only, not a cruel master’ (Moore, 2015). 
From this understanding of Moore’s truth to materials, I return to technique 
and the boundaries that were falling beneath artists like Moore, (as per Arthur 
Danto). There is the suggestion here that Moore came to see technique as the 
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etiquette with which a sculptor approaches material and develops familiarity, 
and not an imposed veil or limit, but that it is in having this expanded vision be 
something visible to others (as per Giacometti) that presents the constraining 
issue.  
 
The primary and vital material of my work is Clay. I studied ceramics, and 
earned a certificate in the context of a craft school, and have therefore been 
schooled not only in the skills, but also in the language and traditions of 
ceramics and pottery which come as an integral part of that kind of education. I 
function peripherally in the context of ceramic tradition, although my skills 
with clay came through this tradition. Acquisition of those traditions along with 
the skills is often so well integrated that we are markedly unaware we inhabit 
them.  
 
For example, in a 2014 Art News article declaring that, ‘American ceramic art 
has finally come out of the closet, kicking and disentangling itself from domestic 
servitude and minor-arts status—perhaps for good’ (Wei, 2014),58 Artist Arlene 
Shechet, is quoted saying: ‘I’m not a ceramic artist, […]. I’m an artist who works 
in clay’ (Shechet cited in Wei, 2014). Her work however specifically references 
clay practices and forms, and these conventions are seldom obvious to viewers 
                                                        
58 The assimilation of ceramics into the fine art world has been heralded for decades. In the 
Journal, American Ceramics, Vol. 13, Number 2, 1999, former Sculpture Magazine editor 
Suzanne Ramljak interviews the New York Art dealer Garth Clark. Ramljak quotes Clark as 
saying, in an earlier issue, “I believe the 1980s will witness that true integration of ceramics 
into the fabric of American fine art we have so long anticipated.” Speaking in 1999, Clark 
observed that to his surprise very few ceramic artists ‘would make the cut once the standards 
of fine arts were applied.’ He went on to say, some twenty years ago, that ‘few individuals in our 
field had the strength to gain such acceptance.’ 
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not familiar with ceramic tradition. Her work speaks to vessels and to ceramic 
tradition however dysfunctional her objects would be in a domestic setting. In 
the same article, artist Nicole Cherubini states that, ‘As far as clay being a craft 
material, it blows me away that it is even part of the conversation anymore’ 
(Cherubini cited in Wei, 2014). Cherubini’s work also references vessels, pots, 
and shards. Artists working in other mediums are rarely as consistently drawn 
to the subtleties of functional vessel forms. These forms may be vestigial, but 
they do speak loudly about a particular tradition and not specifically what is 
potential or possible through the material. 
 
My work and practice also has much of the traditions of clay still clinging to 
both. Again, my studio is essentially a pottery, although without the tidiness 
craft requires. My construction process is descended from large vessel hand 
building, but these references are hidden in the work, unless specifically 
displayed.59 I am informed by, aware of, and have greatly benefitted from 
ceramic tradition. I have learned how to conduct productive and satisfactory 
relations with a material in a structured and tradition-based context. The clay 
informs me as much as the clay is informed by me. I make use of clay in service 
to the figure and ignore ceramics, as a discipline and tradition to that end.60 But 
I do not specifically ask the clay to pretend that it is skin or hair or fingernails. 
The figures I make are not real people, they are not specific portraits or meant 
                                                        
59 In the background of one of the video conversations collected for this project, I bring a man 
over to one of my pieces and lift the head and shoulders off the figure. I was explaining to him 
how the work is like a pot. (See video 3). 
60 By ignore I mean if I need to alter a form after it has been fired, I will grind it or add plaster to 
a piece and paint over it. My figures reference pots only to those who are versed in large scale 
ceramic construction, and are not like pots unless specifically designed to be like a pot. 
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to fool or trick the eye. They are ideas about people made using the statue as a 
vehicle.  
 
Louise Bourgeois speaking about materials said in an interview that: 
 
I transfer the energy into sculpture. This applies to everything I 
do. It has nothing to do with the craft. It has nothing to do with 
the skills. It has nothing to do with the how to manage materials. 
Materials are materials, nothing more. Materials are not the 
subject of the artist. The subject of the artist is emotions and 
ideas – both. (Louise Bourgeois: The Spider, The Mistress And 
The Tangerine , 2008, @1:31:04). 
 
That materials are not the subject of the artist is⎯for me⎯a given, but what 
allows me to expand and explore in the studio is how the materials I use 
function as tools to think with and to materialize emotions and ideas.  
 
Statues in the Studio  
I have argued that using clay in service to the figure, or statues, calls attention 
to the clay, the material, although subtly. I make my figures or statues like large 
vessels or pots, through this—combined with my knowledge of anatomy—I am 
certain my work is not a copy of life. I know that my figures are hollow and do 
not contain any of the muscles or viscera or bones that living bodies do, and 
that are necessary to that life. We see through the skin of a person (or animal) 
to a veiled hint of the viscera contained inside the body. The surface I show 
with clay is little more than that veil or shroud of what is contained underneath, 
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although there is (usually)61 only a hollow pot inside. What I make is a form, 
not a person, it is like a pot, it is an object shaped like a person. It is the 
suggestion of anatomy and the history of statues as an art form that combine in 
my encounter with my work and with statues. 
 
Encounter 
There are barriers to perceiving the encounter with a statue as something fresh 
and fertile. Art historian James Hall conveys that a significant difficulty with 
statues was the way in which the freestanding idol encouraged dissenting 
thought. Statues, he writes, were considered ‘more resistant to being 
incorporated into a master narrative, and they thus encourage the viewer to 
plug the semantic gap with their own, potentially heretical interpretation’ (Hall, 
1999, p.117). Well into the eighteenth century, sculpture—which meant statues 
at this time —was considered a brutish and dangerously mute discipline, 
resulting in a potentially treacherous and expressionless blank canvas that 
could lend support to unsanctioned concepts. The dominant discourse in the 
academy of the nineteenth century had mostly been pursued as an image of 
what was, a copy of nature, or an image we could all read and comprehend 
collectively and as sanctioned, so therefore safely. The more work portrayed 
what was sanctioned as real, the less chance for misinterpretation. Therefore 
artistic training generally sought to obtain skill in reproducing a person, or a 
landscape or a particular religious story or event.  
                                                        
61 To be absolutely clear, the insides of my pieces are not exactly pot-like in that the interiors 
are not aesthetically considered. It is not a pristine environment, but rather the hollow from 
which I can push and press and form the exterior.  
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Spanish Philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset wrote with annoyance in his essay, 
The Dehumanization of Art, that artists in the nineteenth century went too far, 
‘and let the work consist almost entirely in a fiction of human realities’ (Ortega 
y Gasset, 1972, p.11). He writes that ‘an object of art is artistic only insofar as it 
is not real’ (p.10). This is an important point about art objects and a particularly 
significant point about statues, as discussed in chapter one. However, Ortega y 
Gasset laments that ‘not many people are capable of adjusting their perceptive 
apparatus to . . . the transparency that is the work of art’ (p.11), that we are not 
generally refined enough to see through the portrait, beyond the person 
portrayed, to the art. The solution for Ortega y Gasset is modern art or ‘pure art’ 
(p.12).  
 
Pure art for Ortega y Gasset, writes journalist Anthony Howell, involves ‘a 
progressive elimination of the human or too human elements characteristic of 
romantic and naturalistic works of art’ (Howell, 2015, p.5) until the human is 
removed from art altogether. ‘We then have an art which can be comprehended 
only by people possessed of the peculiar gift of artistic sensibility, an art for 
artists and not for the masses, for “quality” and not for hoi polloi’ (p.12). If we 
remove our image we will see the art. 
 
However, in direct contrast to those minimalist and modern sensibilities—
where the art object is defined by that removal of all representation—a statue 
is the consequence of combining material and image into a shimmery third 
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thing that never quite settles down into just material or subject for us. To 
expose how the human form—both wielded as an artist and encountered and 
considered as an art object—retains and enlarges the materiality, physicality, 
form, and concept in one unified object is the key theoretical moment for 
statues. It is this revealing, and conceptually locating of statues as an example 
or the embodiment of the flickering of material, form, and our own assumptions 
(in and of our own image) that is presented to us through an encounter with 
statues as art objects. Rather than remove the image, a subtle shift in our 
discussion of the image and comparisons to the real or the mimetic could be 
altered. To understand that statues in particular are real and not real 
simultaneously, and to hold this duality as an acknowledged approach to 
statues may allow the image to support the ‘transparency that is the work of 
art’ (p.11) and therefore potentially better indicate the altered perspective that 
art provides. Acknowledging both the material and the (human) form⎯the real 
and the not real⎯in the encounter is an initial point for measuring a 
reconsideration or modification of our perception of statues. 
 
To further indicate the importance and conceptual complexity of the human 
form in sculpture, David Getsy argues (Getsy, 2015) that the rejection and 
removal of the figure in 1960s sculpture, in favour of non-referencing 
abstraction, inadvertently generated narratives about the ‘multiplicity and 
mutability’ (Getsy, 2015, p.xvi) of gender. He argues that efforts to expunge the 
human form specifically and representation generally, was expressed using 
descriptions of the human body and even gender. ‘Abstraction calls forth the 
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image of the human but refuses to give an anchoring image of it’ (2016, @4:21). 
The body is referred to but not ‘imaged.’ Getsy supposes a more fluid 
understanding of body, of gender, of personhood has ensued.  
 
Repeating in the way a mirror does, but doing more than just reflecting, 
sculpture reveals, illuminates, or evokes things we cannot see about ourselves. 
Sculpture perhaps manifests perception in a way comparable to Donald Schön’s 
observation that ‘we have the ability also, to reflect on our reflection-in-
action’62 (Schön, 1995, p.6) A method of reflecting on our reflection-in-action is 
able to show more to the practitioner than the practitioner could see in the 
moment during practice, or even in only reflecting on practice after the fact. 
Getsy’s submission indicates that the history of sculpture influences and 
informs the encounter or how we look at and discuss sculpture, even when no 
human form is present in the work. The encounter is perhaps, influenced by 
more than what we assume and can see in the moment and this may mark the 
quality of similarities, variations and the potential in our encounters with 
statues.  
 
Words and the Encounter 
Professor of modern languages and comparative literature, Naomi Segal writes 
about words and statues. She points to the form of the veiled statue, as 
                                                        
62 Schön is suggesting that watching a video of ourselves in action has a slight difference to 
remembering what it was like to reflect in action. (Schön, Reflective Practice: its implications for 
classroom, administration and research, 1995) 
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specifically represented by Antonio Corradini and Giuseppe Sanmartino,63 
Veiled Truth (1752) and Veiled Christ (1753) respectively (Figures 29 and 30). 
She speaks about the carving of diaphanous cloth veiling the flesh, and how that 
carving of cloth is ‘a second layer’ (Segal, 2006, p.1) over the figure, revealing as 
much at it conceals.64 Segal suggests that words are ‘a third skin, of a similarly 
revelatory and frustrating kind.  
 
Her thesis is that words play ‘with the border between life and fixity, bodies 
and stone’ (Segal, 2006, p.15). She quotes a poem65 about Michelangelo’s 
statues particularly of the (so called) Slaves (various dates beginning in 1505), 
Moses (1515), and the Pieta (1499) (Figure 31). The poem points out that the 
suffering of the slaves is silent, that Moses pulls on his beard in agitation but 
sits still, and that although her suffering is apparent, no tears fall from Mary’s 
eyes. Segal’s translation of Meyer’s poem ends with: ‘What tortures the living 
breast is rendered blissful and delightful in stone. You make the moment 
eternal – and you die, ever and again, but with no death’ (Meyer, Trans. Segal) 
(Segal, 2006, p.10). ‘Words precisely permit what stone does not’ (p.10). 
Suffering cannot be overcome in life. It has been captured and held in the stone 
and laid out for us to examine and to understand that we are not alone in our 
                                                        
63 Corradini’s Veiled Truth or Modesty stands in the Santa Maria della Pietà dei Sangro in Naples 
and Sanmartino’s Veiled Christ in the Museo Capella Sansevero, also in Napels.  
64 It is important to understand here that suggesting that the veil and the flesh are layers is 
slightly nonsensical. Veiled statues are an illusion. That we are so transfixed by this illusion 
points to the difficulty we have, as per Ortega y Gasset, with seeing through the “veil” to the 
material. There is no veil over the stone figure, except in what we assume. 
65 The poem is in German and by Conrad Ferdinand Meyer (1825-1898). 
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endurance of it.66 She writes, analysing the poem that ‘it is the very paradoxical 
capacity of stone67 to catch the moment before a visible event, an emotional 
consequence, that fascinates [Meyer]’ (p.10). Therefore, it is the narrative that 
we supply or is supplied for us that enables the emotions that allows the statue 
to suggest suffering back to us, that allows us to see and feel what suffering, 
agitation, and loss might be, and to prepare for it, and if not to understand it, 
then to at least recognize and witness it.  
 
Again, the art is in our encounter with the object, and is influenced by what we 
bring to that encounter. The stone and the image, and the concretized ideas that 
words and stories are able to signify historically and culturally, appear to 
inform what we experience, and what we require from the experience of 
statues. 
 
Artist Joseph Kosuth’s piece, One and Three Chairs, (1965) (Figure 32) further 
demonstrates the influences of words on the encounter. A brief description of 
One and Three Chairs: a chair—any simple chair will do—is placed in the space 
that will be exhibiting the piece, and photographed. The picture of the chair in 
place is then displayed on the wall to the left of the chair and on the right side is 
a dictionary definition of chair. The MoMA Website reports that, ‘In One and 
                                                        
66 Otega y Gasset disagrees with this “capturing” being something useful in art. Ortega y Gasset 
writes that the only requirement to engage with this kind of work ‘is human sensibility and 
willingness to sympathize with our neighbor’s joys and worries’ (Ortega y Gasset, 1972, pp.11). 
He would have art be dehumanized and more dependant on ‘our power to focus on 
transparencies and images’ (pp.11). 
67 I am compelled to point out that this capacity is not limited or unique to stone. 
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Three Chairs, Joseph Kosuth represents one chair three ways’ (MoMA, 
2017). The chairs are considered and witnessed, but each “chair” is very 
different. Much of what is true about Michelangelo’s statues is true about 
Kosuth’s piece. Again, words permit what stone—or in this case the object: 
chair—does not, to paraphrase Segal.  
 
Standing in front of Kosuth’s piece, in an exhibition setting, the real chair is 
off limits as a chair, or functional object, and in this case we may be willing 
to concede that this piece is indeed three chairs. Sitting down to dinner, we 
would not consider either the picture of the chair or the definition of the 
chair useful. They are merely images of chairs. What is suggested back to 
us by this piece is not only how conceptual our grasp of the world can be, 
but also that at times we have the capacity to give an almost equal weight 
to the intangible—the photo and the definition—as we do to the object. 
This is often overlooked as we consider how the picture is a single view of the 
chair, and reveals much less about the chair than the chair itself. The brief 
dictionary description, in English, also does not exhaust the chair, and is only 
available to those able to read English. Both perhaps corroborate that kind of 
subtle iconoclasm where the object (the chair) is reduced to what it might 
be only as an object in a gallery (not in a dining room), and therefore 
without including the chair’s other, less conceptual life as an object.  
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The encounter with a photograph of a chair or of an image of a person 
differs from the encounter with the object (or person) in that the object is 
removed from direct experience. However, a statue is a real object. In some 
ways this is what always happens to sculpture in a gallery, it is 
encountered in the same way and with the same rules as an image. We may 
never touch or make use of a statue as we might a chair but it remains that 
a picture of a chair, or of a statue differs from the object, the description of 
the statue (or chair) is not equivalent to the object. When we allow the 
words to become the equivalent of a statue, we believe that the stone 
figure really is covered in a veil, or that the nudity of a statue is an 
equivalent for our nudity, and therefore taboo, and while this is the illusion 
that the artist may have wished to create, we are missing much more that 
the object in the world has to offer. 
 
In this context, we can see the separation of object and our idea about or 
our encounter with the object. The flesh and the shroud are not really 
separate layers, and the stone (or clay) is not a naked sinner. The words as 
concretized ideas appear to inform what we experience, and somehow override 
and veil the object from us, and in short, veil the thing itself, concealing what 
we could extract from the experience.  
 
Arthur Danto quotes Hegel, writing ‘art invites us to intellectual consideration, 
and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for knowing 
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philosophically what art is (2014, p.13/14). Recognizing that the philosophical 
invitation is there when we encounter statues is an approach to experiencing 
them with altered expectations. As Danto is quoted in the introduction, when, 
‘artists pressed against boundary after boundary, and found that the 
boundaries all gave way’ (p.14) and the result was the Duchamp-ian cry that 
really anything can be art, the status of statues as art objects began to decline. 
The object itself began to recede through a kind of popular conceptual 
iconoclasm that held statues to be merely lesser copies of us. Statues as art 
objects, I argue retain inherent albeit veiled philosophical concerns that 
directly correspond to us and then move beyond us. Statues offer us reflection 
on a knowing about the body, as well as materials required to make them, 
through to the disdain of our conflicted assessment that they are lesser copies 
of us.  
 
Apprehending some of the character of the construction of these assessments 
or narratives or concepts, Philosopher Shaun Gallagher begins his paper Self 
and Narrative (2015) this way: ‘Narratives don’t exist in thin air. They are 
physical things’ (2015, p.403). He goes on to argue that narratives exist in the 
world, dependent on other people who understand the narrative, which is 
made of language and semantics, which is mostly created by people probably 
not known by the original narrator. While Gallagher is moving toward making a 
point about inter-subjectivity, I use his argument, but suggest it means that we 
can be compelled by concepts whose origins and construction we are 
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unacquainted with, and ideas and thinking we are unaware we have allegiance 
to.68 
 
Feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz, further examining Deleuze and Guattari, 
also speaks about concepts. She takes a position cited in their book, What Is 
Philosophy? (1994), that while philosophy generates concepts as its way of 
addressing provocations and issues, art does not. Instead, art generates 
‘sensations, affects, and intensities’ (Grosz, 2012, p.1). Art does have concepts, 
but those concepts are ‘by-products or effects and not the material of art’ (p.4). 
Grosz proposes that philosophy ‘may find itself the twin or sibling of art’ (p.2), 
and could, rather than assessing or illuminating or speaking for art, be used to 
‘addresses the common forces and the regions of overlap between’ (p.2) art and 
philosophy. She suggests here a way to use art to do philosophy, to use 
philosophy to bring forward the by-products and effects of art into concepts. 
Drawing out her argument suggests that a statue itself has no specific concept 
or meaning that can be considered a fact or knowledge, only ‘sensations, affects, 
and intensities’ contained in the material, subject and presentation. Concepts 
appear to assist in our encounter with statues providing the means to glean a 
concept from the ‘impact’ the statue has on us. 
                                                        
68 Correspondingly, in Brian Massumi’s translation of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateaus, (1987) comes a short sentence in Massumi’s introduction: ‘A concept is a 
brick,’ followed by ‘It can be used to build a courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through 
the window’ (Deleuze, 1987, p.xii). This evokes an image of the physical consequence of the 
concreteness of ideas, the importance of how they are used, whether destructively or 




Statues are something other than a lesser form of ourselves. This is made 
explicit in practice where constructing a figure is unlike dissecting a cadaver or 
washing a badly scraped knee. As an example, as I began to have children I 
became interested in Madonna figures. I was investigating the mother and child 
together. The child form I most used in this series was a ball with a face and 
limbs (Images 27-30). There is little in this form to suggest life or a person. 
However, the concepts we encounter statues with make it coherent. The child 
was easily identified, although not an actual child shape. While the form did 
suggest what the feeling of a little child might be, it was augmented by cues, 
such as the way the larger figure held the ball, which is also present in other 
statues of a mother and child. It is this recognition of the nature of the object as 
something other than an illustration of a fact or knowledge that brings into 
focus the purpose of investigating and understanding our own encounter 
beyond the object itself.  
 
 
Methods and Diffraction 
Are we ventriloquizing the object, making it speak to us or for us, 
or is the object ventriloquizing us? Are we animating the dead 
material, lending voice to the voiceless, or is the object animating 
us, by constantly prompting us to talk about it and on its behalf. 
(Comay, 2015, p.44) 
 
The methods of this study rose from practice. An illustration of the construction 
of the methodology would be this: My practice is like a small pond. It has a 
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prescribed size and depth and statues are like a small stone that I toss into the 
pond repeatedly. I have tossed many stones into the pond and interpreted the 
circles and ripples for decades. This study represents another stone. This stone 
is to be dropped into the pond with the stone that represents statues making a 
diffraction pattern from which to collect additional data about the boundaries 
of the pond, the water, and the stones. 
 
Grosz claims that it is boundaries, or a frame, that ‘establishes territory out of 
the chaos that is the earth’ (Grosz, 2012, p.11). She writes, interpreting 
Philosopher Gilles Deleuze, and Psychoanalyst Philosopher Felix Guattari, that 
it is the frame that allows ‘qualities’ to become ‘expressive’ and to ‘transform,’ 
to become art. The framing, that allows qualities or attributes to alter, can be 
applied to both the frame of practice and the frame of the art object (or 
performance or installation, etc.) Framing through practice allows a site and an 
approach for the alteration of material to take place, while art frames qualities 
from which the work is made. A further framing of myself, as artist, inside the 
parameters of my studio and practice, allows qualities I may not perfectly 
realize, to be expressed and become a transformative force. That there are 
parameters laid out as studio and as the work that takes place there, should 
make disinterested reflection available—what I am to look at and consider is 
defined—but I am also part of the practice that takes place there and this is 
what challenges that position. 
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In her book Meeting The Universe Halfway (2007), theorist Karen Barad 
proposes diffraction as an overall methodology. For this study, diffraction, 
although similarly defined, has been used as a method, specifically for 
collection, consideration, and analysis of data. Much of what Barad proposes 
concerns reading ‘insights from . . . different areas of study through one 
another’ (Barad, 2007, p.25). This method comes from Barad’s understanding 
of Haraway, who considers diffraction, as opposed to reflection69, as a way to 
activate a reconfiguring of our social/political and conceptual engagement with 
the world. She writes (and Barad also quotes) of reflection and diffraction that, 
‘the first invites the illusion of essential, fixed position, while the second trains 
us to more subtle vision’ (Haraway, 1992, p.300). Haraway’s subtle vision has 
proved to be a method to recognize something overlooked or new in tacit 
studio knowledge. In short, being attentive to where the ‘effects of difference 
appear,’ has been both a device for structuring methods and a mechanism to 
redirect my interest to habitually discounted attributes or incidents that, 
viewed through this concept, proved to be significant.  
 
Barad further speaks about diffraction in an interview with Writer Iris van der 
Tuin. Diffraction, she implies, while kin to reflection, draws in related concepts 
rather than, like a mirror, merely displacing or repeating ‘the same elsewhere’ 
(Barad as cited by van der Tuin, (2012), p.51). Vital to the subtle difference a 
diffracted form of reflection made to data collection in this project, has been 
                                                        
69 Here reflection is used in the optical sense of the word. 
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Haraway’s assertion that ‘A diffraction pattern does not map where differences 




Barad also uses the term unknowability in her book, Meeting The Universe 
Halfway, (2007). She compares unknowability in physics of physical states with 
the unknowability of knowing ourselves, without the reflection of ourselves 
back from others. She writes, ‘we are prohibited, in principle, from knowing our 
own thoughts, motives, and intentions. The only possibility we have of catching 
a glimpse of ourselves is through the eyes of another’ (Barad, 2007, p.11). She 
highlights this point by making use of the play Copenhagen, by Michael Frayn 
about the physicists Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg at the end of WWII. 
Heisenberg was once Bohr’s student and an intimate of the Bohr’s household. 
Upon meeting again after several years, Bohr, Bohr’s wife Margrethe, and 
Heisenberg are in a room making small talk. The conversation is shallow, overly 
polite, and very awkward. The following are the internal dialogs of Heisenberg 
and Bohr: 
 
                                                        
70 As a further illustration, a diffraction pattern is formed in water when two stones are 
plopped into a still pond. When the waves created by each stone meet in phase, the waves build 
each other up, and conversely the waves that are out of phase cancel each other out 
(Veritasium, 2013). Here, making use of Levi-Strauss’ bricolage method, the other stones were 
chosen from suggested and intuited subjects at hand. The statue stone was dropped (into the 
pond of practice) with a new theory or subject stone to discover what characteristics would 
meet in phase. The ideas and aspects that met in phase were enhanced, and encouraged each 
other, while those that met out of phase were cancelled out.   
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Heisenberg: And yet how much more difficult still it is to catch 
the slightest glimpse of what’s behind one’s eyes. Here I am at 
the centre of the universe, and yet all I can see are two smiles 
that don’t belong to me….  
Bohr: I glance at Margrethe, and for a moment I see what she 
can see and I can’t— myself, and the smile vanishing from my 
face as poor Heisenberg blunders on.   
Heisenberg: I look at the two of them looking at me, and for a 
moment I see the third person in the room as clearly as I see 
them.  
Bohr: I look at him looking at me, anxiously, pleadingly, urging 
me back to the old days, and I see what he sees. And yes— now 
it comes, now it comes— there’s someone missing from the 
room. He sees me. He sees Margrethe. He doesn’t see himself.  
(Frayn, 1998, pp.87, Act 2) (Barad, 2007, p.12) 
 
The two men, one in frustration and one with acceptance, find self-evaluation to 
be impossible without an outside perspective. Heisenberg struggles with being 
the centre of his experience, and yet has no access to the thoughts or 
perspective of either Bohr or Margarethe and barely understands the effect he 
has on them. He can only briefly glimpse himself in their veiled responses. Bohr, 
knowing and having accepted this difficulty with self-perception, makes use of 
Margarethe for perspective and soon understands Heisenberg’s predicament, 
and he further knows Heisenberg is unaware of himself in context. In the 
studio, where I am specifically in the centre of practice and of this study, and in 
the investigation of the encounter with statues, it is this understanding that I 
have worked to acknowledge and respond to. 
 
The methods and practices that form the research of this study are outlined 
specifically in chapter three, however reflection has proven to be a significant 
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matter both as a condition of the studio to address through methods, and as a 
concern throughout negotiating the encounter. For example, a method for 
moving past self was to video myself working in the studio and to analyse the 
video of myself, rather than try to understand my actions while in the studio, or 
to record conversations with others about statues making it possible to analyse 
what was said with a method that could account for perspective, rather than in 
the moment. Frayn indicates our blindness to the difficulty with self-reflection 
or ‘seeing’ ourselves or hearing ourselves in the world, and underscores the 
necessity of a signal back from the world to achieve most self-knowledge. This 
suggests we cannot even exhaust knowledge of ourselves. Further the capacity 
to reflect on what we say about our encounter with statues requires that we see 
or hear ourselves speaking about statues. Like Heisenberg, we cannot see 
ourselves—or hear ourselves—from inside the conversation.  
 
A method for reflecting on our actions is the concept of reflective practice put 
forward by Schön, who suggests in Reflective Practice: its implications for 
classroom, administration and research (1995), the example of a ball player 
watching a video of the game the day after as a useful approach to a perspective 
on our own actions. My initial attempts at reflection in the studio were simply 
to write what I was thinking while I was working, which quickly became an 
additional and distracting duty while working. The early reflective experiments 
proved to be confusing and eventually indicated problems with this form of 
direct reflecting for me in my practice. Early in this study, I engaged affect as a 
theory to consider what happens when we encounter statues. I recorded myself 
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reading the book, The Transmission Of Affect, by Philosopher and Theorist 
Teresa Brennan. I played this reading in the studio as I began the reworking of 
the hips and thigh of a figure. In order to be reflective, I wrote down my 
thoughts in a notebook as they occurred to me.   
 
Initially, I did not recognize that I had only written what I was thinking about in 
the studio, and had not written about my actions in the studio, until a few 
weeks later, when I went back to consider the pictures and the text together. I 
discovered I had only written about affect and the concepts in the book I was 
listening to. I had not written anything about how I had approached and 
reworked the hips and thighs of the figure, which I altered and reworked for 
about three hours.  
 
This set of circumstances was similarly repeated and documented in the same 
way three more times. Even when I was aware that there had been a 
disconnection between doing and thinking, I was still moved to write about 
what I was thinking about not what I was actually doing. I found writing about 
what I was doing to be intensely disruptive. I returned again to Donald Schön, 
who points out that reflecting on actions generally stops flow. This was 
certainly my experience. Schön quotes Hannah Arendt as saying,  ‘All thinking 
demands a Stop and Think . . .’ (p.278), and mentions the well-known story of 
the ‘centipede paralyzed by the attempt to explain how he moves’ (277). It is 
important to note that Schön makes a clear distinction between reflection-on-
action, reflection-in-action and refection on reflection-in-action. He explains 
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that while reflection ‘takes place in the medium of words’ (Schön, 1995, p.3), 
reflection-in-action is more like a form of improvisation in music, where the 
unexpected comes from the context of the familiar, where tacit knowing is 
allowed to respond and disrupt routine, as responding in conversation does, or 
recognizing someone’s face, but it is something still difficult to describe in 
words. Reflecting on reflection-in-action differs from reflecting-on-action, in 
that it is a direct consideration of documentation of what happened during 
reflection-in-action, such as a video or recording, and not merely considering or 
analysing a situation after the event. 
 
Schön points out we all practice this kind of extemporization described as 
reflection-in-action. But again, the ballplayer would be hampered by explaining 
her actions during the game, however watching a video of the game the day 
after, the athlete is afforded the ability to see and understand ‘how [she] let that 
guard get around her each time.’ She knows she will have to be faster. ‘This she 
does in words – reflection on reflection-in-action takes place in words’ (Schön, 
1995, p.5). The ballplayer now knows what happened and what to do next to 
achieve the results she desires. Here, words meet the tacit knowledge of 
practice without disrupting flow. Schön further argues that reflection-in-action 
‘not only applies knowledge, but generates knowledge’ (Schön, 1995, p.5), 
therefore the perspective of the video offers the possibility of articulating and 
gaining knowledge from practice. With this understanding, the difficulties I had 
with direct reflection on practice evaporated, and several methods for 
discerning studio events—and other data—became obvious. 
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This study has focused on both statues and our encounter with them. My 
practice making statues in my studio positioned as encounter provided a 
perspective on the encounter with statues and served as a necessary platform 
from which to understand and analyse and to further comprehend how our 
encounters are formed and function. The materials I use are not the subject of 
my work but they are the tools I use to think with, to realize through, and so 
ultimately they are the means through which I transmit emotions and ideas. 
Therefore, through making work in the studio I am made aware of the non-
human nature of statues through materials in a particularly concrete way. 
Furthermore, through attempts to document these encounters in the studio, I 
became aware of the limitations of my perspective. In making use of the altered 
perspective offered by video allowed the possibility of understanding, 















Projects and Duality 
This chapter outlines a series of practical projects performed as research for 
this investigation alongside the main body of creative practice. The projects 
were designed to be explorations or features of the encounter with statues or, 
in the case of The Conversation Project, analysis of conversations with other 
people about their encounters with statues. The projects are identified as such 
to allow each to frame gains made through practice at certain stages of this 
study. Each project discloses the particular significance of applying an altered 
intention, derived from considering actions in practice diffractively with 
concepts from outside my practice.  
 
However, a preliminary examination of the various projects and encounters 
with statues finds a duality apparent in many. This duality has been engaged in 
discussions of the real/not real of a statue as a real object, but not a real person, 
or the statue is spoken about as if it were a real person although it is not, or 
when the statue embodies (or becomes the locus but is not actually the locus) 
of ideas or concepts resulting in the specific iconoclasm of destruction of 
images. In order to address the possible origins (and nature) of duality as it 
appears in relation to the encounter with statues in several of the projects 
(particularly the Conversation Project and the Giacometti Materials Project), 
duality is briefly explored, chiefly through a discussion of what metaphor (and 
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to some extent mirror neurons) might account for in our encounter with 
statues.  
Duality 
F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote in his 1936 article, The Crack Up that ‘the test of a first-
rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same 
time, and still retain the ability to function’ (Fitzgerald, 1936, p.2). While this 
appears to be a welcome mark of intellect, Fitzgerald ultimately determines this 
duality to be a source of something undesirable, as this study also finally 
indicates. The location and nature of the parallel thinking or duality uncovered 
in this study appears to be an unresolved way to speak about the real of the 
object⎯although it is the not real of the form⎯in terms of human traits. This 
can be clarified somewhat by what Philosopher Richard Wollheim calls ‘seeing-
in’ in Art and its Objects (1980). Seeing-in is a ‘matter of seeing Y in X’ (p.140)71, 
where X = the medium or representation and Y = the object, or what is 
represented. It is the difference between encountering a statue as a person and 
encountering the form of a person, and being aware of the impulse to bestow 
human properties and intention on it.  
 
What is real and what is not real is difficult to point to in these objects, it is 
indistinct and fluid. For instance, that the material is real but the form is not, is 
true but also not true, because the form is also real, but not a person. The 
double nature appears as parallel lines of meaning, held apart but in tandem, 
                                                        
71 As opposed to ‘seeing-as’ which is seeing X as Y. 
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often evident when we speak about statues, when ‘off guard’ or, conversely, 
when we are most certain about our encounter. This characteristic of a double 
nature in the encounter with statues is explored further in the remaining 
projects discussed in this chapter. 
 
The approach taken here has not been to seek a location or definition, but 
rather an indication of the duality concealed in the way we speak about 
encountering statues. To this indication, I received an e-mail from my Director 
of Studies, the Sculptor Dr. Michael Bowdidge. He wrote about one of his small 
statue-figures placed near a window; 
 
Looking at him 'looking out of the window' I was struck by the fact 
that at some level that seems very real, as if that's what he's actually 
doing but at another level I know he's not. (Bowdidge, 2017)72 
 
He continued, writing that because he was quite familiar with this figure, he 
understood that the looking out of the window he perceived his figure to be 
doing, rose from himself, and was not something the statue was actually doing. 
He wrote, ‘I wonder if we all retain, somewhere, some almost intuitive kind of 
scepticism about 'other minds’ (Bowdidge, 2017). He went on to concede that 
solipsism is neither easy to refute nor of much use in getting along with other 
people. The suggestion is that because we are socialized not to continually 
                                                        
72 Bowdidge, M, m_bowdidge@hotmail.com, 2017. stuff. [E-mail] Message to L Osborn 
(lbosborn@aol.com). Sent Sat, Jun 10, 2017 6:34 am. [Accessed 10 June 2017]. 
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question other consciousnesses, that perhaps this is what empowers objects 
shaped like people to appear to look out a window, because we are used to 
assuming the internal reality of the other. We see the statue’s shape, he implied, 
and assume a consciousness until it once again becomes obvious that the statue 
isn’t real. However, while solipsism and the perils therein certainly play some 
role in the encounter with statues, it cannot fully account for the encounter in 
the story of Pygmalion, or the contemporary touching of the effigy of Victor 
Noir, or embarrassment at the nudity of statues.  
 
A doll can appear to be ‘looking out the window’ but we do not necessarily 
believe in its consciousness or think it is alive until we notice that it doesn’t 
breathe or move. The underlying assumption of life is not exactly what allows 
us to speak about looking in relation to the doll while knowing the doll is not 
actually looking. The nature of our encounter with statues is revealed and 
shown to be subtle and complex when David Getsy writes about the passive 
resistance of statues (2004), or Jean-Paul Sartre writes in his 1948 article, The 
Search For The Absolute, (1996), that Giacometti’s figures distil life and that ‘for 
three thousand years sculpture has modelled only corpses’ (1996, p.186), and 
when, in the 2014 catalogue for The Human Factor Exhibition at the Hayward 
Gallery, Ugo Rondinone is quoted as saying that his figures ‘are exposed and 
vulnerable because they are nude’ (p.160).  
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There is nothing to suggest that Getsy thinks statues are really acting out a 
resistance, or that Sartre supposed all statues were dead people until 
Giacometti made a living one, or Rondinone believes his statues are really 
naked and exposed people, but they have all written as though the statues are 
something other than a stone or wax or metal, without apology or self-
consciousness. 
 
Metaphor and Mirror Neurons  
As discussed in chapter one, mirror neurons are the neurons that fire in the 
brain both during an action and when observing an action performed by 
another. The relevance to this study lies in the suggestion that the ‘body state 
simulated by mirror neurons is not the subject’s body state’ (Damasio, 2010, 
p.110). This again brings the form of the statue into question, suggesting the 
possibility of mirror neurons working in relation to the encounter with statues, 
and therefore connected to the dual nature of our discourse about statues. 
Instead of solipsism, as my Director of Studies suggested, it is perhaps a more 
embodied state that allows us to recognize the realness of the object and to 
then confuse the not-realness of the person shape, combining both at once 
through an embodied encounter with statues. As Ramachandran suggests, the 
significance to this particular study—of what mirror neurons are supposed 
do—is that they allow the barriers ‘between you and other human beings’ 
(2009, pp.6:00) to dissolve without actually touching. 
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 A statue offers the experience of tactile, rather than purely conceptual, 
affinity.73 Further drawing out the function of mirror neurons, in a 2005 study 
by Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff called The Brain’s Concepts:  The Role Of 
The Sensory-Motor System In Conceptual Knowledge (2005), the role of mirror 
neurons (also Canonical, and Action-location neurons) or a group called  
‘executing schemas, (or X-schemas for short.)’ (p.14) is addressed in conceiving 
of and/or executing new and previously unconsidered ideas. The tasks x-
schema perform are described this way:  
 
In short, they are capable of carrying out imaginative simulations. 
Furthermore, those imaginative simulations can carry out abstract 
conceptual reasoning as well as actions and perceptions. The 
result is a neural theory of conceptual metaphor. (Lakoff & Gallese, 
2005, p.15) 
 
This is a suggestion that metaphor is part of the mechanism of constructing 
new ideas and the comprehension of abstract ideas. What Gallese and Lakoff 
are proposing is that we build from what we know, for example, because we 
have experience with travel, we can then conceptualize a long term love 
relationship as a journey. Consequently, we are able to jump ahead in our 
                                                        
73 Film maker Daria Martin has edited a recently published a book about mirror synaethesia 
called Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia; Thresholds of Empathy With Art 2017, which brings together 
newly commissioned essays of the blurring particularly between sight and touch and empathic 
responses by neuroscientists, anthropologists, artists, and art theorists. Martin proposes ‘the 
construction of a certain kind of mind—a synaesthetic mind—as a model for looking at art 
work and the converse can also be true—artworks might model the mind’ (Martin, 2014, 4:11). 
Martin investigates how mirror-touch can model an empathic way of engaging with artworks. 
Statues are ideally situated to provide a model for this kind of empathic response. Furthermore, 
this project includes the assumption that all perception is embodied, and that we make use of 
more than one sense at a time. 
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knowing, extending and negotiating the similarities and differences74. We can 
see, conceptualize, and grasp a previously un-encountered significance. 
 
While the quote does seem to highlight certain assumptions in neuroscience, 
particularly where neurons are described as ‘capable of carrying out 
imaginative simulations’ (p.15),75 perhaps this neural capacity speaks to the 
reason we see a veiled statue when it is merely one stone carved in a particular 
way, or consider a statue to be embarrassingly naked, or feel the grief of Mary 
holding Jesus. To me, this is particularly apparent in religious statues, where 
the person presented as a statue is already a conceptual metaphor. For 
example, Michelangelo’s Pieta: a still young and virginal Mary, holds the corpse 
of her grown son, on her lap; echoing the Madonna and child, which adds 
substantially to the pity and the sorrow. None of this is physically possible in 
our world, but it is for a statue and we revel in the realness and possibility 
proposed by the statue. It is the manifestation of several very abstract concepts. 
The statue is, although it is also not, almost evidence of a moment that was and 
                                                        
74 Graham Harman further draws out the uses of metaphor in terms of an object’s allure, briefly 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
75 Damasio begins Self Comes To Mind (2010) saying that this book was ‘written to start over’ 
(Damasio, 2010, p.6). Damasio writes that, though he had been engaged in studying the human 
brain and mind for over 30 years, he had grown ‘dissatisfied with [his former] account of the 
problem’ (p.6) of consciousness. He says that after looking again, at research old and new, in 
slightly different ways, he has come to alter his former thinking, principally on two problems: 
‘the origin and nature of feelings and the mechanisms behind the construction of the self’ (p.7). 
His book, he claims is about ‘what we still do not know but wish we did’ (p.7). What Damasio 
has achieved through re-conceiving his former ‘account of the problem’ (p.6) of consciousness, 
is identifying where the key problems lie in the underling framework. Alva Noë also makes this 
point: He writes in Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature that ‘neuroscience is straitjacketed, 
not by the methods of science, to be sure, but by unacknowledged philosophical assumptions, 
not so much by a theory as by an ideology about what we are’ (Noë, 2015, p.120). That you are 
your brain, he continues, ‘is not one of neuroscience’s findings; it is rather a raft of assumptions 
that have been taken for granted by neuroscience from the start; it is Descartes’s conception 
but given a materialist makeover (Noë, 2015, pp.120-21). 
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still is real, but is not real. Solid as a concept and here, made solid beyond 
words in the world. 
 
To claim that mirror neurons are the means through which we can consider a 
veiled woman rather than a stone or we might be made uncomfortable by a 
naked statue is clearly beyond the scope of this study. I have merely grasped a 
possibility that speaks to my experience (in the form of encounters) with 
statues. The action of simulation of mirror neurons as described by Damasio 
speaks to experiences documented for this study, such as being caught unaware 
by statues, and my own experience of making figures and feeling that a form is 
human shaped or knowing how to alter that form to better make use of it. The 
action of mirror neurons suggests to me how the gesture of a statue might be 
able to cause empathy to rise in me, or how I can use gesture to indicate a 
mother and child when neither is shaped like a real mother or child. 76 
                                                        
76 The ability of neurons to influence other cells is the foundation of the construction of brain 
maps, which are generated in the brain and are actual, physical, cartographical things, contends 
Damasio. This is accomplished somewhat like a digital billboard, where each piece does its part. 
The brain both receives information from the body about the body with which it has a close 
physiological bond, and through the body about the world, with which it has no physiological 
bond. Damasio says that, ‘we generate brain maps of the body’s interior and use them as the 
reference for all other maps’ (pp.9:48). ‘When the brain makes maps, it informs itself’ (2010, 
p.67). When the brain makes maps, it creates images, achieved through the senses (the body), 
and stores the multi-sensory images. This infers that our memories are full-body experiences 
made of smell, temperature, feelings, emotions, etcetera. The brain has the ability to bring the 
images back into mind when needed (Damasio, 2010, p.67). The maps are made in specific 
parts of the brain, stored in different brain regions, but recall takes place in the areas in which 
the maps were constructed. Map images are the main currency of minds, created in the brain to 
serve, update, and inform the organism, typically unconsciously 76, of appropriate actions of the 
body toward continuing or gaining ‘biological value’ (p.76) and a maintained existence, and to 
accumulate memory and, eventually, autobiography. Damasio submits that when the embodied 
organism encounters objects in the world, it is a full body experience.  
Damasio contends that this is because ‘the brain actually records the multiple 
consequences of the organism’s interactions with the entity’ (p.141), it is not just the object’s 
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That we are a body in the world, embodied, and that what and how we think is 
absolutely locked into that embodied experience appears certain, yet it is 
difficult to internalize this structure and not imagine our minds as separate. 
Contrary to Cartesian duality, Damasio argues that our mind arises from our 
body; that the body is where consciousness comes from. This idea is not a new 
one, Baruch Spinoza in Ethics, published in 1677, also opposes Descartes’ mind-
body duality. Damasio writes in Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the 
Feeling Brain (2003) that when Spinoza wrote that ‘the human mind is the idea 
of the human body’ (Damasio, 2003, p.12) (Spinoza, 1955, p.6), he was 
describing the mind as a manifestation of the body. Spinoza’s statement 
parallels the central theme, The Self Comes to Mind, which is, in short, that ‘the 
body is the foundation of the conscious mind’ (Damasio, 2010, p.21). This 
                                                        
visual structure that is recorded and logged, like an image, it is a fully embodied experience that 
is logged or mapped, which includes a prejudiced history, previous consequences and 
unpredictable feelings. ‘States of mind begin physically, and physical they remain’ (Damasio, 
2010, p.341). In observing what we recall about an object, it is clear, writes Damasio, that it is a 
composite of ‘the interaction between the organism and the object during a certain period of 
time’ (p.142). Damasio goes on to summarize: ‘The brain holds a memory of what went on 
during an interaction, and the interaction importantly includes our own past, and often the past 
of our biological species and of our culture’ (p.142). Therefore, Damasio would allow that we 
bring our autobiography to each interaction as a means to understand the world, in terms of 
biological value, and consequently to further encounter and grow self, which suggests we do 
this with each encounter with a statue as well. Our history, personal and collective, is part of the 
encounter. 
What Damasio labels the autobiographical self calls for ‘very elaborate coordinating 
mechanisms’ (p.225). He writes that a conscious mind consists of a flow of images, ‘a lived past 
and anticipated future’ (Damasio, 2010), mediated by a subjective perspective, or an 
autobiographical self. The brain receives information about the world through the body or it 
recalls information logged through the body. Toward this end, the brain maps the body, 
creating neural maps or images of the body, to better gather information through the body 
about the world. ‘Consciousness allows us to experience these maps of bodily experience as 
images, to manipulate those images, and to apply reasoning to them’ (p.67), and it is then the 
perception of self that allows consciousness. (‘We are only fully conscious when self comes to 
mind’ (Damasio, 2011)). It is the mapping of experience in or through the experienced body 
form that is pertinent to the encounter with statues.  
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understanding of the whole body as mind suggests how we come to experience 
empathy with what a statue is feeling, and to read its thoughts and intentions. A 
statue’s form is the outer manifestation of mind. 
 
It is difficult not to believe that our mind and body are separate and that ‘the 
mind lacks physical extension. I believe this intuition is false’ writes Damasio,  
Viewing the mind as a nonphysical phenomenon, discontinuous with 
the biology that creates and sustains it, is responsible for placing the 
mind outside the laws of physics, a discrimination to which other brain 
phenomena are not usually subject (Damasio, 2010, p.15).  
 
This understanding suggests that the concept of the separation of mind and 
body is misleading. It seems implausible that the mind would be ‘different in 
kind from the biological tissues and functions of the organism that begets it’ 
(p.15). The important division is not that of mind and body but body, and an 
interior body manifestation of world. The division appears to be the difference 
between a close physiological bond with body and the internally mapped bond 
with the world. It follows that we use formerly mapped experience to 
encounter and comprehend the world with which we have no physiological 
bond; the body in the world is how we make sense of it and are connected to it. 
Accordingly, the form of the body must be particularly relevant to locating and 
knowing ourselves. For us, the form of the human body is the ultimate 
configuration or map of our experience. The form of the body is how we 




With an appreciation of the physicality of the embodied mind, and mindful that 
‘we see the mind with eyes that are turned inward; and we see biological 
tissues with eyes that are turned outward’ (Damasio, 2010, p.15), what follows 
are the descriptions and discussions of experiences or encounters from periods 
of practice that took place during the course of my research that I have framed 
as projects.  
 
The Projects 
These projects are described from notes or audio recordings to demonstrate 
how my engagement with the figure and materials required something to 
change slightly in order for me to understand my encounter or my actions and 
their consequences differently. It was essential to approach the familiar 
routines and procedures of practice with an adjusted perspective that would 
both reveal and translate actions in the studio I could neither see myself doing, 
nor speak about much beyond what I thought I was doing with materials. This 
is the case for all the projects with the exception of The Conversation Project, 
which was performed within the bounds of practice but directly involved 
others and recording our conversations and therefore involved Ethics 
Committee approval and to disclose a method of analysis of the data.  
 
The Conversation Project 
October 2014- February 2017 
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The initial rationale for conducting conversations about statues was to record 
the way people spoke about past encounters with statues or what feelings or 
actions if any they attributed to statues77. The data for exploring this encounter 
with statues was collected as informal conversations. The participants were 
invited to discuss statues and the conversations were allowed to be as brief or 
as lengthy as was natural in each case, occasionally shifting away from statues 
altogether. Through applying Grounded Theory Data Analysis (GTDA) as per 
(Glaser, 1992), to forty-four interviews, the experience of the parallel and 
untethered qualities of real and not real in statues as was apparent, as well as 
how encountering statues is not a rare or uncommon experience.  
 
With the appropriate ethical approval in place, (documentation in endnote i), I 
began to record conversations about statues with volunteers. I sent an e-mail in 
July to a group who signed up during a show in 2014 at the ACA Gallery to 
receive “more information about having your thoughts about statues recorded.” 
Several responded and included people who had not been to the gallery. When 
approval was granted I began to meet people to talk.  
 
I recorded conversations from 2014 through 2017. To examine the 
conversations, I made use of Grounded Theory Data Analysis (GTDA) as 
discovered by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (Glaser & Strauss, 2006), and 
considered the method further through (Glaser, 1992) or Glaserian Grounded 
                                                        
77 This is not an interest in specific language usage.  
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Theory. This method works to reveal the theory in the data, and for this project 
the core variable was related to the encounter with statues as spoken about by 
others. My aim for this part of the study of the encounter with statues was to 
document people speaking about statues, not to bolster any specific point. 
GTDA as an approach to data was well situated to reveal a theory from these 
conversations78. 
In brief, Glaser describes three primary constituents of analysis as: 
 
(1) data collection, which soon becomes intricately involved with 
in (2) the methods analysis, that soon generate the concepts, 
hypotheses and their integration which results in the production 
of (3) written or verbal presentation (Glaser, 1992, p.13).  
Because theory comes from or through the data in GTDA, the analysis takes 
place over time and in stages. As data are collected, coding, a primary method 
of the analysis begins. The codes that emerge from the data are topics or ideas 
that repeat or seem important, in this case, to people speaking about statues. 
These ideas or codes are then considered through memoing79. I either wrote or 
recorded my thinking about what the conversations might reveal. An example 
of analysis through memoing came when I had made a significant number of 
recordings and realized through considering the codes I was discovering that I 
had never had to explain what a statue was to anyone, beyond that I wanted to 
focus on the human form.  
                                                        
78 Again, I did not work from transcripts of these conversations, which I found unwieldy and 
confusing. Rather I made use of repeated listening and was able to find codes in concepts or 
similar meaning, i.e. references to David, the statue by Michelangelo, ranged from direct to 
“some big naked guy.” Each was coded as a mention of the David statue. 
79 Memoing is the theorizing of ideas about codes and their relationships. Most of the memoing 
I did was recorded into my phone, although some was written. 
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It seemed clear from listening to the conversations that statues, whether large 
in a public space, or small at home, were known and had been considered to 
some degree by everyone I spoke to for this study. I accumulated twenty-one 
categories or codes from forty-three conversations. The code list was then 
considered, ideas and links were sketched out through memoing, and primary 
concepts began to emerge that explained the tendencies revealed in the data. 
Again, the data was not collected or considered proof of a hypothesis or concept 
I could articulate, the theories that were revealed through following the process 
are grounded in the data, and showed themselves through a slow consideration 
of that data.  
 
It became clear that the nature of the conversations did not lend itself to 
transcription. I did transcribe several, but discovered that word searches were 
not the ideal way to code these conversations. The conversations were 
undirected and therefore, ranged very widely, and speaking about statues as if 
they are real people is subtle. I had the most success listening repeatedly to 
what was said and noting the context, and then coding after listening again. 
This is due partly to the nature of what became the theory gleaned from the 
interviews.  
 
An example of what was revealed through the conversations is apparent in two 
quotes from conversations about my work recorded at a 2016 show of work 
from The Sins Project (described in Projects) completed for this study. “It is the 
 146 
one on that side, over there, that is definitely looking at you” (2016) and “[when 
I see a statue] I expect some sort of movement from it” (2016). Neither 
statement is a particularly revealing comment about how we encounter statues; 
but in context the statements are conspicuous.  
 
The first was a woman talking about how the eyes in figurative work are 
important to her and draw her in, and the other woman was knowledgeably 
speaking about her approach to art. She went on to say that although she 
admired the craftsmanship of the Lincoln Memorial (in Washington DC), that 
there is an “inherent dishonesty” (2016) in the material of statues because they 
look like they will move, but they don’t. (Videos 1, 2, and 3). 
 
Of course my statue is not looking at the woman who claims it is, and she knows 
that, but in this situation she is faced with the difficulty of articulating what 
happens when it feels like a statue is looking. The other statement is more 
difficult to parse. To encounter statues considering them inherently dishonest 
and disappointing in their stillness obstructs the possibility of understanding 
them as objects. The concept that statues are false and disappointing 
concretizes the idea that statues are fake people, rather than an opportunity to 
engage with our assumptions, desires and the interwoven strangeness of 
material and image. 
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What follows is the beginning of another conversation recorded for this project 
in 2015 that lasted thirty-nine minutes. It demonstrates the speed and subtly of 
answering no to a direct, although obvious question about statues thinking. The 
person I spoke with in this case responded with laughter to my direct question 
about statues, but immediately went on to speak about emotions related to the 
statue and how friendly and open it appeared.  
 
Lisa Osborn (LO): Do you know what statues are thinking when you look 
at them? 
Subject (Sub): No. 
[Both laugh] 
Sub: Uhmmmm . . .maybe,  I think  . . . I don’t read thoughts into them as 
maybe like  . . . emotions . . . or just a  general demeanor . . .  
LO: What about this one? [LO indicates a statue.) 
Sub: It seems childlike and friendly . . . curious . . open but not 
terribly aggressive or coming-into-your-space. The eyes are 
white. I think that is why it is not threatening (2015). 
 
 
The subject went on to reveal that she doesn’t like to have dolls or statues in 
her house because they appear to be watching. After discussing an encounter 
with a rubber snake on my porch, the woman connected the experience she had 
with the rubber snake to dolls. She spoke about repeatedly being caught 
unaware or surprised by dolls, ‘they always register out of the corner of my eye 
as someone there watching’ (Osborn, 2015, 8:59). This particular conversation 
ended with the woman expressing that she did not think my dog would 
similarly find empathy, experience the uncanny, or be caught unaware by a 
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stuffed bear, he would ‘just tear it up, probably,’ (Osborn, 2015), she said. She 
was aware that the feeling of doll or statue or stuffed animal eyes watching 
would probably not translate to animals, thereby suggesting it is not a real 
threat, but her unease with eyes was not dissipated through having this 
understanding. She retained a double or parallel perception of statues.  
 
Around the core variable of others speaking about their encounters with 
statues, I accumulated twenty-one categories 80 (Code Key, Appendix i). The 
conversations were continually coded, and analysed through memoing, 
resulting in two particular theories that were further supported through 
diffraction with other theories emerging in practice81.  
 
The two entwined theories pertinent to this study produced from analysing this 
particular data were these: of primary significance to this study was 
documentation of a duality frequently manifested when speaking about statues. 
Statues are spoken about convincingly as both real and not real, a kind of 
paradox, which corroborates my reading of Getsy’s Abstract Bodies: Sixties 
Sculpture and the Expanded Field of Gender (2015) and Body Doubles; Sculpture 
In Brittan 1877-1905 (2004) as noted.  
                                                        
80 The opening of the conversation above would have been coded: NoBut, meaning no was the 
answer to direct question about statues, but the conversation continued as if statues had 
human traits.   
81 As an example, the way we speak about statues as real and not real directly corresponded to 
concepts in Getsy’s writing specifically, as well as Noë’s concept of access to knowledge. 
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The second (and more generalised) theory that appeared encompassed the 
significance of statues as literal placeholders for broader concepts or ideas 
exemplified in effigies or in the removal of statues, such as leaders or religious 
figures, when what those figures stood for is no longer supported, which also 
suggests a possible foundation for most literal forms of iconoclasm. However, 
this idea can still be said to fall under a parallel knowing and not knowing about 
person shaped objects. An overarching and useful indication was that 
people⎯even those who do not attend art gallery openings⎯have opinions82 
and stories⎯often from childhood⎯about statues that are important to them. 
This suggests that statues are integrated into our engagement in the world and 
that they are (physically) accessible beyond the art gallery context. This theory 
also finds support in related literature, particularly where statues are used as 
examples as in Comay (2014) writing about Hegel and the defaced statues or in 
Oscar Wilde’s story The Happy Prince, which begins: ‘High above the city, on a 
tall column, stood the statue of the Happy Prince’ (Wilde, 1997). 
 
 
GTDA as a method functioned well throughout this project83 and this study. 
While I made formal and considered use of the method to analyse the 
conversations, I found the general structure of Glaserian GT⎯particularly the 
                                                        
82 A particular turn in several conversations was the Robert E. Lee Statue in New Orleans and 
whether it should be removed. A conversation that often moved to racism.    
83 See The Slides Project for further discussion. 
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emergence rather than forcing of patterns and connections⎯useful and to 
relate closely to the method of diffraction. I made use of and positioned my 
findings from this project throughout this study. 
 
 The Shusterman Project 
March-April 2014 
Photography as Performative Process  
This project was designed to both engage new concepts and a new mode of 
practice. I began the process of data collection through practice with a literal 
acting out of a photography project recounted in Body Consciousness: A 
Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics, by Richard Shusterman, (2008).  
Shusterman engages with Roland Barthes Camera Lucida (Barthes, 1982), while 
this project was designed to engage Shusterman’s neologism somaesthetics, 
which appeared to address mind and body issues both practically and 
conceptually. It was also an initial effort to employ practice as research. 
 
I designed a project with photographer DT Maynor, modelled on Chapter 11 in 
Thinking through the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics, 2012 (p.239), in which 
Shusterman describes his encounter and experience as a photographic subject 
of Radiant Flux, a project by Parisian artist Yann Toma. In the chapter, 
Shusterman delineates his philosophy on photography, cites other writers and 
thinkers, contextualizes the project, and explains the steps and methods he and 
photographer Toma implemented to gain what Shusterman described as the 
‘transformation of an ordinary person into a photographic subject’ (p.257). 
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Shusterman’s focus is on the position of the sitter in a photograph, which he 
explores through Barthes discussion of his own self-consciousness.  
  
I constructed a project84 following Shusterman’s description in his essay in 
which I would experience being the subject of another artist’s artwork, or as 
Shusterman describes it, ‘the performative process of making a photograph of a 
human subject, and the sorts of artistic and aesthetic experiences that this 
process involves’ (Shusterman, 2012, p.241). This included reading Roland 
Barthes, and following the methods that Shusterman used working with a 
photographer. The goal was to understand what the transformation into a 
photographic subject meant, through a reasonable portrait of me in everyday 
clothes, while Shusterman wore a ‘gold body stocking’ (p.255), and Yann Toma 
painted his aura in light.  The project was outlined carefully and performed 
with detailed records. When the photographer and I performed, and I read and 
compared Barthes’ Camera Lucida, as Shusterman had, the results I 
experienced were different than Shusterman’s but I experienced an enlarged 
comprehension of both Shusterman and Barthes work and experienced an 
altered perspective from which to base my interpretations.  
 
For example, Shusterman interprets Barthes confession of self-consciousness 
when sitting for a photograph as vanity. After my experience being 
photographed for this project, my reading Barthes was that, in finding vanity 
                                                        
84 Pictures and project draft in Appendix iii.  
 152 
where he might not have expected it, Barthes, after a gentle, self-deprecating, 
reflexive confession, moves on to bigger ideas. Shusterman’s focus was on the 
anxiety of how he appears to others and the consideration of how to improve or 
alter that appearance. (Appendix ii) 
 
The photos resulting from this project are reasonable portraits of me. However, 
experiencing how making use of doing⎯not just sitting in a library 
thinking⎯to enhance my comprehension of both a primary and secondary text, 
allowed me to move the process specifically into my practice making statues.  
 
This was straightforwardly transferred into the studio and provided a template 
for further methods to articulate investigations through practice. In discussions 
with the photographer, I also became aware of how necessary addressing the 
issue of self-reflection was to the success of this project. This project allowed 
the experience of performing practice as a means to research, and engaging 
concepts, and a clear decision on the issue of mind and body, which has been 
explored further in this study primarily through the work of philosopher Ava 
Noë (Noë, 2009) (Noë, 2015); neurobiologist, Antonio Damasio, (Damasio, 
2003) (Damasio, 2010), and philosopher Graham Harman (Harman, 2010) 
(Harman, 2012) (Harman, 2016). 
 
The Berlin Figure Project (Foam)  
May-July 2014 
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Following the The Shusterman Project, I designed a project for the studio 
focused on materials. This project was an attempt to have work to show in 
Berlin during the 2014 Transart summer residency (attended as a requirement 
for this study). As I have suggested previously, the figures I make need the 
support of the studio. The work is large and the materials I work in—clay, 
cement, and steel—result in each piece being relatively fragile and heavy. I 
resolved to make six pieces, similar to and recognizable as my usual work, but 
that could reasonably be shipped to Berlin from where I live, in Louisiana. I 
imposed a weight limit and looked for alternate materials with which to copy 
four previously finished figures leaving two pieces to evolve from the new 
process. The materials I chose, (expanding foam, canvas, and PVC pipe) to 
construct these lighter pieces, delivered a lighter weight, and to some extent, a 
similar form, but did not work in the same way clay and steel do. Ultimately, I 
successfully completed all six figures and did ship them all to Berlin. 
 
The six pieces I brought to Berlin were each two meters or more tall. I had the 
process of making the foam work documented in a short video by the 
photographer DT Maynor. This project reverberated throughout the rest of the 
study. The work I made in an alternative material, as copies were sufficient 
approximations (though awkward and in my opinion inelegant) of my work in 
clay. However, these pieces (clumsy lightweight copies of ceramic and steel 
statues) were less interesting than work that began to grow directly from the 
new materials and process. To me, this indicated that the engagement with 
material was influential on the outcome of the work. (Video 4) 
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While my aim was to make lightweight copies of my work, in altering the 
material only (not subject, overall intention, and it was still I who made the 
work), other forms and options for making the figure revealed themselves.  
 
The experience of using materials that perform differently to make familiar 
work suggested to me that it is in the engagement of materials and myself 
through making that material matters. I was able to carry out making work in 
alternate materials that, as I became familiar with them, was satisfactory and 
intriguing enough to choose to work with some of the materials again. I 
discovered that while materials are fundamental to the work, they are not 
really particularly important to the finished artwork (beyond conservation or 
mobility etc.). The alternate materials allowed me to have figures for the Berlin 
residency, but shipping weight is not usually the focus of my work. I discovered 
that my work is, I suppose, a publication of a private experience85. The 
materials appear to be primary to my engagement, but secondary and even a 
hindrance to my completed work. 
 
The GoPro Project   
March 2015 - September 2017 
                                                        
85 The work does something other than illustrate ideas, it is a manifestation of something else 
as when artist Grayson Perry speaks about the art object itself, he says that he wants it to be 
more than something: ‘I could think it up in the bath and just phone it in’ (Perry, 2012), 
implying that for him, the art object is something further than an idea, or its concepts, which is 
perhaps what engagement with materials has to offer to concepts.  
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Early in this study, I again hired DT Maynor to film how I resolved using 
alternative materials in order to bring examples of my work from Louisiana to 
Berlin. I wanted to document the process and be able to show myself working 
with new materials in my studio when I presented in Berlin. However, I had 
difficulty working with an observer in the studio. I was self-conscious, and 
aware I might be taking too long with drawn-out material struggles, and I was 
hampered by having to remember to face the camera or the light. When I 
watched these videos, it was clear to me I was uncomfortable, and rather than 
just doing what I was doing in the studio, I was self-conscious, performing, and 
considering what I might be showing.  (Video 5) 
 
Exploring the concept of reflecting on reflection-in-action as per Donald Schön, 
I considered using a GoPro camera to document my work in the studio. A GoPro 
is a small camera that can be set to film continuously or can take a picture every 
thirty seconds, which can then be strung together into a kind of movie showing 
action in the studio. I chose to use the GoPro and the pictures for two reasons. 
The battery lasts about one hour filming or about four hours taking a picture 
every thirty seconds. Aside from the extended time advantage, the videos I 
would have to watch repeatedly were not so detailed as to be awkward for me 
and difficult to watch. I could get a good idea of what I did without having to 
feel self-conscious about every detailed move I made for hours. Also, because I 
wouldn’t know exactly when the battery would die, I was free to assume the 
camera may or may not be on while I worked. This helped me to forget about 
the camera and to just do what I do in the studio.  
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I regularly set up the camera, left it to run, and watched the footage, usually 
about a week or so after it was shot.86 Several categories rose as I applied 
Grounded Theory Data Analysis to the footage (Appendix ii), but very simply, 
the ultimate revelation was that I am the only thing moving in the studio. While 
this may at first appear a little simplistic, it is important, as this is not at all my 
experience of the studio, and led me to the understanding that while my 
practice and work in the studio is something I have constructed and invented, I 
do not comprehend it completely.  
 
In short, I was faced with videos documenting my actual experience in the 
studio, which radically differed from how I described that experience.87 The 
data collected through documenting my studio practice arrived at a particular 
result which supports both conclusions drawn from other studies completed in 
this project and concepts that are discussed particularly in (Schön, 1983) 
(Reflecting on reflection-in-action), (Harman, 2012)(sensual object), (Noë, 
2015)(access to objects), and (Grosz, 2012)(concepts in relation to art and 
philosophy).  
 
                                                        
86 I shot about 40+ hours of video, which roughly equals 90+ hours of documented studio time. 
87 In the past I have described it this way: “The studio is full of noise and moving around. It is 
things happening one after⎯or because of ⎯another, sparking or overwhelming the ideas or 
possibilities that arise and decline. It is busy and loud and full of action.” 
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Making use of a GoPro camera to document my studio practice came directly 
from a diffractive approach to Schön and his ball player example. When I failed 
at writing and reflecting in the studio about what I did, I repositioned myself to 
take the role of a ball player watching her performance after the game is over. A 
similar approach to Glaserian GT on video was employed in a study called 
Attuning: A Theory of Interaction of People with Severe and Profound Intellectual 
and Multiple Disability and their Carers by Colin Rien Griffiths (2010), where the 
researcher makes use of video to collect data about the interaction of people 
who do not speak.  
 
When GTDA was applied to my studio footage, the revelation was simply that I 
am the only thing moving in the studio. The theory became that my experience 
of the studio differs from what it appears I do in the studio. What I physically do 
in the studio was familiar and obvious to me when I watched the video. I 
recognized how much I move, and that I work on several pieces at once, partly 
due to the requirements of clay, and partly my own temperament, but before 
viewing it, I would not have described the experience I saw documented. 
 
The Sins Project   
July 2014- (Exhibition) September 2016 
I structured a project to consider and engage ways that feelings might be 
transmitted or recognized in statues. I designed this investigation to address 
some of the vagaries inherent in my attempts to grasp the nature of affect, as 
presented by Teresa Brennan, as an unseen force.   
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Brennan makes use of the seven deadly sins as a technique to characterize 
affect. (Brennan, 2004, p.21) She writes that affects are primarily negative, that 
they are not endogenous and should, in this case be understood as ‘mobile 
forces.’ Brennan suggests that the negative affects ‘are identical with demons 
and/or deadly sins’ (p.21). She argues that ‘the seven deadly sins are not acts. 
They are affects:’ (p.21) and here she lists the sins as pride, sloth, envy, lust, 
anger, gluttony, and avarice. My plan was to construct nine figures, three 
figures at a time. I began with Gluttony, Avarice, and Acedia (sloth), then I 
would consider Lust, Wrath, and Pride; followed by Envy, an eighth sin 
described as a kind of meta sloth, and Love. 
 
In The Transmission of Affect (2004), Teresa Brennan’s discussion about affect 
focuses theoretical attention on the body and its attendant charges and 
energies. Affect, she suggests, circulates in and among and through bodies. It is 
an experiential state, it is contagious, and it isn’t stopped by the boundary of 
the skin. 
 
When Brennan suggests that the deadly sins are an understanding of the 
affects, it is important to consider that she is comparing the negative affects 
(like anger and pride) to early conceptions of demons or the seven deadly sins, 
where the sins were understood to be passing passions (Brennan, 2004, p.97) of 
the soul, and not imagined as specific acts or as endogenous. Her point is to 
show that, historically we have understood affect and have integrated 
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awareness of its character into the social. Like demons, affect is to be 
understood as something outside of us, something that gets into us, with effects 
on mood, thinking, and behaviour. (Brennan, 2004, p.21) Again, affect, says 
Brennan, is social, but it has a biological effect. What is significant about the 
way transmission occurs is ‘the resistance it reveals to the idea that a foreign 
body— something from without— can enter into one’s own’ (Brennan, 2004, 
p.10). Brennan argues that it is vital to recognize that our perceived boundaries 
are permeable.  
 
I began the first three pieces together, as outlined in the project plan, but only 
Gluttony conformed to my original intention. I wanted to make a figure of 
Gluttony, not the personification of gluttony or an obese person being a glutton, 
but a figure of bottomless want. Curiously, the other two figures, which I began 
as Avarice and Sloth, both became something else, altogether. Although there is 
more than this brief description at play, my goal was to explore how an 
engagement with affect might play out through the studio, Ultimately, I chose 
not to continue calling on (sins) negative affects. Engaging gluttony as an affect 
appeared to have a depleting effect on me, I wrote in the studio notebook that I 
didn’t have ‘the time or energy’ (Osborn, 2015) to complete the two figures 
begun as Avarice and Sloth. When I chose to revise my intention in relation to 
the second and third pieces, they were finished within a few days having 
become less specifically sins and something more related to anxiety. I did 
complete nine pieces, which are documented in (Images 4-9) and (Video 6).  
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In relation to the Gluttony statue, I experienced affective transmission of some 
kind. If I follow Brennan, this was because I called in the kind of despair that the 
sin of gluttony engenders. I found it difficult to fully describe or understand 
what exactly had occurred, but that it did occur is significant.  
 
Seattle University Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies, Ali Altaf Mian 
describes the more recent affective turn as privileging ‘human and animal 
bodies, sensation, and potentiality’ (Mian, 2011). Susan Kozel, a professor of 
new media at Malmö University and a dancer says in her video, Phenomenology 
In Five Acts, that affect is ‘liminal,’ that it is ‘what is conveyed in between 
gestures,’ that affect is a ‘shimmer or ripple’ (Kozel, 2013). Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick writes about affect as ‘aspects of experience and reality that do not 
present themselves in propositional or even in verbal form alongside others 
that do’ (Sedgwick, 2002, p.6). In Cruel Optimism, Lauren Berlant writes about,  
 
The affective structure of an optimistic attachment, which 
outlines the tendency to do the same thing over and over and 
expect different results- to expect that this time, nearness to this 
thing will help you or a world to become different in just the right 
way (Berlant, 2011, p.2). 
 
 The Affect Theory Reader (2010) editors Melissa Gregg & Gregory Seigworth 
open their field-defining collection of essays on affect with this definition: 
 
Affect is in many ways synonymous with force or forces of 
encounter. The term ‘force,’ however, can be a bit of a misnomer, 
since affect need not be especially forceful (although sometimes, 
as in the psychoanalytic study of trauma, it is). In fact, it is quite 
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likely that affect more often transpires within and across the 
subtlest of shuttling intensities: all the miniscule or molecular 
events of the unnoticed. The ordinary and its extra—. Affect is 
born in in-between-ness and resides as accumulative beside-ness 
(Gregg, 2010, p.2).  
 
 
Addressing affect in a slightly more concrete way, Antonio Damasio writes in 
Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, that Spinoza defined 
affect as an ensemble of ‘drives, motivations, emotions, and feelings’ (Damasio, 
2003, p.8). Damasio addresses Spinoza as a scientist and not a philosopher, 
seeing merit in Spinoza attempting to understand human beings and define 
truth through the pursuit of joy and rejection of sorrow (Damasio, 2003, p.12). 
More difficult for a philosopher however is that Spinoza sees this pursuit as the 
definition of intuitive knowledge and so, truth.  
 
 
Silvan Tomkins first discussed Affect Theory in his book, Affect Imagery 
Consciousness, in the 1960’s. For Tomkins, affect also refers to the biological 
portion of emotion. For example when we are surprised or startled our 
eyebrows go up and eyes blink. Tomkins suggests affective 
resonance⎯conveying or identifying the feelings of another nonverbally⎯is 
the first level of communication particularly in intimate relationships.  
 
 
Tomkins and Spinoza’s (mediated by Damasio) definitions are noticeably more 
specific. Spinoza is also a hero of Brennan’s. She follows and expands his 
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approach to affect as well as building on Tomkins thinking about 
communication in her book The Transmission of Affect, while addressing her 
theories from a philosophical, feminist, and psychoanalytic position. It is 
through The Transmission Of Affect that I have taken a characterization of affect 
for this investigation. 
 
I was not able to clearly grasp affect or its transmission through my practice. 
This is partly due to the structurally un-representable nature of affect. Through 
Brennan’s book I did obtain an altered interpretation of the extent to which our 
perception of self-containment is illusory and permeable not only through 
sight, sound, and smell, but thought. The book had an enormous effect on my 
conception of the tacit, and of how that can be engaged. Brennan, writing about 
how hormones and bodily communications work, argues that, ‘conscious 
linguistic thought is slower than communication that is unimpeded by 
reflection’ (Brennan, 2004, p.141). My interest for this study leans more toward 
that unimpeded communication.  
 
Finally, I completed the The Sins Project with nine figures as I had planned. 
Three male figures described above, three female figures and three pots, seen 
in the documentation photographs and videos (Images 4-9 and Videos 1, 2, 3 
and 6). The three female figures worked as an antidote to the experience of 
calling on affect as the sins. The pots furthered an investigation of the nature of 
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the figure form and when a pot is a figure, or a pot with a head and hands or 
pots with figures on them.  
 
The Giacometti Materials Projects 
June 2016 
 
My figures are tall and often quite slim. This is primarily a residual 
consequence of the processes that led to how I first constructed statues. The 
first tall figures I made began as large thrown cylinders. I discovered I could 
wrap clay around pipes and make even taller figures (heads on cylinders, 
actually). I often retain the tall cylinder as a form to work from (see Figures 45 
and 46 for examples). I assume this is why my work is compared occasionally 
to that of Alberto Giacometti, occurring twice in eight recorded conversations 
during a recent show. In an attempt to address what may—or may not—be 
similar in my work to that of Giacometti, I read the book Alberto Giacometti 
Works/Writing/Interviews, (Gonzalez, 2006), an essay by Jean-Paul Sartre 
called, The Search for the Absolute, and an interview with Giacometti by Jacques 
Dupin called, What Interests Me About the Head, both in Theories and Documents 
of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of Artists' Writings, (Stiles, 1996), Giacometti 
A Biography In Pictures, (Hohl, 1998), and Giacometti Portrait (Lord, 2015 
reprint). I began by taking the position that perhaps there are similarities in the 
work, although I do not find my work similar to that of Giacometti. Nor do I find 
my attitudes in his descriptions of his own approach to the figure. 
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In an essay about Giacometti, his friend Jean-Paul Sartre writes:  
Why doesn’t he try to achieve something perfect, relying on some 
reliable technique, instead of seeming to ignore his predecessors? 
But, for three thousand years, sculpture modelled only corpses. 
(1996, p.186) 
 
While choosing not to make figures perfect is something I have interest in and 
have addressed elsewhere, I disagreed with dismissing three thousand years of 
statues. Sartre goes on to suggest that Giacometti ‘shows us men and women 
already seen. But not already seen by him alone. These figures are already seen 
as the foreign language we try to learn is already spoken’ (p.187). This passage 
is an interesting simile but it unfortunately suggests Giacometti is again 
reducing or distilling the essence of the human.  
 
In the interview titled What Interests Me About The Head, Giacometti points to 
the way in which we look to the eyes of a statue, even when we know they do 
not see: ‘even when you look at a blind man, you look where his eyes are, as if 
you could feel the eyes behind the lids’ (p.189). Giacometti points out that we 
look at a blind man’s eyes, but ‘feeling’ the eyes behind the lids is an impression 
rather than an explanation or theory of why this is so. I had no sense that 
Giacometti considered this looking interesting or even funny. His attitude 
relates back to my investigation of eyes in my work, to tactility, and to 




I found little in the writing to be sympathetic with. In fact, I grew to further 
dislike Giacometti, the man, and his work, which had never particularly 
interested me. However, it was in looking at photographs and videos of 
Giacometti working in his studio, that I found similarities and a method to 
engage materials became clear.  
 
Videos of Giacometti working in his studio provided the most potent 
connection. Watching Giacometti work in clay and in plaster I recognized 
exactly what he was doing and how it felt to work with his materials. I could see 
what he knew and what he was translating to the clay and plaster and even—I 
believe—understand his frustration with plaster. The photographs of 
Giacometti working in plaster on an armature particularly illustrated a method 
of construction I am very familiar with. 
 
I chose two pictures to use for this particular project. One showed Giacometti 
working on a walking man figure in his studio, which showed me the scale he 
was working at and much about how the plaster was applied. The other 




Giacometti often labels his plaster pieces as plaster worked with a penknife. 
This means he was working in both an additive and subtractive way with the 
plaster. I welded a similar armature to that of the Walking Man in the photo, 
and began.  
 
I made the same mess and a similar figure. The figure announced itself almost 
at once. The plaster on the armature instantly suggested a slim figure. The 
thinness was certainly from the way the armature was designed, but what I 
sensed was that through having some familiarity with the figure and anatomy, 
and using these particular materials in this particular way, I believed I 
understood what Giacometti had felt in the moment the figure made itself 
known. I am not suggesting anyone can do this, nor that I made a Giacometti, 
only that my knowledge of the figure and plaster when joined with the 
particular armature Giacometti made use of, produces the familiar thrill of 
figure very quickly. (Video 7) 
 
This experience suggested I had reproduced another sculptor’s results by 
asking certain materials for a similar result. Any number of materials; glue, 
wood, lipstick, and shoelaces can all perform their tasks in a similar way to 
when last asked by a skilled user, but this particular event resulted in an 
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abstracted figure I had no particular interest in remaking, and even arrogantly 
assumed I could alter for the better, which proved not to be the case.88 
 
The materials had a voice in this project. I was able to reproduce work and a 
sense of figure I had not at all expected. This was a further indication of how 
specific materials inform work, and underscores a concept of a collaboration 
with materials, that echoed the Berlin Figure Project and underscores for me 
concepts about objects in Harman, particularly around the discussion of fire 
burning cotton (Video 9). Harman is pointing to object relations. Fire has a 
relation to cotton that among other things, disregards what is important to us 
about the cotton, that it is a bag, or a shirt or a ball. Materials or objects appear 
to have relations that play out predictably. 
 
The Slides Project   
May 2014 
Early in this study I was reunited with a large plastic box of slides documenting 
my work from the early 1980s through to around 2004. I employed the task of 
reviewing these slides as an opportunity to practice my Grounded Theory Data 
Analysis skills. I looked through slides and scanned about an eighth—over two 
hundred—slides of past work to make use of. I was able to see (as per Schön’s 
                                                        
88 I had always thought the arms of Giacometti’s Walking Men to seem stiff and ill-posed. In 
making the figure I find I completely understand the nature of the gesture. The figures have a 
different meaning in the gesture for me now. The understanding came though the experience of 
making the figure, and I can only describe it as I understand why the arms seem so stiff, 
discovering this posture to be the only solution. 
 168 
reflection on reflection in action), through the most elementary employment of 
GTDA to slides of the most rudimentary work, what has concerned my practice, 
and how I have made use of skills and craft throughout my career.  
 
Looking at work made while I was at Boston University School for the Arts it is 
clear I have a grasp of the figure. The portrait heads are adequate as is the 
drawing. In craft school, learning to master the potter’s wheel required 
repetition. Faced with a hundred objects to glaze at a time, I had begun to write 
and draw quick phrases and pictures on each form. I could see that what I 
lacked in skill with clay was supplemented by the words and drawing. I 
remember that this work was difficult to photograph, the words often went 
around the outside rims of little bowls and cylinders and the drawings were 
inside the bowls or on curved surfaces. This was a medium I was not yet 
experienced with. I recognized that as my mastery of clay and glazing increased 
the figure began to appear as that object and the writing generally disappeared. 
(Images 10- 35 and Video 8). The figure emerged as a pot form89. (Appendix iii). 
 
Furthermore, these were early encounters with objects that could not be 
understood (or read) from one point of view. I made decals of Eadweard 
                                                        
89 Through looking at, scanning, and organizing the large amounts of slide, I discovered coding 
that came from the attempt to manage the images. I had a file for drawings, one for heads, pots, 
pre-figures, figures, herms, and Madonnas. Theses categories exposed much about what has 
been relevant to me in practice.   
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Muybridge’s photographs to go around pots, and carved images in slip that also 
went around the form. (Video 8). 
 
An analysis of the data revealed two particular concepts about my work I had 
not understood before. One was the strikingly similar way I forced new content 
into early ceramic forms and content into my practice for this study. The 
approach was so literal, but eventually yielded results. The other, related 
finding was that my concerns thirty years ago are so similar to my current 
investigation. Objects that cannot be seen all at once, the feelings (or perhaps 
affect) that I want in the work that had to be written onto the pots, and 
haphazard treatment of the finished object.  
 
In this early engagement with GTDA I became aware of its similarities and 
compliment to Diffraction. Diffraction also makes use of an approach to data or 
concepts that requires the researcher to consider objects or ideas as the locus 
of what is to be discovered, instead of testing hypothesis. Haraway asserts, ‘a 
diffraction pattern does not map where differences appear, but rather maps 
where the effects of difference appear’ (Haraway, 1992, p.302). Ripples are in 
phase or cancelled out but both have to be recognized.  
A brief discussion about GTDA is in order here. My experience of GTDA was that 
I was able to obtain theories and comprehend the data⎯any data⎯I applied 
the method to. However, my initial experience was confusing. I began by 
reading The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research, 
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by Barry Glaser and Anselm Strauss, (2006), and I further consulted Basics of 
Qualitative Research 3E, by Corbin and Strauss (2008), and found the coding 
strategies put forward (micro-analysis) to be overwhelming and difficult to 
manage; particularly because the data (transcripts of conversations) were not 
revealing much that was coherent or of concern to the study through analysis of 
the words. It was here I began the Slide Project to gain experience at coding and 
to step away from the conversations. I had not planned to make formal use in 
this study of the Slide Project, and so I was more exploratory in my approach.  
 
At this point I also read Basics Of Grounded Theory Analysis, by Barney Glaser, 
(1992) and discovered the conflict and subsequent split between Glaser and 
Strauss that primarily focused on the approach to analysis, among other issues. 
Glaser’s discussion and rigor differed from Strauss’ in that Glaser considers 
concepts rather than coding through words, allows for a Core Variable, suggests 
that a plethora of rules [ . . .] hamper creativity’ (Glaser, 1992, p.6), and that 
good grounded theory should be readily modifiable’ (p.24). Furthermore, 
Glaser defines the goal of Grounded Theory in his way: ‘to generate a theory 
that accounts for a pattern of behaviour which is relevant and problematic for 
those involved’ (Glaser, 1992, p.75). This approach resonated with my 
concerns. I had begun The Conversation Project wanting to document something 
I thought might be revealing about what people say about statues. This could 
have appeared to be a preconceived idea I was possibly forcing on the data, but 
Glaser (1992) argues that without it, GT ‘will drift in relevancy and workability’ 
(p.75). During analysis of the Slides Project, I began to grasp how GTDA worked. 
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I focused on concepts and what I saw in the work in a less rigid and purely 
visual approach to the data, working to discover what my work might reveal to 
me about me, and about it.  
 
In searching for further evidence of using Glaser’s approach versus Strauss’, the 
article A Critique of Using Grounded Theory as a Research Method, (2003), by 
Information Systems Development Researcher George Allan supports my 
experience. Allan expresses that the micro-analysis coding described by Strauss 
and Corbin was ‘very time consuming’ and that ‘so many words being picked 
over individually led to confusion’ (Allan, 2003, p.2). This was solved by 
considering a core variable, and by considering ‘key points [that] allow 
concepts to emerge’ (p.2). In short, GTDA became a welcome part of practice, 
enhancing rather than clashing with diffraction and the bricolage of Levi-
Strauss. I made use of it formally, as in The Conversations Project, The GoPro 
Project, and The Slides Project, while it played a role in my approach to other 
projects, data, literature, and concepts engaged through this study. GTDA is 
easily transferable to audio and visual data when the classic or Glaserian GT is 
followed. 
 
The Broken Piece Project 
August 2016 
One of my large, clay figures was knocked over and smashed. I resolved to 
reassemble it. I had lost a part of the belly and remade that part in plaster and 
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mortar mix. There was some other damage that was also too severe to just glue 
together, and at these places I also made use of alternate materials. I sanded 
and painted the figure in a way that resulted in an impression similar to its 
original appearance. I then asked several people familiar with the piece if they 
recognized it, and they did. I then explained what had happened and asked if, 
knowing this, was it still the same piece? Most answered yes, but some, mostly 
those seeing the work as a commodity, said no, imagining I would be tricking a 
buyer or being dishonest in some way.  
 
The broken piece retains its general character now it is fixed. A detailed 
comparison before and after it was fixed might reveal certain differences, but 
wear and discoloration resulting from two years on an outside porch had also 
altered the piece.  
 
My aim was to consider what if anything had been lost or gained by repairing 
the statue that made it a different statue. Because it is technically an art object 
with a potential life beyond me, the work is altered because it is repaired. For 
me, here in the studio, it is the same piece. Perhaps, it is this particular situation 
that reveals the most about how knowledge about objects is situated in this 
project. It is almost contextual. In some ways, I know the most about the piece, 
but I am the least certain about its character or position, particularly as it 
relates to others. I do know that the statue is more than the clay, or the atoms of 
the clay. Some of what the work is made of has been remixed by breaking, and 
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added to by fixing. The statue was always more than what it is made of, and 
more than the effects it might have on people both before and after it was 
broken and repaired. The statue is not a facsimile of what it was before, but it is 
altered.  
 
I return to this project in Chapter four. 
 
The Canvas Marys Project  
June 2017 
I have continued to work with canvas in an effort to conclude the alternative 
material investigation, although more for my practice, than for this study. I 
wanted to make a veil for a head on a very tall canvas body, but I did not like 
the way the cloth looked draped over the head. I concluded I would need to 
create an armature to hold the veil up around the head, so the head was seen 
through the cloth but the cloth did not take the form of the head. I considered 
horns, like antlers.  
 
The issue of a head with horns aside, I began to consider what to construct the 
horns from. I considered clay, which would allow the horns I would construct to 
look like horns or antlers. I could even cast deer antlers found in the fields 
nearby. I further considered how fragile the horns would be in clay and the 
work and time of making them in clay. When I considered steel, I thought about 
shape and how to achieve the form. The way I thought of the steel did not really 
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include horns but something more architectural. I considered the graduated 
diameters of the steel I already had and would need, and if the welder ground 
could be easily fixed in time to complete this project quickly. 
 
In short, I was designing the ‘antlers’ with knowledge about materials. I 
considered which material would provide a solution; which would be most 
satisfying to make, or force the potent issue of a horned head, or provide an 
interesting solution but remain in the background. I was aware of considering a 
solution through material. I was thinking with what I know about and am able 
to do with material conceptually. The limits of my knowing about clay and steel, 
my experience and comprehension of my skills and tools in the studio, and the 
impressions (horned head or more hat like armature) I imagined either might 
imply were all fully engaged.  
 
My engagement with materials led to thinking⎯not making⎯ about how to 
make a new piece. I am aware that in this case the conceptual nature of working 
toward a solution came from making in the past. However, the piece must be 
made to fully realize the concept and to further inform work in the future. I was 
thinking with materials. Clay (and to some extent steel), as I engaged clay out of 
the studio, behaved like a concept for me that I could use⎯or not⎯to solve 
problems in my work.  
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Making my work requires my studio, and the way I experience it and what I do 
there. That I usually need to occupy some part of me with the radio or audio 
book suggests, perhaps, that the work is more than what I have access to 
through a particular kind of thinking. The work does something other than 
illustrate ideas, it is a manifestation of something else as when artist Grayson 
Perry speaks about the art object itself, he says that he wants it to be more than 
something: ‘I could think it up in the bath and just phone it in’ (Perry, 2012), 
implying that for him, the art object is something further than an idea, or its 
concepts, which is perhaps what engagement with materials has to offer to 
concepts.  
 
While in the scope of this study I have not explored this further, beyond 
thinking that perhaps making is evidence of material “consciousness,” (as in not 
a form of human consciousness). When I make work, it is usually different than 




These individual projects reflect actions I have used in practice before in the 
studio, although performed here with new methods and concepts. This study as 
a whole is organized to show myself what has been happening in my practice 
making statues by introducing slight alterations in perspective and to then 
assess the differences. While I have drawn a map of where I have found 
particular ideas and concepts in the encounter with statues, these are my 
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landmarks, and originate from performing my practice. While a map is 
knowledge about a territory, as in the mind mapping the body (as per Damasio)  
or a road map, the map is not the territory and cannot exhaust it. 
 
It is here Fitzgerald’s ‘ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same 
time, and still retain the ability to function’ (Fitzgerald, 1936, p.2) returns.  
 
Using the methodology and methods outlined in the introduction, the theory 
and concepts that adhered to and expanded when exposed to practice, are the 
ones described and discussed in this writing. However, Philosopher Alva Nöe 
speaks about skills and habits. He writes about how we can multitask⎯walk 
and carry on a conversation⎯and how habit becomes a useful tool to handle 
everyday tasks. He points out that our ‘ability to carry on and be organized by 
the activity at hand, to—if you like—lose ourselves in the flow, is natural for us’ 
(Noë, 2015, p.7). My practice has flow and therefore, habit, and so it may 
continue to elude me.  
 
Furthermore, I have documented and discussed how we can speak about 
statues with ‘two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time.’ Fitzgerald’s 
essay eventually explains that in holding two opposed ideas, we don’t see that 
each idea is only a part of a very different truth the two make together. While 
Fitzgerald may have been regretting a misspent youth and middle age, I 
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repurpose his suggestion here as follows: when we hold on to the dual nature 
of our consideration of statues we are obliged to miss what is enlivening about 
them, what the two natures reveal when considered as one.  
 
Noë makes a point about where the issue of habit lies, writing that we do not 
understand organized activities ‘that are structured by habit [ . . . ] by 
considering these phenomena only in relation to what is happening in the 
nervous system of the participants’ (Noë, 2015, p.8). Just as looking for the 
value of money in the bill is meaningless, the making use of self-reflection to 
resolve what we cannot see about our habits becomes futile without assistance. 
The value of money lies in what we, collectively, believe about the money. 
Similarly, the value of the statue is more than material or form, it is unreachable 
without at very least having united those two issues when encountering a 
statue, and then to further consider what we, all together believe about them.  
 
In the next chapter I engage Object Oriented Ontology through my encounter 
with statues. My aim has been to indicate⎯by example⎯what can be gained by 









In this chapter statues are considered diffractively with concepts found in 
Object Oriented Ontology (OOO). These concepts initially came into this project 
through Graham Harman’s book The Quadruple Object (2010), and 
subsequently through several of Harman’s other books, talks, and articles. I do 
not argue for Object Oriented Ontology in philosophical terms, rather I have 
approached OOO as theory that attached effortlessly to⎯or aptly put words 
to⎯ my experiences with statues and the encounter. Therefore, my approach 
here has been to discuss statues in terms of OOO, which led me to comprehend 
and conceptualize both statues and the encounter more clearly, and to better 
grasp and internalize the basics of OOO. 
 
OOO has offered concepts to this study for articulating tacit knowing about 
objects gained through practice. Whether the theory first informed the 
concepts of practice or practice found words in the theory I am now uncertain, 
but the diffractive approach would accept either or both as accurate. My aim in 
this chapter is to put forward several of the primary ideas found in Object 
Oriented Ontology, and to indicate how engaging with these ideas informed, 
clarified, and enlarged this research. Additionally, OOO is used to articulate, 
contextualize, and enlarge outcomes of this study, including the motivating 
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concept of this project as a whole—which is that statues are person-shaped 
objects, they are something other than mere copies of people.90 
 
An article about Object Oriented Ontology titled, What Is Object-Oriented 
Ontology? A Quick-and-Dirty Guide to the Philosophical Movement sweeping the 
Art World, by Dylan Kerr (2016) will provide a suitable point of departure. 
Kerr, perhaps unwittingly, outlines in the first few paragraphs of his article two 
misconceptions about OOO. These particular misconstruings directly impact 
this study. In order to situate Object Oriented Ontology as it is understood 
through this study, addressing what OOO is not⎯briefly in two cases through 
Kerr’s article⎯will assist in establishing a starting point for both the 
fundamentals of Object Oriented Ontology, and offer a view of statues through 
the lens of OOO.  
 
Kerr begins the article by suggesting that OOO would have us ask ourselves, 
‘What does your toaster want? How about your dog? Or the bacteria in your 
gut? What about the pixels on the screen you’re reading off now’ (Kerr, 2016, p. 
2). The question what do you want? is generally one asked of people by other 
people, or humans so other humans will know what someone wants, and act 
                                                        
90 An illustration of the vague assumption of objects shaped like people are merely lesser 
people would be the mannekins set up in the atom bomb test sites. The images are compelling 
and odd, and a good example of what would happen to fiberglass person shaped objects, but 
not at all what would happen to actual people. The bomb was not confused by or fooled—as we 
often are—by the person shape of the materials. (see 
http://www.cultofweird.com/americana/1955-a-bomb-photos/  or   
http://www.themysteryworld.com/2012/05/pictures-show-aftermath-of-nuclear-test.html  or  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MG4hQQKrhT8) 
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accordingly. Asking this of dogs or pixels is ascribing human needs and 
characteristics to nonhuman things, and implies that we should 
anthropomorphize nonhuman life and objects to understand them more 
deeply. This is not at all how OOO approaches objects. Rather, OOO suggests we 
work to view the world of objects—that are not people or humans—as not 
people or humans. OOO would have us understand, by embracing a non-
anthropocentric attitude, that my toaster and the bacteria in my gut have their 
own way of being and relating in the world and asking them anthropocentric 
questions isn’t sensible.  
 
An overarching concept or a basic assumption of Object Oriented Ontology is a 
direct opposition to the concept that philosopher Quentin Meillassoux has 
labelled correlationism. Meillassoux defines correlationism as ‘the idea 
according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between 
thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other’ 
(Meillassoux, 2009, p.5).91 In short, Meillassoux’s definition captures a concept: 
that because anything we think is a thought, we only have access to the thought 
of the world meaning there is not a world (available to us) outside human 
thought. The consequence of this concept is that human thought and everything 
else is the primary relation in the world, which as Harman suggests, has been 
the position for much of philosophy since Kant. It implies that ‘there is no use 
speaking about the relation between two non-human objects, a matter best left 
                                                        
91 Speculative Realism is the name given to the group of philosophers that met at a conference 
of the same name at Goldsmiths College in 2007. It is or was the opposition to correlationism 
(as defined by Meillassoux) that unites Speculative Realists.  
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to the sciences’ (Harman, 2016, p.244). Object Oriented Ontology is in 
opposition to Kant’s positioning92 of the human to world relation as taking 
precedence over all other relations (p.45). OOO therefore, situates human 
thought back into the world and positions objects and relations as the 
important divide. Human thought remains part of a human and humans differ 
in degree but not in kind from dogs, trees, and rocks. 
 
Harman’s view on Kant explains this positioning of human thought. In 
Harman’s summary, Kant has two basic philosophical positions. This 
distillation of Kant’s positions come from Harman’s paper, The Road to Objects, 
(2011). 
 
1. Human knowledge is finite, since the things-in-themselves can be 
thought but never known. 
2. The human-world relation is philosophically privileged over 
every other sort of relation; philosophy is primarily about human 
access to the world, or at least must take this access as its starting 
point. (p.171) 
 
Object Oriented Ontology is grounded in Kant’s first position, that the things-in-
themselves, the real objects, are not something we can never fully know. It is 
the second position, correlationism, or the assumption that the world is here 
                                                        
92 Harman expands the differences of OOO and correlationism in his book Dante’s Broken 
Hammer, (2016).  
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because of or for humans, or that our consciousness functions as an integral 
part of the structure of the world, that OOO rejects. 
 
However interesting we humans may be to ourselves we are 
apparently in no way central to the cosmic drama, marooned as 
we are on an average-sized planet near a mediocre sun, and 
confined to a tiny portion of the universe (Harman, 2010, p.63). 
 
‘It is often assumed,’ writes Harman, ‘that the human relation to reality is one of 
transcendence’ (Harman, 2010, p.113). Objects—and other forms of life—are 
merely inanimate stuff or lumps, caught in our minds or in the flow of the 
world. ‘Humans are believed to rise above that world into a windy, starry space 
of freedom where they lucidly observe things “as” they are’ (p.113). To engage 
Object Oriented Ontology it is essential to embrace that the world ⎯and 
objects⎯exist independently, outside of human thought. This is the first 
concept that begins to construct the perspective of Object Oriented Ontology as 
it serves to advance an altered discernment of statues. 
 
 
Returning to What Is Object-Oriented Ontology? A Quick-and-Dirty Guide to the 
Philosophical Movement Sweeping the Art World (2016), Kerr goes on to write 
about Object Oriented Ontology rejecting human-centred ways of approaching 
the world, but suggests that ‘The whole idea that artworks exist only insofar as 
they’re available for human viewing and interpretation is entirely opposed to 
the post human perspective OOO promotes’ (Kerr, 2016, p. 4). This is not so. 
Kerr also makes reference to artworks ‘acting on viewers’ (p. 4), and that 
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Speculative Realism and OOO are ‘dedicated to exploring the reality, agency and 
“private lives” of non-human entities’ (p. 2). That OOO is opposed to human-
centred viewing and interpretation of artworks is misconceived, in fact it is 
exactly opposite, and this error appears to be a common misunderstanding of 
the position of OOO toward art. The human perspective of art is something 
Harman suggests is the point of artwork.  
 
First, Harman says that art without humans is like ‘basketball without humans’ 
(Harman, 2015, @2:30), it would not be very interesting or even possible. As 
John Dewey points out, the art is in the experience or the encounter. Art objects 
are constructed to be an experience for us, related to us. A statue outside, in a 
garden or cemetery, has to be kept clear of vines. Vines are not discouraged or 
influenced by the human shape of a statue. Similarly, a statue as a person-
shaped object isn’t usually required to wear clothes in public, vacate the 
museum at night or come inside for dinner, or out of the rain or snow. A statue 
or human-shaped object is not a person, and is not significant in this way to 
vines, rain, lightning, the ground, except to us. An object shaped like a person is 
made for us to experience, sometimes as art. Very little else in the world would 
encounter a statue in the way we do, although everything else in the world can 
encounter a statue. Firing clay body parts in my kiln is not like cremation of a 
human body in any way, except that it is similarly conducted event. A moulded 
clay head does not trick the kiln; the kiln will not incinerate the head as if it 
were the head of a person. When I open the kiln I will find a vitrified clay head 
and not ashes.  
 184 
 
Anthropomorphizing objects does not suit the Speculative Realism of OOO. 
Humans are not central to the universe in this ontology, instead we are asked to 
consider that⎯just as humans do to each other and to objects⎯objects must 
also relate to objects. It is relations, rather than humans, that are the more 
central concern of OOO. The important divide is objects and relations, not 
humans and the world. We are asked to consider that a rock relates to other 
objects in a way that is similar in kind, if not in complex degree, to the template 
of our relations. This relocation of human thought is not banishment; OOO does 
not want to do away with people, just to acknowledge what objects are and the 
nature of relations. Again, in a way similar to, for example basketball (which 
requires people), I contend that statues are objects that require humans to be 
seen as human shaped and therefore as statues. While statues do not require 
the presence of people in order to exist as objects, they do require the presence 
of people to be seen as art objects shaped like people (statues). Statues are the 
human form constructed and interpreted by humans, to be considered by 
humans. Statues are⎯to a degree⎯ anthropomorphized material. Statues are 
made for humans alone to consider. The clay (and perhaps steel and concrete) 
and the form that makes up my particular work (or statues) is not a person to a 
cat or to moss, it may not even appear to be a human figure. Conceivably, the cat 
does encounter a large vitreous mass, but does not encounter, for example, the 
figure of Gluttony or even a human form when it encounters my statue. The 
moss that might be growing on my work is making use of the vitreous clay or 





In The Quadruple Object (2010) Harman begins his discussion of objects by 
examining what he calls the overmining and undermining of objects. He 
initiates his discussion of Object Oriented Ontology by pointing out the broad 
iconoclasm of philosophy.93  He argues that ‘most western philosophies try to 
get rid of objects’ (2015, @3:28 ) through reducing them to a smaller elemental 
building blocks or, to ‘reduce them upward’ (2010, p.10) where the object is 
only part of an event or a moment. Harman suggests that either position is 
usually considered to be the reasonable focus of philosophy, and not the objects 
themselves. Undermining objects looks to what an object is made of, whether it 
is the “element” of air or water or atoms. Harman points out that in 
undermining we look for what we assume to be the real thing that makes up an 
object, such as its qualities, or atoms, the assumption is that an object is made 
of something smaller and more real, which ignores the object itself as 
something real, as a mysterious unity or thing in-itself. An object cannot be 
exhausted through knowing about the elements or atoms or qualities that make 
it up, and an object cannot be reduced to or manifested through knowledge. To 
know that a statue is made of clay (or atoms) is almost directly in opposition to 
perceiving or encountering it as a figure. If Dalou’s gisant of Victor Noir is 
reduced to the atoms that make it up or to the bronze it is cast in,94 the impact 
                                                        
93 See  (Harman, 2015, 3:10)  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cR1A4ILPmjE 
94 (conceivably, the bronze could be melted down, and then cast again as a bronze leopard at 
the zoo) 
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of the statue of the corpse of a man long dead or the apotropaic nature he has 
more recently acquired is unavailable or lost.   
To overmine an object is to consider the object to be only what it is in relation 
‘to the mind, or . . . some concrete event that effects other objects as well’ (2010, 
p.11). Overmining deems objects to be what they do, or are in the moment, 
which does not afford an object the possibility to change or to differ from what 
the object is or appears to be at any particular time. Here again Dalou’s gisant is 
a good example of the limitations of overmining an object. What the gisant of 
Victor Noir does now differs from its initial purpose and what it was designed 
to do. The statue has depths, potential, or more available to it than even Dalou 
(its maker) could have envisioned.  
 
Harman argues for the unified object. He agrees ‘that all entities are composite, 
made of smaller things . . . but in no way does this prove that only the smallest 
things are real’ (Harman, 2012, p.8). Rather than say objects are nothing more 
than atoms, which implies atoms are more real than objects, or suggest that 
objects are nothing more than they superficially appear to be, Harman asks us 
to accept an object as a thing that cannot be reduced down to smaller parts, and 
cannot be exhausted through knowing or knowledge about it, the object is 
withdrawn and retains hidden depths and cannot be fully known.  
 
In summary, Harman defines real objects, after an interpretation of Heidegger’s 
tool analysis, as ‘withdrawn into private interiors, barely able to relate at all’ 
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(Harman, 2010, p.36). He argues that real objects exist, individually, in a world 
unknown, withdrawn, and unavailable. Harman approaches objects as 
unknowable unities, and not as a knowable bale, or bundle of identifiable parts 
or, traits that, packaged together, make up the object. He does not explain 
objects as rising up from tiny bits of an elemental substance nor does he find 
objects to be part of the original whole of everything, or merely all they appear 
to be in the moment.  
 
We cannot exhaust an object through our relation to it. Just as we cannot know 
the potential of the Victor Noir gisant, or have the object appear in front of us 
through our knowledge of it. Clearly, what we know about the statue does not 
exhaust or equal it in this way. It is here that the composite or sensual object—
an object that contains ourselves and our perceptions and ideas about another 
object—becomes relevant. My statues, even though I make them and know 
about them, cannot be exactly copied, even by me, or made from a mould and 
be the same object, which, tangentially, is why The Broken Piece Project was 
significant to this study. It became an exercise in testing the degree to which a 
piece could alter and still be said to be the same piece. Had I remade the statue 
from scratch, it would be a replica of the original, but because I repaired it 
instead, it retains a unity, and remains the same object. An object remains itself 
even when it sustains small losses, like a repaired sweater, or a glued statue. 
The mysterious unity of objects, and not the attempt to distil them, is the focus 
of OOO.  
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The Baby Doll Heads  
I will step away from specifically quoting Harman for a moment, and give an 
example of using the studio to engage what I was reading of his work 
particularly. I explored, in an elementary way and exemplified through an 
obvious exercise, when I make several objects in the same material and 
shape⎯in this case baby doll heads⎯ what makes each head a separate head 
or object. These heads were cast as part of the larger work made with artist 
Mary Morgan. While it is common sense that the heads are not the same object, 
I found the exercise useful. I cast six doll baby heads, from the same slip, in the 
same mould. I fired them all together in the same kiln, which means they were 
all in a similarly vitreous95 state. (Image 36).  
 
The heads were all made in the same shape, of the same material, but each is an 
individual head. The objective was to experience the objects as the same, but to 
encounter the separate unities as the way the objects differed from each other. 
With the focus on the unity of objects in mind, that the heads were not 
interchangeable and were individual was, naturally, absolutely demonstrated. 
Why this was so, was suddenly less clear to me.96 I made a doll using one of the 
                                                        
95 Vitrification is what firing clay to high temperatures achieves. It is the melting of the silica in 
clay to glass. This is what alters clay into a more stone-like substance and is why fired ceramic 
does not melt in water. 
96 To draw out the baby doll head experiment, I can smash one with a hammer and still have 
five. I can make one blue and still have four baby doll heads that are the same, but mysteriously 
separate unities, and not the same. Further, I can wipe the blue off the head, and it is still the 
same head, or attach it to a body, where it is still the same head, but becomes part of a baby 
doll, that has its own unity that the head is part of. Beyond the obvious and common sense of 
the six separate heads, there is the curious nature of individual objects that each have some 
difference that is not obvious to me.  
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heads. The head became part of a doll. I smashed the head, and replaced it with 
another one of the heads. The doll remained the same doll. The unity of an 
object is the central issue, or point, or concern here, and is the satisfying 
mystery in Object Oriented Ontology. (Video 10) 
 
Relations and The Encounter  
There are two important concepts to appreciate, through OOO, about the 
encounter for this study. First, to regard the human position as ‘in no way 
central to the cosmic drama,’ in that we differ ‘only in degree’ (2010, p.45) from 
other unified objects. Again this situates us in the world slightly differently than 
we are perhaps used to, and suggests that the world outside thought is 
significant and necessarily ascertainable, and although our self-investigation is 
‘in no way central to the cosmic drama,’ it is no less important. It is perhaps 
through embracing this position that realizing object relations is facilitated.  
 
Secondly, that we do not exhaust an object through knowing that object or 
being in relation to it. Harman uses the example of Berlin, the city in Germany, 
to illustrate the bounds of knowledge. No matter how extensive and complete 
my knowledge of Berlin is, writes Harman, ‘if Berlin were wiped from the face 
of the earth, my knowledge of it could not heroically step in and become a new 
city in its place’ (Harman, 2016, p.245). This is similarly true for my ballpoint 
pen. The knowledge that replaces it is where to buy another one.  
 
 190 
Even the Broken Figure repaired is not exhausted through my intimate 
knowledge of it. Although I made the statue and repaired it, and so it is the 
same statue repaired, but I have not manifested the same object through my 
knowledge of it.  Like Harman’s knowledge of Berlin, I have mended a broken 
statue that continues to function as a statue, I have not replaced the object with 
my knowledge of it, suggesting the object has depths I have not and cannot 
plumb. 
 
 This draws us toward an explanation of the sensual object, which is where the 
encounter with statues takes place. We do not have full knowledge of objects 
and must relate to them through perception. Harman writes that ‘all relations 
between all objects translate, distort, or caricature those objects; after all, [the 
objects] are never fully at play, and are reduced by such relations to something 
other than they are’ (Harman, 2016, p.242). We do not exhaust an object, nor 
can we replace it with knowledge about it. A map is knowledge about a place, 
but does not exhaust, nor can it supplant, that place.97 
                                                        
97 On Exactitude in Science, a story by Jorge Luis Borges. 
. . . In that Empire, the craft of Cartography attained such Perfection that the 
Map of a Single province covered the space of an entire City, and the Map of 
the Empire itself an entire Province. In the course of Time, these Extensive 
maps were found somehow wanting, and so the College of Cartographers 
evolved a Map of the Empire that was of the same Scale as the Empire and that 
coincided with it point for point. Less attentive to the Study of Cartography, 
succeeding Generations came to judge a map of such Magnitude cumbersome, 
and, not without Irreverence, they abandoned it to the Rigours of sun and 
Rain. In the western Deserts, tattered Fragments of the Map are still to be 
found, Sheltering an occasional Beast or beggar; in the whole Nation, no other 
relic is left of the Discipline of Geography. 




Important in understanding what the sensual object is or contains, is that it is a 
‘composite’ (2016, p.246) of a real object, for example me (a real object), and 
my perception of or relation with an object. When I encounter the Baby Doll 
head, I do so through my current perceptions of the qualities of the head and 
former experiences with the head. I am real and the head is real, because two 
real objects cannot touch, my encounter with the head is through a third 
(sensual) object that contains me, and my perception of the head. To be clear, 
Harman says that not even parts of real objects make contact, because ‘there is 
a sense in which objects have no parts’ (2010, p.73). This aligns with the 
mysterious unity of the object. An object can lose parts and still be the same 
object until, at some ill-defined point, it loses enough that it isn’t anymore and 
the unity is lost; then that object would be unrecognizable and not itself 
anymore. If parts could touch, an object would be a bale of parts, and this is 
specifically not how an object is defined in OOO. I argue that when we can 
conceive of a statue as a mysterious unity⎯as an object we cannot exhaust 
through our knowledge of what it is made of or what it does⎯and when we can 
consider that our encounter is with the form of these objects⎯ which has a 
particular significance for us as people, but does not have a similar importance 
for anything else   
 
In undermining an object or reducing an object to atoms, we observed in the 
Broken Piece exercise that objects can ‘withstand certain changes in their 
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arrangement without ceasing to be the same [object]’ (2010, p.117). When I 
encounter Michelangelo’s Pieta, that her hand and nose were smashed and 
repaired does not suggest a different statue however many atoms that 
displaced. The statue is still Michelangelo’s Pieta. The gisant of Victor Noir has 
mutated from the political to the personal, but it is the same object. Even 
universities are still the same entity, or institution, although every term brings 
different students, faculty, locations, and affiliations.98  
 
That objects are not exhausted by their relations indicates in part, that we can’t 
exhaustively know everything about an object, and that our relation to an 
object is commonly constrained as a human centred relation. We relate to 
objects generally in terms of ourselves, both personally and collectively. OOO 
further offers us the understanding that objects relate to other objects in the 
same way. This situates us in terms of objects and relations. Statues as objects 
are human focused (by humans, of humans, for humans), but not human 
objects. Our relation or encounter with a statue is with an object shaped 
somewhat like a human (we are incorrect when we consider a statue to be a 
replica of a human) and therefore with an object in a form potent (as per 
Damasio’s mapping) for us. 
 
                                                        
98 Harman writes about an institution—specifically the Dutch East India Company— as an 
object in Immaterialism, (2016) Polity Press. 
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As a move toward broadening the definition of objects (and to further address 
the sensual object through which we encounter them), I will focus on the 
(mysterious) unity of objects by making use of an object that isn’t real. The Tin 
Woodsman provides an example of the unity of an imaginary object. In the 
book, The Wizard Of Oz by L. Frank Baum, the Woodsman—before he becomes 
tin—had fallen in love with a beautiful Munchkin Maiden. The Wicked Witch 
also wanted the girl, and put a spell on the Woodsman’s axe. While he is 
chopping wood in the forest, in order to make money to win the maiden, his axe 
cuts off his left leg. He manages to drag himself home and asks the tinsmith to 
make him a prosthetic leg, which goes very well. On subsequent trips into the 
woods he looses his other leg, then both arms and his head. All acceptably 
replaced by the tinsmith. 
 
I thought I had beaten the Wicked Witch then, [ . . . ] but I little 
knew how cruel my enemy could be. She thought of a new way to 
kill my love for the beautiful Munchkin maiden, and made my axe 
slip again, so that it cut right through my body, splitting me into 
two halves. Once more the tinsmith came to my help and made 
me a body of tin, fastening my tin arms and legs and head to it, by 
means of joints, so that I could move around as well as ever. 
(Baum, 1900, p.58)  
 
As we know, the Tinsmith forgot to replace the Woodsman’s heart. Without his 
heart, the (now) Tin Woodsman could no longer desire or love the beautiful 
Munchkin maiden. However, the Wicked Witch had not completely won. The 
Tin Woodsman wants nothing more than to go to Oz and gets his desire back. 
The Tin Woodsman replaced all his parts, one by one, and remained himself. 
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Even without his heart and desire, he was still himself, and knew to try to get 
his heart, his desire, replaced.  
 
The unity of Tin Woodsman as an example of the unity of even the imaginary, 
real and sensual objects we encounter. The Tin Woodsman is a unified albeit 
imaginary object. He completely replaces his body with tin prosthetics, but he 
remains himself.99 We recognize the qualities of the Tin Woodsman if we are 
familiar with a particular culture. In 1995 sculptor John Kearney made a statue 
of the Tin Woodsman for OZ park in Chicago. We recognize the Tin Woodsman. 
The statue is a real object. The statue is in the shape of an imaginary 
man/munchkin whose body was replaced in tin. The statue is a real object, the 
form is recognizable and imaginary and not real.  
 
Harman opens The Quadruple Object by affirming we are all concerned with 
objects. He defines an object as ‘anything that has a unified reality that is 
autonomous from its wider context and also from its own pieces’ (Harman, 
2010, p.116).100 Harman explains that he includes and accounts for entities that 
are neither physical nor even real (like the Tin Woodsman, unicorns, and 
                                                        
99 Suppose someone thought the Tin Woodsman was the character that went to Oz for a brain, 
when actually that was the Scarecrow. When that someone is told that it was the Scarecrow, the  
Tin Woodsman does not become the Scarecrow for that person, the Tin Woodsman is unified 
enough to withstand a misunderstanding about who he is to remain himself. We see that the 
Scarecrow went to Oz for a brain and the Tin Woodsman for a heart, and not that the Tin 
Woodsman becomes the Scarecrow. See Graham Harman on Heidegger and The Arts (2013, 
pp.20:00) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W93DtzHCcnM&t=8s 
100 The Woodsman replaces his parts with tin and became the Tin Woodsman but is still the 
same guy who loved the Munchkin Maiden. He remained intact. 
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narratives101). Harman clarifies that while objects are not all equally real, they 
are all equally objects. ‘Some objects’ writes Harman, ‘are physical, others are 
not; some real, others not real in the least. But all are unified objects, even if 
confined to that portion of the world called the mind’ (p.7). Again it is the 
unified nature of an object that is its most interesting and mysterious feature.   
   
Object Oriented Ontology and the Encounter 
Object Oriented Ontology entered this study through examining the encounter 
in the question, what happens when we encounter a statue through the French 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. The idea in Levinas that stood out as relevant 
to the encounter has two entwined elements. The first point is that Levinas 
posits there is no universal moral law, or ought. It is each relationship, each 
‘encounter with the other’ (Levinas, 1989), moment to moment, that creates its 
own ought or ethics. In this, Levinas suggests that the encounter with the other 
is where morality comes from. (Levinas, 2000).  
 
Similarly, Philosopher Paul Ricoeur quotes Levinas when Ricoeur discusses the 
implied responsibility the self owes the other, which is that there is ‘no self 
without another who summons it to responsibility’ (Ricoeur, 1992, p.187). 
Again Ricoeur quotes Levinas, writing, when asked "Where are you?" [by 
another who needs me] the response is the following: "Here I am!" a response 
that is a statement of self-constancy’ (Ricoeur, 1992, p.165). This response 
                                                        
101 Here again, we see that ideas and narratives are considered objects. 
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illustrates that we are embedded in context with the other and this encounter is 
where ought is.  
 
However, when Levinas defines ideas (or concepts) as ‘inventions of the mind’ 
and, again, argues that thinking is ‘not the reflection of transcendence’ (Levinas, 
2011, p.40), he draws a distinction between the encounter with a real person 
and the idea of the person.  
 
[T]hen, anytime I take the person in my idea to be the real 
person, I have closed off contact with the real person; I have cut 
off the connection with the other that is necessary if ethics is to 
refer to real other people (Beavers, 1990, p.3). 
  
Levinas sets the encounter in terms of a reciprocal relationship with another or 
living other. He also has set up the idea of a third person in the encounter. 
There is I, the other real person, and my idea of the other person.  
 
The notion of the third person opens to two further insights: that the encounter 
can similarly be thought of as a third thing, and that the encounter with a statue 
is not the encounter with the other in human terms. The realization that statues 
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are exsanguinated,102 that they are objects and are not people has been an 
obvious but defining point in this study.  
 
The vital ethical importance of the Levinas-ian encounter is that morality is 
implied by the presence of the other. However, the distinction of real person 
from idea-of-a-person is situated in this project as the encounter of a person 
(we) and a person-shaped object. This is not an encounter with the other as a 
person this is an encounter with an object. A statue is not a person; it is person 
shaped. In the crystallization of this understanding lies the beginning of an 
altered perception of statues.  
 
As this study began I assumed that the encounter with statues was with the 
other in an altered form. This suggests I also unwittingly considered statues to 
be a lesser copy of ourselves, or perhaps a simulacrum103, although I knew 
statues were not people. Furthermore, during this study I documented several 
people mentioning, in jest, the idea of statues moving when we aren’t looking 
104, a talent not usually assigned to other objects. In examining this perception, 
dismissing statues as merely disappointing replicas of us, swings too far. 
Rather, if we conceive of a statue as an object shaped like a person (as opposed 
                                                        
102 Statues are similar to the superior puppet as described by Von Kleist. See puppets, Teresa 
Brennan and affect in chapter 1. 
103 See Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation 1994, page 6. 




to a faux person), when we encounter this object we will have already begun to 
allow statues to call into focus our assumptions about objects, relations, and 
ourselves.  
 
Our encounter with a statue is made up of ourselves and our perceptions of and 
assumptions about the statue. The encounter is a third thing or object similar to 
our idea-of-the-other that Levinas supposes to interfere with our connection to 
the real other. The encounter mediates between me, as a unified, unfathomable 
object and the statue, which is similarly a unified mystery. A statue has very 
little in common with people other than shape, and shape is not the totality of 
either statues or people. If my assumptions include considering statues to be 
people or copies of people, statues will always disappoint. 
  
Furthermore, my encounter with a person or a statue is not the same encounter 
or identical to the encounter of that person or statue with me. In this we can 
grasp that relations are not specifically transitive. My encounter with you 
mediates my relation to you; your encounter with me mediates yours. Harman 
points to this stating that ‘any relation immediately generates a new object’ 
(Harman, 2010, p.117), i.e. each encounter is a different or new sensual object.  
 
Harman further argues that objects also encounter each other through this kind 
of third sensual object. While we may have more complex or diverse relations 
with objects and people than rocks, OOO puts forward that relations⎯of any 
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kind⎯ are all fundamentally the same, that our relations with objects differ in 
degree, but not in kind from the relations of object to object. The encounter or 
sensual object is the means through which relations occur. Our encounter with 
a statue does not exhaust the statue anymore than the statue can fully deplete 
or know us. My encounter with you is a third thing or object, just as your 
encounter with me is. Similarly the mechanism for the statue encountering 
either of us or another statue is a comparable third object.  
 
More on Relations 
For Harman, the ‘form of contact between things’ (p.120) is a sensual object, 
because the real object cannot be fully known, exhausted or comprehended, a 
third object comes about as our encounter. Harman has proposed that all 
relations are ‘on the same footing, and because all relations are equally inept at 
exhausting the depths of their terms, then an intermediate form of contact must 
be possible’ (Harman, 2010, p.120). Things do relate to other things. (I do alter 
material in the studio, I do fix and move statues, I do have on-going and 
changing relations with and interests in statues still in the studio and ones I 
have moved to my house). The sensual object is made of our past and present 
experience and perceptions of the object and our selves, or for example, my 
encounter with a statue contains me, and my history, my intentions and skills, 
my past and present experience and interests, and perceptions of statues105.  
                                                        
105 This sensual object does not contain full or exhaustive knowledge of the statue, I cannot 
make this statue appear through my comprehension of it, nor will I ever have full knowledge of 
its past, the material it is made of, or its future. 
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It is through the sensual object that this relation occurs. The sensual, however, 
is not a second ‘fixed site’ (Harman, 2010, p.110) writes Harman, nor is it found 
only in the experience of humans and animals. The division is not the real and 
the sensual, (or human thought and world, the division is objects (every thing) 
and relations. This is why Harman argues that object relations differ from 
human relations not ‘in kind but only in degree (2010, p.45). This suggests that 
in my encounter with a statue, the statue also has an unrelated encounter with 
me through a sensual object. Harman uses the example of fire burning cotton.  
(Video 9)  
In this short video I burn cotton balls, wads of cotton batting, pieces of a cotton 
shirt and an entire cotton bag. The fire burned the cotton whether it was balls, 
batting, shirt, or bag. While Harman agrees that human experience is, no doubt 
richer and more complex than the relationship of fire to cotton or rocks to 
riverbeds or my kiln to the clay bodies it fires, what he is pointing to is ‘whether 
the difference between human relations with [cotton] and a flame’s relation 
with [cotton] is different in kind or only in degree’ (p.45). Harman is putting 
forward that there is one kind of relation between objects, the sensual, and that 
this is how all relations operate, for the relation of people to people, rocks to 
people, rocks to rocks, rocks to vines, vines to statues.  
 
What is important to account for in the encounter through Harman for this 
study is two-fold. First, that the human position is ‘in no way central to the 
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cosmic drama,’ in that we differ ‘only in degree’ from other unified objects, like 
trees and statues. This situates us in the world slightly differently than we are 
perhaps used to, although nothing indicates that self-investigation and 
knowledge should be any less important to us, just that it is less of a specific or 
exhaustive method for comprehending the world itself. Secondly, that an object 
is not ‘exhausted by the presence of another, with no intrinsic reality held 
cryptically in reserve’ (Harman, 2010, p.12). We can never exhaust an object or 
have absolute knowledge of it even through having made it our selves. Through 
making my statues I have insight into them, but not absolute insight. 
 
To reiterate, Harman advances that there are two kinds of objects: Real objects, 
such as the Pieta, and sensual objects, which exist in relation to the perceiver’ 
(Harman, 2010, p.110). My experience of Michelangelo’s Pieta as a sculptor and 
a mother is probably quite different than the experience a child might have, or 
someone tasked with cleaning the marble. I do not know nor can I exhaust what 
or who the statue is in material or in image, although I have considered, and 
experienced both the material and subject many times. The Pieta cannot be 
returned to the block of marble, nor can we know what role it might play in the 
future. I cannot even see the whole object in the moment standing in front of it. 
Therefore, just as my role as a sculptor or mother does not exhaust who I am, 
my perception and experience of the Pieta does not exhaust what it is as an 
object. I experience the Pieta through the mediation of a sensual object. This is 
evident in a similar way through my work. I cannot unmake my statues or 
return them to unfired clay, my statues are more than the materials they are 
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made from and more than my intentions. As it was for Jules Dalou, I do not have 
command of everything I have instilled in them or what the form, context, and 
materials may indicate beyond my intentions.  
 
In summary, the real object is remote, removed, reserved, or introverted. 
Harman uses the word withdrawn, meaning real objects are not fully available 
to us or to each other. He writes that objects, or: 
 
the things-in-themselves remain forever beyond our grasp, but 
not because of a specifically human failure to reach them. Instead, 
relations in general fail to gasp their relata, and in this sense the 
ghostly things-in-themselves haunt inanimate causal relations no 
less than the human-world relation, which no longer stands at 
the center of philosophy (Harman, 2011, p.171).   
 
For Harman, the sensual object is a descendant of Husserl’s intentional object 
(Harman, 2011, p.173).  In short, sensual objects are those that exist in 
experience. Sensual objects are a perception, or experience of the real object. 
The concept of the sensual easily connected to Levinas’ inventions of the mind. 
The concept of the person in one’s experience or perception being mistaken for 
the real person, whom we cannot know everything about, allowed this study 
entrance into Harman’s ontology, although Harman does not find sensual 
objects in the mind. The sensual object exists outside the mind and is made of, 
in the case of myself viewing a statue, my perception, ideas, concepts, and 
knowledge of the statue, and me. 
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I wrote Harman asking where exactly the sensual object is located. (My concern 
in asking this question was how to imagine the sensual object). His kind 
response, dated April 5 2017 was this:  
 
In any case, I thought your question "where is the sensual 
object?" really hit the nail on the head, despite your disclaimers 
of not having had philosophical training. (Such training often 
does little more than kill the imagination and turn one into an 
enforcer, I'm sorry to report.)  
 
As you correctly guessed, the sensual object does not exist inside 
the head. Instead, it exists inside the new object that is formed 
through the combination of me and the object I perceive. So for 
instance, the tree as sensual object exists not inside my head, but 
inside the composite object formed of the real me and the real 
tree. (And the same holds for the sensual version of me, assuming 
that the tree encounters me in some way, as I would think it 
does.) 
 
Harman points out that ‘any relation immediately generates a new object’ 
(Harman, 2010, p.117). This implies then that my encounter with a statue is a 
new object. This new object includes my perceptions of the statue (including 
my understanding of what or who is being referenced to by the object) and me. 
This encounter is a sensual object because it relies on my perceptions and me 
to exist. If I fall asleep, or die for example, the sensual object no longer exists, 
although the statue will continue to be an object in the world.  
 
As a studio-based example of a sensual object I will consider my relation or 
encounter with my kiln. My relation to my kiln is a sensual object that includes 
my thinking about, or perception of, my kiln, which includes what I know about 
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its history and the history of kilns generally; where I bought it, what I believe it 
does with and for my work, modifications I’ve made to it, things I do and 
secretly do not understand about it, but all this knowledge and skill together 
does not equal the kiln in itself, or even have much effect on what the kiln does 
to clay. Knowledge about the kiln or the function of the kiln does not 
correspond exactly to the kiln itself. As an example, my knowledge and lack of 
knowledge about the electricity that allows the kiln to fire my work has little or 
no effect on the kiln. The electricity does what electricity does and is not 
hindered by my lack of comprehension of how electricity works, or my skills at 
installing the elements in the kiln. The electricity flows through the heating 
elements with indifference toward the kiln, toward me, and toward my 
knowledge of how any of it actually works. In short, I do not have an exhaustive 
knowledge of an important object in my studio, yet I am able to modify it, to fix 
it, to mostly get the results I desire from it without fully “knowing” everything 
about it. I encounter the kiln through the sensual object. 
 
Objects, according to Harman, are deeper than any relation to them. A real 
object withdraws (is withdrawn already), and is not available to be fully known. 
106  It is through the sensual object (what I come with to the kiln) that the real 
object (kiln) can be related to. A real object, like a tree or a kiln, lies beyond 
                                                        
106 In this way an object cannot be said to be touched, even in part by another object except 
through the sensual object. Harman writes that the question arises: ‘why exaggerate and say 
things cannot touch at all?’ (Harman, 2010, p.73). Harman answers, ‘The problem is that objects 
cannot be touched “in part” because there is a sense in which objects have no parts’ (p.73). 
Objects are unified. Touching a part of an object has implications for the unification of an object 
posing the problem of how the parts touch the object itself. 
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access; it cannot be completely realized. It is the fleeting qualities of the kiln—
the sun glinting off the shiny silver metal skin, the clay splattered on one side, 
the sound of the kiln cooling—the things about the kiln that do not matter to 
what the kiln is structured to perform, or why I need it as part of my practice 
exactly, that are also encountered through the sensual object and inform me.  
Furthermore, although these qualities change as I walk around the kiln, I have 
no doubt it is the same kiln. ‘The sensual qualities are stripped from their 
sensual overlord and appear to orbit a withdrawn real object’ (p.103). The way 
the sun reflects off the metal of the kiln is something I perceive, not part of the 
kiln. These qualities shift as I walk around it, and can also change with what I 
know, or find out as well. Harman uses the example of a tree that we discover to 
be a gallows (2010, p.103), and even less conceptually, walking around what I 
assumed was a statue of a wrestling Satyr and Nymph, at the Ashmolean 
Museum, (Figures 68 and 69), I find I was wrong about both Satyr and Nymph. 
The Satyr did not have goat legs and the Nymph does have a penis. I could not 
see the whole statue at once, my experience changed as I investigated the 
statue from altered perspectives, but the statue has not. This is that aspect of 
statues that forces us to consider it over time from a multiplicity of viewpoints. 
With each shift our perception or our encounter is altered and amended, while 
the object itself has not altered. 
 
Harman calls the way objects are able to seduce us with their qualities into 
considering them allure. He writes that ‘allure is the presence of objects to each 
other in absent form’ (Harman, 2005, p.246). Statues, as objects shaped like 
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people, have an attraction for us. We can see ourselves, or our form in an 
altered state. We can ask of a statue who is that or what is he doing—questions 
not usually asked of objects that are not people (or animals). In this way statues 
draw us in with their qualities, which have alluring similarities to qualities we 
find in recognizing ourselves. 
 
Assumptions and Qualities 
The qualities (or our perceptions) of an object are not particularly informative 
about the real object we perceive. The statue of the Satyr and Nymph I 
encountered in Oxford is a carved lump of marble, which had little to do with 
my experience of the statue, and what I came away thinking about. Object 
Oriented Ontology suggests that we encounter the qualities, or images of 
objects and not the real object in its mysterious unity. Harman writes that if we 
accept this, and ‘If we identify this event with “aesthetics” in the broadest sense 
of the term, it becomes clear why first philosophy is aesthetics, not ethics’ 
(Harman, 2012, p.14/17). The qualities we encounter then are what Harman 
says constitute aesthetics, and OOO ‘treats aesthetics as our primary means of 
access to reality’ (Harman, 2016, p.11). The qualities of an object—such as the 
shiny kiln or the sameness of the doll heads—are the object’s allure, or 
aesthetic qualities, and the draw of these aesthetic features are emphasized in 
OOO. It is the object’s qualities that draw us in; a statue is a familiar form in an 
unusual and concretized context, the Victor Noir gisant specifically has a 
romantic and vulnerable shape and story. It has become connected to our 
desire for love and fruitfulness. The doll heads appeal as an aid to experience a 
 207 
concern through the studio, as something potent and memorable. However, we 
still do not and cannot exhaust the object through our attraction to it. Or use of 
it. 
 
The qualities of an object can be understood as allure through a visit to 
Madame Tussaud’s Wax Museum in Berlin. My daughter took pictures with the 
band One Direction, Marlene Dietrich, and Princess Leia from Star Wars. 
(Figure 70). She knew the figures were not real but she recognized the people 
though certain qualities. Again, Grosz writes in Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze 
and the Framing of the Earth (2012), that Deleuze takes sensation to be ‘what 
art forms from chaos through the extraction of qualities’ (p.8). The qualities we 
recognize or the way we come to recognition through sensations, do not equal 
the person, but in this case did equal recognition of, for example, Harry Styles 
from One Direction. Harry Styles’ cat107 however probably would not recognize 
Harry in the One Direction group at Madame Tussaud’s, as cats probably do not 
recognize us in the same way we recognize each other. Madame Tussaud’s 
caters to qualities primary for us in recognition. The qualities that allow us to 
recognize Princess Leia are not vital to Princess Leia the character. Princess 
Leia, who is imaginary—and in this case is a wax dummy in Berlin in 2016 
made to look like Carrie Fisher playing Princess Leia on the set of Star Wars in 
1975—can have a different hairdo, wear pants, and grow old and still be 
                                                        
107 Harry Styles was a band member of the now defunct group One Direction. Reportedly, his 
family cat is called Olivia.  http://www.m-magazine.com/posts/harry-styles-and-his-family-
gets-a-new-cat-named-olivia-62049  I am suggesting that cats probably recognize people in 
some way other than facial features, such as smell, or sound, or movement. 
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Princess Leia in the Star Wars story. The qualities we recognize to be indicators 
of Princess Leia are not vital to even the imaginary character, but are part of the 
allure important in the sensual object through which we encounter Princess 
Leia.  
 
Harman explains that allure is a particular and sporadic ‘experience in which 
the intimate bond between a thing’s unity and its plurality of notes somehow 
partially disintegrates’ (Harman, 2005, p.143). This explains Harman ‘happens 
in artworks of every sort’ (2010, p.104). We are drawn in by qualities that we 
confront, without knowing the withdrawn, real object. When we assume our 
perception defines or exhausts the real object, or statue, we encounter, 
forgetting the unknown, unencountered unity of the real object beneath, we 
make a fundamental mistake. It is here we can begin to understand how the 
duality of our encounter with statues may be a vital method for considering 
how we approach objects generally. To misunderstand and define the allure of 
statues as the draw of a lesser copy of ourselves, fundamentally fails to 
consider the real object that is a statue. Further, the impossibility of a statue 
being anything but similar only in some surface allure or insubstantial way to 
what we are and do is also discounted. Statues are something other than what 
we are, and—although, they do have some superficial similarities to us—they 
are a vital resource for exposing our methods of considering this point. 
 
Metaphor and The Encounter 
If metaphor can shed any light on the communication between 
the different poles of being, then it may provide a kind of skeleton 
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key to unlock the other relations in the heart of the world’ 
(Harman, 2005, p.98).  
   
Metaphor, writes Harman, ‘plays out solely on the level of representation rather 
than that of the things themselves’ (Harman, 2005, p.98). Metaphor is in the 
encounter. Metaphor corroborates and is an effective conception of the contact 
between things and ways in which new objects can manifest. Metaphor, 
Harman points out through philosopher Ortega y Gasset, is not reciprocal.108 A 
metaphor is not a comparison of one thing to another nor is it substitution of 
one thing for another.109 Metaphor changes how we understand. To say a 
blanket of stars shifts the night sky to something perhaps, warm and safe. The 
qualities of a blanket become, for an instant, attached to the night sky, 
entwining blanket qualities with a clear night sky, creating a new kind of 
‘vaporous hybrid of both: one that cannot even be described in terms of definite 
tangible properties’ (Harman, 2005, p.107). Similarly, in one version of the fairy 
tale, The Tinderbox, the dog that guards the silver has eyes as big as dinner 
plates. While this is a linguistic simile, thinking about this dog is a curious 
experience. This is clearly not a dog of our regular experience, and it is certainly 
watching what we do. A statue of a dog or person with eyes as big as dinner 
plates would not have the same result. 
                                                        
108 See (Harman, 2005, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things, pp. 
107, 207-208) 
109 Harman writes that ‘Metaphor, humor, and several other types of experiences are all seen to 
belong under the more general heading of allure. Allure differs from normal perception by 
somehow putting the relation of the two moments of the thing at issue for us, by openly 




Because it is difficult to picture, it brings to the front an important concept, 
‘metaphor seems to work only when it utilizes inessential qualities’ (Harman, 
2005, p.105) writes Harman. If one object is compared to a similar object, like a 
blanket and a sheet, or a plate and a platter, there isn’t the same resistance to 
the connection. Harman quotes Ortega y Gasset writing about the function of 
metaphor, when it works with inessential qualities. 
 
The result . . . is the annihilation of what both objects are as 
practical images. When they collide with one another their hard 
carapaces crack and the internal matter, in a molten state, 
acquires the softness of plasma, ready to receive a new form and 
structure. (Harman, 2005, p.107) (Ortega y Gasset, 1975, p.143) 
 
Through metaphor, the real object is alluded to through its usually ‘inessential 
qualities’ (2005, p.105) (like the shininess of the kiln) and can join with another 
object through that surface allure. That I can understand a blanket of stars 
makes no sense, as blanket and stars have nothing to do with each other, except 
when deepened through metaphor. That the dog guarding the silver is not only 
a frightening guard dog, but also has eyes so large it is impossible to imagine or 
to illustrate, makes it clear it is an incomprehensible and inconceivable peril.  
 
Metaphor is also created through statues, and without words. This is 
demonstrated (albeit in this case, with images of statues), in the study where 
balloons were placed onto pictures of statues. Showing images of naked female 
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statues to people while they held a balloon did not draw attention to the 
balloon at all, however the balloons placed on photographs of naked female 
statues did altered the balloons to the degree that the balloons were no longer 
comfortable to hold. It was not the real object being held that was considered 
clearly, because no change to that real object had occurred. The change 
happened in the sensual object, suggesting a transformation of that object 
through placement, a visual metaphor. We have been affected, as per Brennan 
(2004), and altered by the encounter. This is a further indication of the power 
of the sensual object, and that this is where we are most accountable. 
 
In summary, Harman’s argues that ‘any relation immediately generates a new 
object’ (Harman, 2010, p.117) and that this is the sensual object—which is the 
form of contact between things—because the real object cannot be known, we 
know about real objects only in a kind of translation. The encounter is not a 
transitive relation. This claims Harman is ‘hardcore realism because it takes 
real objects so seriously that it holds them to be irreplaceable by any 
conceptual model’ (Harman, 2011, p.10/11). The Woodsman, as a unified 
object, can become tin, survive the shift, cause a shift in my conception of 
objects and be imaginary and a real object. There is in this a characteristic of 
the encounter with art that follows here that is vital, but subtle. We have 
encountered person shaped objects—such as mannequins, dolls and probably 
statues— without considering the experience from an altered perspective. 
When we are willing and able to consider these objects differently, we are 
offered insights about the quality and the limitations of our perception and our 
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assumptions. It is when encountering a statue as an art object, which is charged 
differently than everyday objects, that we are offered an opportunity to alter 
our perspective through a greater consideration of the sensual object we are a 
part of. 
 
‘The reality of a thing is always utterly different from any of our relations to it’ 
(Harman, 2005, p.103). This was illustrated to me vividly by watching the 
GoPro video of myself in the studio. Recognizing that there is always more to 
any object we encounter is, in itself, overwhelming. However, the unknowable, 
unified object that is mediated by the sensual object is in relation to the 
perceiver, and offers an opportunity to consider how much assumption, or 
disinterest will come with us into the sensual object and therefore the 
encounter with statues. To reiterate, the sensual object is not located in our 
mind specifically, we are on the interior of the sensual object110, we are part of 
the sensual object, which is a further drawback to our unobstructed perception 
of our own encounters. Again, this has been demonstrated by my experience of 
the studio. I designed the studio, I am the skilled “labourer,” I generate the work 
in the studio and yet I do not have a clear, lucidly observed understanding of 
events and actions there. Harman points out that ‘introspection is no more 
exhaustive than knowledge gained from the outside’ (p.73). I am part of the 
larger object of my studio and this object is not exhaustible through my having 
created it. Harman writes, 
                                                        
110 This argument can be found in chapter 8 of Quadruple Object, (Harman, 2010) 
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For notice that our relation with an entity can itself become a 
unified object that withdraws from the scrutiny of all other 
entities, including we ourselves: as when we form marriages and 
business partnerships, or join the Foreign Legion. The 
implications of these links are by no means fully accessible to 
their participants (Harman, 2010, p.113). 
 
All objects are trapped in this limited perspective. This is the nature of 
relations. In the same way we are not able to fully exhaust partnerships or 
understand marriages completely from within them, fire does not consume all 
of the aspects or qualities of cotton or translate the aspects of cotton important 
to other objects.  
 
Harman says that ‘art isn’t trying to explain what [an object] is made of or what 
it does’ (2015, @12:47), and ‘artists do not provide a theory of physical reality’ 
(2012, p.14). Artists are not focused on replacing an object with knowledge 
about it and merely duplicating or copying an object would allow for nothing 
different than everyday things. Instead, writes Harman in his Documenta 
article, The Third Table, (2012) in art ‘there is an attempt to establish objects 
deeper than the features through which they are announced, or allude to 
objects that cannot quite be made present’ (p.14).  Statues also achieve this on 
several levels; i.e. we encounter Pluto capturing Proserpina, or the body of the 
long dead Victor Noir or Shelley. These are not everyday things. 
 
Situating and Contextualizing Statues  
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Statues, as discussed in the introduction and Chapter One have a tentative 
position in Contemporary Art. However, statues are comfortably situated as art 
objects through Harman’s essay, The Third Table (2012), and realistically 
contextualized in an interpretation of Arthur Danto’s new Art era. Harman’s 
essay begins by defining the two tables of Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington.111 The 
two tables are duplicates, says Eddington, of the table of ‘everyday life, at which 
he sits to write, and the same table as described by physics’ (Harman, 2012, 
p.5). There is the familiar table he uses, and the table described by science, 
made of atoms or particles. These two tables align with the concept of the two 
cultures, the sciences and the humanities, as put forward by scientist and 
writer C. P. Snow in 1959. Harman writes that ‘the scientist reduces the table 
downward to tiny particles invisible to the eye; the humanist reduces it upward 
to a series of effects on people and other things’ (Harman, 2012, p.6). The 
object, the real table, is neither of those tables alone, argues Harman. An object 
is not only the tiny particles it is made of, in this the object is undermined, nor 
is it only a part of a whole, the object is overmined (as previously defined in this 
chapter). An object is a third thing, it is both the table of the humanities and the 
table of science and the mysterious unity of the object itself. If Eddington’s two 
tables provide the moral support for Snow’s two cultures (Harman, 2012, p.7), 
one of the Humanities and one of Science, then Harman argues that his table 
requires a third culture.  
 
                                                        
111 Sir Arthur Stanley Eddinton was an astrophysicist, who famously confirmed Einstein’s 
general relativity. In his 1927 Gifford lectures he spoke about two tables, that table of the 
everyday experience and the table of science. 
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Harman suggests the arts as the third culture. He describes the philosophy of 
the third table as one that ‘is committed to tables that do exist at a deeper than 
all possible transformations, modifications, perturbations, or creations’ 
(Harman, 2012, p.13). This culture is more than the one of the enlightened 
natural scientist, who, in effect would blend only the two tables that Eddington 
proposed. In this mixture, the unified object is still missing. Artists, suggests 
Harman, ‘do not provide a theory of physical reality (p.14). Art is not science. 
Artists do not seek the first table, the everyday table, because ‘art is not just 
replication’ (p.14). Instead, writes Harman, art and artists ‘attempt to establish 
objects deeper than the features through which they are announced, or allude 
to objects that cannot quite be made present’ (Harman, 2012, p.14).  
 
Statues quietly do this quite well. Hercules, or the Tin Woodsman, Jesus, or 
David can be present with us, and Giacometti’s figures are read as ‘us,’ although 
the forms would never physically, medically or anatomically work as a living 
person. Abstracting the body, altering it from an exact copy of ourselves, seems 
to enliven it. We find empathy with the Pieta and it is natural and unchallenged 
to speak of stone as flesh, although we know it is illusion.  
 
Harman, speaking about philosopher Manuel Delanda’s112 discussion of human 
society as something apart from humans, considers that ‘humans are necessary 
ingredients of society but it does not follow that humans have transparent 
                                                        
112 A New Philosophy Of Society, 2006 
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knowledge of that society’ (2015, @21:00). Just as I am a necessary ingredient 
of my studio but do not have transparent knowledge of my studio practice, 
Harman proposes that art is a human activity for humans, but from that 
perspective we do not have transparent knowledge about it. Statues offer us a 
specific form of encounter that puts forward our relations with others and 
objects generally for inspection.  
 
I suggest that statues are art objects that connect and resonate with Object 
Oriented Ontology and similarly, OOO provides concepts to better comprehend 
both the encounter and statues. Statues are openly about us, made by and for 
us, but are not us, not human. Statues are objects that put our relations with 
objects on display. Our encounters with statues reveal much about our 
encounters with the world, and reveal our concretized concepts and ideas with 










The authority from which this study has been conducted comes directly from 
practice. The employment and study of the figure and the continued use of 
materials to do so is the foundation and origin of this research, and is where all 
concepts and comprehension engaged during this study were corroborated and 
confirmed. Again, as Kathrin Busch puts forward as definition number six of 
outcome for artistic research, art ‘can thus reveal the concealed, flipside of 
knowledge’ (Busch, 2009, p.4), which positions art as able to point to what is 
obscured or concealed by the structure of other forms of knowledge. I contend 
that this revealing of the flipside, or the revealing of assumptions, is what this 
study has aimed to achieve. Statues therefore, the physical result of practice, 
are positioned as a means through which concepts can be both considered and 
provoked, revealing what is frequently masked or veiled.  
 
Assumptions and Contributions 
Again, our encounters with statues⎯ objects shaped like people, made by and 
for people, but are not people⎯ put our relations with objects on display, 
revealing some of how we might conceive of our encounter generally with the 
world. Grosz argues that concepts are how we are able to deal with life. 
Although she further points out that concepts do not solve problems. Gravity, 
living with other people, and mortality are not problems solved with concepts, 
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but engaged and addressed through concepts (Grosz, 2010, @22:20). We know 
how to approach things from past experience or socialization. In short, the 
production of concepts is how we order life. How we approach life. In most 
cases, we need to have these assumptions in place,113 but being aware that we 
do, and mindful of our position as only a part of our relation with an object, is 
sometimes overlooked. Statues are positioned almost specifically to invite us to 
consider assumption we have about ourselves as people and objects.  
 
Statues as objects resist or do not respond to an overmining or undermining 
consideration (as described by Harman) in any revealing way. A statue, when 
considered reduced⎯perhaps to the atoms it is made of⎯or as a piece of the 
whole that is the world, is lost as a focal point, all that is interesting about it as 
an object lost or misplaced, its purpose and point removed. It is when we 
consider the unified object that is a statue and review our curious summaries of 
that object that we begin to actually encounter a statue, and allow it to enhance 
our concepts or to reveal unidentified, or concealed assumptions about it. 
 
Antonio Damasio begins Self Comes To Mind (2010) writing that this book was 
‘written to start over’ (2010, p.6). Damasio asserts that, although he has been 
engaged in studying the human brain and mind for over thirty years, he is no 
longer satisfied with his former interpretation of the issue of consciousness. He 
                                                        
113 See Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind; Constructing the Conscious Brain Pantheon, 2010, 
for an explanation of how shorthand in thinking, previous experience is useful. 
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writes that after looking again, at research old and new, in slightly different 
ways, he has come to alter his former thinking, principally on two problems: 
‘the origin and nature of feelings and the mechanisms behind the construction 
of the self’ (p.7). His book, he claims is about ‘what we still do not know but 
wish we did’ (p.7). What Damasio has achieved through re-conceiving his 
former account of the problem of consciousness is to identify where the key 
problems are in the underlying framework. He has traded his former certainty, 
or knowledge, for knowing, or pointing to the assumptions at the base of his 
previous arguments.  
 
Similarly, Alva Noë also addresses assumptions. He writes in Strange Tools: Art 
and Human Nature (2015) that ‘neuroscience is straitjacketed, not by the 
methods of science, to be sure, but by unacknowledged philosophical 
assumptions, not so much by a theory as by an ideology about what we are’ 
(p.120). That you are your brain, he continues, ‘is not one of neuroscience’s 
findings; it is rather a raft of assumptions that have been taken for granted by 
neuroscience from the start; it is Descartes’s conception but given a materialist 
makeover (pp.120-21). Here, assumptions have been gleaned and exposed. The 
slight shift that comes with considering a non-anthropocentric world allows 
assumptions about human consciousness to be revealed. The point is not to 
remove humans as a focus, but to remove humans as the centre point of 
everything, blocking the view. We have seen that it is difficult to see ourselves 
in our relations, as the scene from Frayne’s play Copenhagen describes. Statues 
are particularly well positioned as objects shaped like us to further provoke 
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consideration about how we encounter others, as the initial brief attention to 
Levinas in relation to statues denoted. Both Damasio and Noë, scientist and 
philosopher, suggest that by having realized and indicated assumptions in the 
foundations of structures made of otherwise sound scientific or philosophical 
knowledge, they have an approach to building more sound⎯albeit slightly 
altered⎯edifice, and are able to be enlarged beyond the previous arrangement. 
 
Discovering assumptions is, by nature, an unusual occurrence.  As discussed 
earlier, Harman uses the example of fire burning cotton as a means to 
characterize the difference between our relations with cotton and a flame’s 
relation with cotton as a difference of degree of relation and not kind or type of 
relation. The flame relates to only some of the cotton’s qualities, not all of the 
cotton’s qualities. When we encounter a statue, we are in relation with qualities 
that may not be pertinent to fire, birds, the ground, or water. The ground 
relates to the material and weight of the statue, but probably not the human 
form, so too fire may burn up a statue, but the flame’s warming or destruction 
of a ceramic figure is not the same as a flame’s warming or destruction of us.114 
Encountering a statue may become a prompt for us to recall that all objects 
have relations that differ only in degree but not in kind from the relations we 
experience. Reminded of our experience of statues as an object we are able to 
hold two opposing ideas about, or catching us unaware or even striking us as 
                                                        
114 My father had a knee replacement about ten years before he died. When he was cremated, 
the steel knee was charred but undamaged and now rests in a inconspicuous place in my living-
room.  
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uncanny could perhaps assist in indicating or pointing to assumptions we carry 
into our own relations with other people and encounters with other objects.  
 
Harman argues that when we are asked what something is, we can explain 
what it ‘is made of, or what it does’ (Harman, 2016, p.178) (or both). This 
allows for two kinds of knowledge, what something is made of or what it does. 
Harman writes that ‘this is how we attain knowledge of the world’ (p.178), 
however, he continues, ‘it does not follow that knowledge exhausts the reality 
of the world, or that it is the only worthy means of gaining access to that world’ 
(Harman, 2016, p.178). The two tables of Eddington represent the two options 
we have been offered for engaging objects and for engaging knowledge. In his 
essay, The Third Table (2012), Harman proposes a third table which ‘is a 
genuine reality deeper than any theoretical or practical encounter with it’ 
(2012, pp.9-10). This table gives way to a third culture, or a third attitude 
toward knowledge. Harman’s option is more than an embrace of both scientific 
knowledge, and the common sense of everyday experience, it includes a third 
perspective, ‘found neither in subatomic physics nor in human psychology’ 
(p.10).  
 
Harman’s third table is an encounter with objects that I propose to be 
exemplified by our encounter with statues. To see a statue as only the material 
it is constructed from or as part of a system of art or statuary is not to perceive 
the figure (or point of, or art) in the object, although, the statue is not an 
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attempt to specifically replicate a person and is not human. Often when we 
direct the question what is it? to a statue, the object—the statue—disappears as 
we discuss either what it does, or what it is made of. Neither answer tells us 
much that is useful about a statue, or touches the object as this study has 
indicated. Therefore, the necessity of Harman’s third option, which includes the 
questions about what something is made of or does, but also, a ‘cognition that is 
not a kind of knowledge’ (Harman, 2017, @9:00), is made plain, especially if we 
are to speak comprehensively about statues. Harman says that the third table is 
‘dealt with allusively, obliquely, elliptically’ (@9:10). It is not knowledge but 
knowing. The contribution of this study is an articulation of knowing or 
cognition about statues. 
 
While it may seem to be a paradox to employ Object Oriented Ontology as a 
means to articulate what happens when we encounter statues, OOO has been a 
clarifying and expanding method. Statues, as art objects, demonstrate the third 
table of Harman’s third culture and exemplify an approach to thinking about 
the non-human. OOO’s position that our relations differ in degree but not in 
kind to the relations of all other objects offers parameters to the encounter, 
which enhances rather than diminishes what can be discovered and 
understood about human consciousness through the encounter with objects 
shaped like⎯but not actual⎯people.  
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I argue that through OOO statues can be seen or understood as material in the 
studio and as person-shaped objects in the world, which then broadens and 
conveys the character and boundaries of our (and other objects) encounters 
with them. I further contend it is in this articulation of objects and the 
encounter that we can begin to amend and modify our ideas or perceptions of 
what a statue as an object presents to us and reveals about us as people. 
 
Elizabeth Grosz writes that art is the ‘regulation and organization’ (2012, p.4) 
of materials through restrictions (‘self-imposed’ by the artist), that ‘directly 
impact living bodies, organs, nervous systems’ (p.4). Grosz advances that ‘art 
enables matter to become expressive, to not just satisfy but also to intensify—
to resonate and become more than itself’ (p.4). The statue, as a mysterious 
unified object, is more than the materials and more than the intention of the 
artist as this study suggests. It is both of those things and more, exemplified by 
Harman’s third table. 
 
The answer to the question that has directed this study⎯what happens when 
we encounter a statue⎯is that a third object, the encounter, appears. It is in 
conceiving of this encounter as an object that holds concepts, perceptions, 
histories, assumptions, and ourselves, but differs from the object statue, that 
this study has consequence. As we encounter an object shaped like us, we have 
the occasion to consider the statue diffractively, or expansively, rather than 
through endless reflection.  We encounter through our concepts, perceptions, 
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histories, assumptions, and ourselves the real and not real of  ‘a three-
dimensional figurative image [ . . . that] both depicts a body in space and is a 
body-in-space’ (Getsy, 2014, p.2), or an object shaped like a person. 
 
To achieve a diffractive approach to statues, there must be a willingness to ask 
about allowing them the same taboos we reserve for ourselves. We need to 
identify and ask why we can speak without self-consciousness about a veiled 
statue. Why do we dismiss statues and find them an anachronism partly 
because they remain still, “caught in a moment,” and do not live. There are very 
few other objects that can expose our buried assumptions in this way. Engaging 
the encounter has incorporated (but has not been limited to) consideration of 
mirror neurons, concepts of embodiment and mind, theories of affect and 
transmission, and the nature of materials as related to sculpture. Furthermore, 
the figure and our attitude toward it denote concepts that are ancient yet 
unresolved for us. We have assumptions buried in forms, such as in what 
monuments are and the purity of Greek figures. We are extremely familiar with 
the body, and yet to gain the skill to convincingly work with the form requires a 
conscious ⎯historically considered dangerous or taboo⎯ medical-like 
knowledge of the body that makes use of the structures and forms inside and 
unseen beneath the surface we consider body.  
 
With a slight alteration of the concepts with which we approach a statue, an art 
object, we gain benefit from our encounter, and as Harman points out  ‘We 
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define ourselves ethically by what we take seriously’ (Harman, 2016, p.17). We 
reveal our assumptions, prejudices, and relations in the world through the 
encounter or third object, or as Levinas suggests, a third other in mind.  
 
The shift is that when we encounter an object⎯a person, thing or statue⎯to 
conceive of it in the manner of the third table, to deal with it as an art object, 
allusively, obliquely, elliptically. Our encounter is not the statue, the object we 
encounter is experienced with our remembered history and anticipated future 
in mind. Recognizing that the philosophical invitation is there when we 
encounter statues is to experience statues with altered expectations. The 
benefit of that slight alteration of the concepts with which we encounter a 
statue, an art object, is that there is the possibility to reveal and discern part of 
our relation to the world, if not for furthering what is known about the world, 
then for the satisfaction of a more profound experience of statues.  
 
The impact of this study on my practice has been an integration of my practice 
with theory and concepts established outside my practice, and to have a means 
to continue to do so. This has been realized by bringing my practice of making 
and considering statues into a measured dialog with theories and concepts 
particularly about the body and about objects. In this exchange it was initially 
clear to me where my comprehension of the concepts was broadened by 
practice and my practice extended by concepts, although I am less certain of 
this division now. My practice has been enlarged and harnessed to work with a 
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conceptual coherence it did not have before. This was achieved through best 
use of the methods employed for this study. This included making use of my 
practice⎯what I had at hand⎯as per Levi-Strauss (1966), a ‘trust’ that data 
has something to offer and that theory will emerge, as per Glaser (1992, p.21), 
from data, and through making use of diffraction, as per Barad (2007), which 
enlarged or abrogated the concepts I engaged toward discovering what happens 
when we encounter a statue and Schön’s consideration of reflection (1983). 
Previously in my practice, questions were generated but lingered, unresolved 
without methods for bringing theory and concepts from outside practice to 
bear on issues encountered in my practice.  In short, the theory I engaged has 
made sense of my practice for me while my practice has also made the theory 
comprehensible, and therefore useful, to me. 
 
More broadly, the primary contribution to knowledge this study makes is to 
indicate how statues are philosophical actants. This denotes my aim to have 
argued for statues, with the history of the form intact, as an art form suited for 
engaging and enhancing conceptual and philosophical thought. This study has 
proposed that our encounter with statues is able to subtly reveal ways of 
considering objects that has been obscured by other concepts. For example, 
investigating our encounter with statues has indicated that we often, as per F. 
Scott Fitzgerald, ‘hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time’ about 
the figure. For us the human form appears to predominate our reflection on an 
object. We condemn statues (iconoclasm) that might represent people or ideas 
we disagree with, and conversely adore or worship those that we do, and 
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further, we allow statues taboos we reserve for ourselves, such as difficulties 
with nudity. Through placing my encounters with statues through practice⎯as 
defined in the introduction⎯into dialog with Object Oriented Ontology, I both 
gained a basic understanding of OOO, and enlarged my comprehension and 
articulation of statues and the encounter. I consider that result to indicate that 
statues could be said to function as a philosophical actant.  
Moving toward considering statues as this kind of actant would perhaps best be 
achieved by conceiving of the statue as a prompt. When statues disappoint us 
by remaining still, or cause us to feel uncomfortable in their nakedness, or 
strike us as uncanny, we could consider our ability to hold two opposing ideas 
about statues to assist in pointing to what is sometimes left unconsidered in 
our encounter with a statue.  The encounter reveals assumptions we carry into 
our relations or encounters with them and with other objects. 
Finally, while questions about statues and the encounter were always 
generated in my practice, it has been through applying the specific methods 
required by this study that it has become feasible to examine and address 
questions in practice. The methods of this study provided a specific approach, 
which once embraced and adhered to, comfortably situated particular aspects 
my practice⎯often ones I had been only tacitly aware of⎯as collectable data. 
In The Slides Project for example, where I considered work I had made and 
documented, when these specific methods were applied, contained an 
emergent theory that revealed issues in my current practice to me. The 
methods directed an approach to data that delayed conclusions and 
assessments, allowing for the expansion and negation of diffraction to occur. 
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Understanding a diffractive approach to data, which considers an expansion of 
concepts rather than a resituating of the same, has been easily adapted to and 
rigorously performed through Glaserian Grounded Theory in this study. 
Glaser’s direction to trust that data has something to offer, that theory will 
emerge, and that ‘good grounded theory should be readily modifiable to new 
conditions, new subjects, and perspectives’ (p.24) provided clear boundaries 
and delineated a specific attitude especially when describing the GT researcher 
as having ‘the patience and security and trust to wait’ (p.26) for theory to 
emerge from the data.  
This approach fundamentally assumes the data itself has something to offer, 
which is perhaps why Object Oriented Ontology had an expanding influence in 
this study. Ultimately, it has been the methods I was able to employ in this 
study that allowed statues, and the object that is my practice, to inform and 
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                           Figure 3: Ugo Rondinone (wax Nudes 2011) (p. 34) 
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David Coleman / Alamy Stock Photo 
 






 Figure 5: Yinka Shinobare MBE (RA) (Scramble For Africa  2003 or How To 












Figure 8: Paul Thek Working on the Tomb Figure: Photo by Peter Hujar 





Baboons (P. 69) 
 
Part of a mural in the 
tomb of Egyptian 
Pharaoh Tutankhamen, 
who died in 1323, 
showing six of twelve 
baboons (Papio 
Hamadryas Anubis) 
with erect phalluses 
BCE. Each baboon is 
watching over one of 
the twelve hours the 
king would have to 




Figure 10: Rodin, The Age Of Bronze (1877). (p. 35)                              Lisa Osborn 
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Figure 11: Pawel Althamer, Monika and Pawel , (2002).  (p. 37) 
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Figure 14: Rebbecca Warren’s She (2003). (p. 37) 
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Theresa Scarbrough / Alamy Stock Photo 
Figure 16: Victor Noir gisant, (1891), by Aimé-Jules Dalou, Père Lachaise 












Figure 18: (p. 80) 
‘In the ninety-first division of Paris’s Per Lachaise cemetery, the tomb of August 
Blanqui shivers with an undercurrent of angst-riddled vigor’ (Eschelbacher, 









Figure 21: Balloon. (p. 88) 
 
‘I then handed around a bag 
of balloons and asked the 
participant(s) to take one, 
and everyone was asked to 
say what it was: An un-
blown-up balloon, was the 




Figure 22: I then showed the same series of pictures with a balloon 




Figure23: Standing Woman, Gaston Lachaise, 1932 UCLA campus. (p. 88) 
 
 




Figure25: Jake and Dinos Chapman, Zygotic Acceleration, Biogenetic, De-















vittorio sciosia / Alamy Stock Photo 




age fotostock / Alamy Stock Photo 
Figure 30: Antonio Corradini and Giuseppe Sanmartino, Veiled Truth (1752), 




Peter Barritt / Alamy Stock Photo 
Figure 31: Michelangelo, Pieta (1499). (p. 115) 
 
 
Figure 32: Joseph Kosuth, One and Three Chairs , (1965). (p. 116) 





Figure 33: Giacometti working on the plaster for Walking Man.  (p. 164) 
 
 
Figure 34: Traces of his sculpting with plaster. (p164)                
 
(Both photos fromErnst Scheidegger Archive: Photograph by Ernst Scheidegger © 2018 Stiftung Ernst 
Scheidegger-Archiv, Zurich.)  
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Figure 69: Alternate view.                                                          Lisa Osborn 





Figure 70: Charlotte and Princess Leia. 












































































Coding sheet examples for The Conversations Project: 









This is a memo from The Conversations Project that considered some of the 
ways that Michelangelo’s statue of David was indicated by people with whom I 


























These pages show coding categories, memoing, and the two theories, one useful 
to this study and one quite personal: ( I am an actant in the studio, the only 
moving thing, and that the studio is good for me which may explain why I like 






iii -The Shusterman Project documents: 
Project structure: 
Title: Photography as Performative Process Project: 
Happiness lies neither in vice nor in virtue; but in the manner we appreciate 
the one and the other, and the choice we make pursuant to our individual 
organization. -Marquis de Sade 
Question: 
What role does the body play in the performative process of 
photographing a subject? 
Project outline: 
Shusterman describes somaesthetics as a discipline that 
emphasizes the role of the body in aesthetic appreciation. 
Somaesthetics is a neologism combining soma- indicating the body 
and aesthetics.  
Shusterman argues that the body has been marginalized or omitted 
in the conception of humanistic study. He argues that a meliorative 
reintegration of the body into philosophy is a necessary and 
required.  
 
Based on Richard Shusterman’s “Somaesthetic theory”, his three 
branches of Somaesthetics, and his essay Photography as 
Performative Process, artist and model will collaborate and 
document both action and thought, in the role of the body of both 
photographer and model (Dynamic doing of artist vs passive 
undergoing of subject) in a series of photographic sessions.  
 
Using the three aspects of Somaesthetics: 
Analytic: What we read Foucault, Uses of Pleasure and Order of 
things; Shusterman, Photography as Performative Process and 
Thinking Through the Body: Educating For The Humanities; 
Barthes, Camera Lucida; Sade, Pragmatic: What we read about what 
exercises we do: Foucault, bio-power  
Barthes, Camera Lucida 
Practical: What exercises we do to photograph- (Shusterman never 
explicitly outlines or approves somatic disciplines) Exercises 
invented from Barthes, Foucault and Shusterman.  
“In visual arts, somaesthetics has been used to explain not only how 
artists use their bodies in making artworks, but also how observers 
deploy themselves somatically to perceive such works.” (TTB 9) 
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Problems:  
Subject is self-conscious, uncomfortable in the way Barthes 
describes in Camera Lucida when he writes,  
“Now, once I feel myself observed by the lens, everything changes: I 
constitute myself in the process of “posing”, I instantaneously make 
another body for myself, I transform myself in advance into an 
image.” (P10 CL) 
The issue arises when the third eye of the camera is introduced. 
Subject: LBOsborn 
Desires to carry out photography project  
Desires to understand the role of the body in a performative 
process 




Desires to photograph subject.  
Desires to remove the influence of the camera on the subject. 
Willing to investigate the role of the body in a performative process 
but does not desire to understand it. (Not particularly self 
conscious or caught in the fears of what photography does) 
 
Desire didn’t get the project anywhere. Desire is not enough.  




Foucault points out in Uses of Pleasure that, 
 
“Nature intended that the performance of the act be associated 
with a pleasure, and it was this pleasure that gave rise to 
EPITHUMIA, to desire in a movement that was naturally directed 
toward what “gives pleasure” P43 Uses of pleasure 
 
It is agreed that the desire to photograph or understand and the 
willingness to be photographed or assist in making the project 
happen was not enough to produce an agreeable experience of the 
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performative role of the body in the process of art making. An 
agreed on power/control and touch erotic component allowed the 
artist to remove or control the subject’s “re making” of self in the 
photographic sessions. Artist desired to control subject’s 










Process (not outcome) 
Nature intended that the performance of the act be associated with 
a pleasure, and it was this pleasure that gave rise to EPITHUMIA, to 
desire in a movement that was naturally directed toward what 
“gives pleasure” P43 Uses of pleasure 
 
Object partners: 
Active actors: carry out   
Passive actors: carried out on. (47UoP) 
 
Domain of pleasure  
 
Following Shusterman’s four point outline of his collaboration with 
Toma, this project will address: the role of artist and model will 
follow the same basic structure: 
 
Setting: where to photograph and why. 
Camera: it’s effect on both artist and model. 
Props: Transformative/ritual objects and their effect on the soma 
of both artist and subject 
Performative process: Shared experience and somatic 
communication of making the photograph 
 
 271 
The main points to be addressed in the journal will be the choosing 
the setting, addressing the use of ritual props, the effect of the 
camera on artist and subject, the bodily action and creative 
participation of both photographer and subject, and critique of 
resulting photograph(s). 
: 
 Bodily action of photographer bodily action of subject; 
Photographer’s skill at gaining the confidence of the model:(p245) 
dominant aims of photographing; 
Subject must be willing.-Barthes quote(p247) {fears} must work 
toward being vitally and authentically present. (247) 
Role of camera: role of photograph as an object (248)  
Setting and pose: performative process. ( different from gaining 
trust) Rules of performance- narrative we create. (posing and 
positioning are typically created without a formal script-P250){is 
this what we create??} 
Setting: 
Where to photograph 
Place becomes mise-en-scene with the addition of the 
camera.(P.257) (document) 
Props? (Shusterman’s goldsuit) 
Creative participation of model. 
A series of exercises to perform in 3 sessions was devised based on 
two uncomfortable attempts at photographing and the agreed on 
readings. (see above) 
Structure became very important in order for flow to happen; Time 
and specific activity was important: 
 

















X scenarios each with a 15 minute time frame. 
Foucault says we focus on the subject of desire rather than being 
the agent of pleasure.  
Shusterman is caught in desire and not in pleasure-if he finds the 
pleasure in the gold suit, he needs to deal with that better. 
The project will result in a journal of the sessions documenting the 
experiences of both subject and artist individually and in the 
collaboration(experiential flowP.250) leading up to and during the 
photographing session and work manifested through the pose.  
(Performative process is ontologically complex and difficult to 
demarcate-P.250) 
Approaching this project from a constructivist paradigm and using 
a relativist ontology, we decided to use interpretive and dialectic 
methodologies to collect and interpret data. 
 
Knowing how rather than knowing what- reflective practice. 
Research has historically been carried out by academic observers 
of the actions, not the artist. The practitioner is objectified. Unites 
research and practice.(VR22) 
Most outstanding feature of a professional is the capacity for self 
evaluation. (VR23) 
What characterizes your professional context? What is Best 
Practice in this context? 
In what ways are you already a reflexive practitioner? 
What problems could occur being a reflexive practitioner? 
 





Figures 40, 41, and 42 
Figure 40                                                             Figure 41 












 Draft: 2014 
Against Shusterman: An exercise to articulate what has been gained 
from doing. 
 
Richard Shusterman’s primary project is somaesthetics, a neologism 
combining Soma, indicating the body and Aesthetics or Aesthesis (the 
ability to experience sensation or sensitivity), indicating what he 
describes as a discipline that emphasizes the role of the body in aesthetic 
appreciation.   
 
Shusterman claims that 
 ‘since we live, act, and think through our bodies, their study, care, and 
improvement should be at the core of philosophy, especially when 
philosophy is conceived (as it used to be) as a distinctive way of life, a 
critical, disciplined care of the self that involves self-knowledge and self-
cultivation’ Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and 
Somaesthetics (Shusterman, 2008, p.15).  
 
He argues that the body has been marginalized or omitted in the 
conception of humanistic study and that a meliorative reintegration of 
the body into philosophy is a necessary and required.  
Shusterman recounts the origins of his Somaesthetics as rooted in 
‘childhood raptures of radiant bodily charms and blissful somatic 
fulfillment’ Thinking through the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics 
(Shusterman, 2012, p.ix) that left him “yearning for beauty” at a tender 
age. He further begins his essay, Thinking though the body, educating for 
the humanities: a Plea for Somaesthetics, with saying that the humanities 
relate to our human condition, and that our bodies are an “essential and 
valuable dimension of our humanity,” (25TTB) and should be 
understood as such and that it is the “basic instrument of all human 
performance” (26TTB)  
 
In Body Consciousness, Shusterman reprimands Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, 
Dewey, Wittgenstein and James for devaluing the body in their 
philosophies. In Thinking Through the Body he discusses Somaesthetics 
in a variety of different situations from muscle memory, which focuses 
on how training in somatic awareness can meliorate the “somaesthetic 
pathologies of everyday life” to Photography as a Performative Process, 
which deals with the role of the body in the making of art. My interests 
are in the body and its role in aesthetics. Shusterman’s ideas and 
arguments would seem valuable as an aid in further understanding and 
growing my conceptual engagement with the figure in my work.  Having 
read Thinking Though the Body and Body Consciousness I find 
Shusterman to be a curiously constrained thinker. I will make an 
argument against using his work to inform my own by delving into both 
the chapter on Foucault, called Somaesthetics and Care Of The Self: The 
Case of Foucault from Body Consciousness and by designing and carrying 
out a project parallel to his Photography As Performative Process chapter 
in his book Thinking Through The Body. I will also further suggest that 
looking to cognitive scientists and philosophers who are engaged with 
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the recent discoveries in that field would serve my work and interests 
better. 
 
In the essay Somaesthetics and Care Of The Self: The Case of Foucault 
from Body Consciousness, Shusterman begins by listing and objecting to 
charges leveled at Somaesthetics, which include “narrowness, 
sensualism, Hedonistic triviality, and a political narcissism. (19BC) He 
cites Dialectic of Enlightenment by Horkheimer and Adorno as the 
antithesis of Somasthetics, because while it deals with the somatic- the 
beautiful body- it divides it from the mind. The beautiful body [becomes] 
the tool of capitalist ads and political repression. (27) Shusterman 
declares that, “They ignore the body’s subject-role as living locus of 
beautiful, felt experience.” (BC28) 
 
Shusterman then outlines the three aspects of Somaesthetics: Analytic, 
Pragmatic, and Practical. 
 
Analytic: Descriptive. 
It is the research and theory that link thinking, the body and bodily 
practice. Foucault’s power theories come into play here, specifically his 
theory of bio-power. 
“Studies show how the body is both shaped by power and employed as 
an instrument to maintain it, how bodily norms of health, skill, and 
beauty and even our catagories of sex and gender are constructed to 
reflect and sustain social forces.” (23BC) Shusterman goes on to mention 
the role of embodiment in biological and cognitive sciences through the 
work of Alva Noe, Shaun Gallagher, George Lakoff and Antonio Damasio 
here to mention a few who also interest me.  
 
In his essay Photography as Performative Process, Shusterman makes use 
Foucault’s ideas of power and “of one’s own life as a personal work of 
art” and Barthes’ writing on “self-conciousness” in Camera Lucida in 
describing the analytic.  
 
Pragmatic: Prescriptive. 
Which focuses of the thinking and theories of the physical disciplines 
used to train and enhance or change the body. Pragmatic somaesthetic 
disciplines are sorted as either concerning an inner personal experience 
or external appearance to others. Feldenkrais1 is experiential (for both 
practitioner and client) while plastic surgery is representational and 
external. Most subjects have both the inner and outer focus because 
“[h]ow we look influences how we feel, and vice versa.” (26BC) 
Shusterman mostly indicates what this should not be, suggesting 
Foucault’s “fixations on sexuality, transgression and sexual 
intensity”(40BC) are limiting. (While decrying most kinds of 
experimental or S/M sex, Shusterman does advocate a more body centric 
sex education claiming that the Kama Sutra and other choreographed 
acts are beneficial and promote health.) Shusterman puts forward 
meditation, workouts, and dance to be the kinds of physical training 




“Intelligently disciplined practice”(BC29) -or doing-is neglected by 
philosophers. This is, of course the action or performance of the practice 
itself. 
Oddly, Shusterman never explicitly outlines, sanctions or approves 
specific somatic disciplines to practice. He discusses Feldenkrais at 
length and is a practitioner as well as teaching/lecturing about dance.  
 
At this point, Shusterman declares he will concentrate on the pragmatic 
somaesthetic in Foucault and not the analytic or practical aspects that 
are “powerfully present” in his work by saying that “the enticingly 
controversial details of his actual bodily practices” (30BC) or the 
fascinating analytical studies are not to be concentrated on. 
Somaesthetics as practiced by Foucault, implies Shusterman, is slightly 
off.  
 
Here I find Shusterman’s rambley desire to refute Foucault prudish. 
Through out this chapter, Shusterman seems disgusted by Foucault’s 
interest in S/M and drugs and in his disgust misses the points Foucault 
makes about transgression, sex and power and manages to make his 
own brand of Somasthetics seem prim and stuffy. Shusterman 
announces that S/M and drugs conflict with Foucault’s goals of  “the 
multiplication of somatic pleasures and forms of self-fashioning.” (31BC) 
And puts forward that breathing, stretching, walking, yoga and dancing 
can “produce experiences of great power and exaltation.” (37BC) 
Shusterman goes on to say that “intensification of pleasure cannot be 
simply be achieved by intensity of sensation.” (37BC) but quotes yogis 
and ascetics who acheive pleasure by rejecting it or “from and emptiness 
that reveals it own empowering intensity and fullness.” He further 
suggests the feminine by suggesting that we should come to know 
pleasure in its more tender or gentler guises of  “diversion” and “fun and 
so forth.” (37BC) Here Shusterman has clearly missed modern feminist 
thinkers on sex, pleasure and desire like Elizabeth Grosz. Grosz says in 
her book “Space , Time and Perversion” that thinking of female desire in 
this diminished way “reduces female sexuality and genitality to the 
status of castration” and that in this way “Woman is man minus the 
phallus and its benefits.” (STaP158) 
Basically, Shusterman is finding Foucault an unrefined and hedonistic 
pervert but claims he won’t demonized Foucault because he is a pervert. 
Shusterman will celebrate “bio power, gender construction, and 
somatically based social domination”(BC31) Just because he died from 
aids doesn’t mean he is wrong . . . and he isn’t just a “nihilistic French 
sophisticate” with a “jaded taste for narcotic, sexual perversion.” 
 
Foucault advocates for a desexualization of pleasure- Shusterman 
questions this if eroticism is not left out of the picture. First objection. 
Foucault suggests the mix of “rules and openness” in S/M intensifies 





Every part of the body potentially gives pleasure 
Shusterman doesn’t like that Foucault wants the body to be sexy- He 
doesn’t like the “narrow focus” of “intensifying the sexual act” and that 
the body is “reduced” becomes the sexual instrument. (33BC) 
Shusterman doesn’t like that body pleasure is sexualized. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
Foucault: (Shusterman thinks he is a pervert) 
Pragmatic: 
Shusterman wants us to know his critique of Foucault is not ‘a rejection 
of  philosophy per se, but rather constitutes an affirmation of philosophy 
as critique’ (31BC). 
Shusterman will not tell us how problematic S/M and drugs are but he 
thinks they conflict with Foucaults goals of  ‘the multiplication of somatic 
pleasures and forms of self-fashioning’ (31BC). 
Foucault won’t be demonized because he is a pervert. Shusterman will 
celebrate ‘bio power, gender construction, and somatically based social 
domination’(BC31). Just because he (F) died from aids doesn’t mean he 
is wrong . . . and he isn’t just a ‘nihilistic French sophisticate’ with a 
‘jaded taste for narcotic, sexual perversion’ (BC 32) 
Foucault advocates for a desexualization of pleasure- Shusterman 
questions this if eroticism is not left out of the picture. First objection. 
 
Foucault suggests the mix of “rules and openness” in S/M intensifies 




Every part of the body potentially gives pleasure 
Shusterman doesn’t like that Foucault wants the body to be sexy- He 
doesn’t like the “narrow focus” of “intensifying the sexual act” and that 
the body is “reduced” becomes the sexual instrument (33BC)- 
Shusterman doesn’t like that body pleasure is sexualized. 
Shusterman objects to S/M sex because it is too masculine and violent. 
Says ‘differently gendered subjectivities and desires’(34BC) could be 
equally as creative and ‘gentler methods of sexual contact’ 
Asexual pleasures are not inconsistent with sexual delight . . . 35 
Second objection is to Foucault’s championing “intense delights” 36 
Foucault says pleasure must be intense- Shusterman says Foucault has 
ANHEDONIA- 
Shusterman says that for Foucault the everyday pleasures of food and 
drink are “meaningless” compared to the pleasures of transgressive sex 
and drugs. Shusterman suggests that breathing, stretching, walking, yoga 
and dancing can ‘produce experiences of great power and exaltation’ 
(37BC).  
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Shusterman randomly says that ‘intensification of pleasure cannot be 
simply be achieved by intensity of sensation’ (37BC). This SOUNDS true 
but he doesn’t back it up. 
Shusterman talks about pleasure but quotes only Yogis while saying 
Foucault, who experienced what he is discussing, needs a more refined 
logic of understanding refinement. Basically Shusterman is finding 
Foucault an unrefined and hedonistic pervert. 
Anhedonia is the symptom of Foucault’s excesses claims Shusterman. 
Anhedonia ( linked to drug abuse and suicide)  
I don’t think he is using this word correctly. It seems to be more of a 
symptom of emptiness or mental illness. Is it Shusterman diagnosing 
Foucault?. MS patients fatigue depression drugs. Have anhedonia. Is it so 
bad? Maybe if you can only get pleasure from yoga you should stick to 
yoga and heavy breathing.  Just because Shusterman doesn’t have the 
same feeling about S/M or drug use-which do have pitfalls- his inability 
to really see what Foucault is saying is curious. Because S thinks S/M is 
“heavy” and pervey and his feelings about drug use seem judgemental 
(does Shusterman drink?) his argument is just judgemental. Breathing 
deeply can get you to the same place as some negotiated power 
exchange eroticization of the body other than the genitals . . . ?? (Not in 
my world) Shusterman is missing the differences between desire and 
pleasure - and Foucaults focus on the differences and the idea of 
managing pleasure. Foucault argues that there is no theory of human 
pleasure, which is not as caught up in a “value” to be measured and is 
more open to variation and creative construction while there is much 
study and evaluation of desire and the supposed normative structures 
and laws that drive it in humans. Can Shusterman diagnose Foucault? 
Reward pathway stuff today 
has changed the idea of pleasure- but Shusterman doesn’t seem to see 
the differences. Power does not work by suppressing desire  
 “Our culture’s constant lust for ever greater intensities of somatic 
stimulation in the quest for happiness is thus a recipe for increasing 
dissatisfaction and difficulty in achieving pleasure,” because “all work 
and no play makes jack a dull boy” (BC39) 
Shusterman points out his view on somasthetics “have in fact” been used 
to recommend strong mind altering drugs, though under carefully 
controlled circumstances. (39 footnote) 
“Body-friendly philosophers” (40) 
Addresses the idea of hedonism- Foucault was fixated on “sexuality, 
transgression and sensational intensity”(40) aesthetics can be ascetic… 
Pleasure is important 
Feeling good (pleasure) can make us more open to the world 
Somatic pleasure is not localized. Tennis is pleasurable but not localized 
in one place in the body. If pleasure were merely blind sensation, you 
would feel it without playing tennis. 
Transformational experiences. (Have to be spiritual or aesthetic) 
Pleasure so intense it is painful to endure . . .(43) the aim here isn’t 
sensual, so somehow it’s better. 
Somaesthetic s is not about pleasure-it is artful reshaping and 
sharpening- not simply for our own sensual satisfaction but so we are 
more aware of the needs of others. (Prude in bad relationship) 
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Not clear on pleasure… (44) 
Shusterman ultimately seems to vaguely agree with Foucault by saying 
that Foucault’s ideas of transformation In History of Sexuality, Foucault 
discusses how power is not suppression of desire but control of 
pleasures. “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, 
but because it comes from everywhere”(THoS93), it permeates and 
manifests as what is “true”, “allowed” and “accepted” generally in 
society. This knowledge is then reinforced through social and political 
institutions and structures and become self-regulating through generally 
accepted behaviours and thinking. Foucault is suggesting this “power is 
not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we 
are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex 
strategical situation in a particular society" (THoS93) 
 
Repression has always been the "fundamental link between power, 
knowledge, and sexuality" (5) making the disruption of its hold difficult 
and potentially very costly. Foucault suggests that nothing less than full 
on transgression and contravention will result in “a reinstating of 
pleasure with in reality” (THoS5)   
When trying to understand the relationship sex plays in power, it can be 
difficult to see, but by looking at repression, the space sex occupies is 
more easily defined. There is a power in speaking about sex as one must 
appear to make a "deliberate transgression. A person who holds forth in 
such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of 





Body should be included in on all philosophy- (BC16/17) 
Should is used oddly in how we SHOULD look at the humanities and do 
(TTB25) they include the “Social Sciences which have pretensions to 
science” or SHOULD we focus on traditional methods and topics of high 
culture that give the humanities an authoritative aura of nobility, or 
should it extend to new and funkier forms….. 
Somaesthetics make us have better lives ameliorative (TTB27) 
Body divides us /contrast to stroke of genius (29TTB) 
body sets limits(31TTB) 
Confusius say (32TTB) 
Shusterman says body is like a Woman- marry it (TTB36) 
Bad habits arise from bad muscle memories 93ttb 
Couples sides of beds-97 did he check this-? 
Spaces strong somatic imprint 96TTB 
Talks about artists and womens’ delectable bodies on page (xBC)and 
(9TTB) 
Need for academic approval:  
TTB28) resistance to body focused learning-body has been rejected… 
TTB1 intro- 
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Not flexible:  
(104TTB) chronic raised shoulders are bad-how does he know this? 
Body norms(TTB42-44) magical thinking-(bad way) 
Process 
Vision of knowledge-Teresa Bennett: How her embodied knowledge 
comes back and effects the body. She doesn’t leave the body to have 
impact on the world. More acceptable way of having the body in the 
world. 
Gender: Candy Darling stuff: 
Shusterman doesn’t identify with unshaven face or rolls of fat…. Candy 
darling stuff- He thinks candy was badly done . . . 
(TTB246) Avedon/Danto/Hujar (A&E Naked Truth 270) 
Gender: Foucault Sex is political Power Candy Darling quotes. Bio-power 
(143HS) 
When studied and practiced with careful mindfulness and sensitivity as 
part of one’s project of melioristic self-cultivation, the art of love making 





Gold suit video 
Who I will use instead? 
V S Ramachandan 
Daniel Dennet?- (Zombie space) 
Alva Noe 
George Lakoff- Metaphor works in all this- understanding something 
through something else? Maps? Knowing about the thing but not the 
thing . . . . ?? 
 
Shusterman is caught in desire and not in pleasure-if he finds the 
pleasure in the gold suit, he needs to deal with that better. (OMG!) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jv4m4GGLU5c 
 
I am not a genuine woman but I am not interested in genuineness. I am 
interested in the product of being a woman and how qualified I am. 
 
I have always found socially unacceptable people make the best lovers 
because they are more sensitive. 
 
I will not cease to be myself for foolish people. For foolish people make 
harsh judgements on me. You must always be yourself, no matter what the 






Foucault may be equally revered and loathed It is really easy to despise 
Foucault for his personal investigations, but by their nature Foucault’s 
investigations he pressed into areas not completely looked at before.  
 
The trangressive nature of Foucault’s investigations make him easy to 
criticize, but the fearless enthusiasm with which he looked beyond the 
“good and naughty”, however biased by personal desires, makes his 
search seem to almost illustrate the Philosophy altering premise 
Shusterman hopes to advocate. Foucault’s willingness to actually use his 
body to break with tradition and break through to seeing the world  
 
“We do not want to be the arbiter of anyone’s sex conduct.” (AA69) we 
are reminded in the Big Book of Alcoholics Anonymous, “It’s so easy to 
get way off track.” 
 
Penis pictures. 
Tie in is same as candy darling  
Elizabeth Grosz quote about women being a disempowered man.  
 
Arnheim quote: 
“Insignificant living is the worst possible enemy of art” 15?  
Where Shusterman was right: 
Gold suit made him magic and was transformative. (and foolish) He 
found an external something that makes him able to operate in the 
construct of the project- that’s the artist being clever. 
 
Shusterman thought it was bad for Candy Darling to have a penis. 
Foucault says that was the important thing and transgressive thing. MY 
context is fru-fru old lady land. A penis isn’t fru-fru old lady land. Penis is 
the prop to focus on. You aren’t looking at me alone. Me in a context that 












iv A memoing example for  The Slides Project.  
I began with dates but quickly moved to the different institutions where I had 
gained skills as the initial method for coding this project. Here, I also became 
aware that I use technique, or craft as a tool, rather than as the standard for my 





"Abstract Bodies". 2016. [You Tube] Directed by David Getsy. Houston, Texas. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUrhkPvo1ys. 
Allan, G.G., 2003. A critique of using grounded theory as a research method. The 
Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods (EJBRM), 2(1), pp.1-77. 
Department of Information Systems and Computer Applications, Portsmouth 
University, UK. 
Anon., 2014. Erotic Erosion: The Recumbent Effigy of Victor Noir. [Online] 
Available at:   HYPERLINK "http://www.atlasobscura.com/places/erotic-
erosion-recumbent-effigy-victor-noir"  
http://www.atlasobscura.com/places/erotic-erosion-recumbent-effigy-victor-
noir  [Accessed 6 July 2017]. 
Barad, K., 2007. Meeting the Universe Halfway. Duke University Press (kindle). 
Barthes, R., 1982. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Hill and Wang. 
Baudrillard, J., 1994. Simulacra and Simulation (The Body, In Theory: Histories of 
Cultural Materialism). Translated by S.F. Glaser. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Baum, L.F., 1900. The Wonderful Wizard of Oz. George M. Hill Company. 
Beavers, A., 1990. Introducing Levinas to Undergraduate Philosophers. 
University of Austin. 
Berenson, B., 1896. The Florentine Painters Of The Renaissance. Putnam. 
Bergo, B., 2015. Emmanuel Levinas. S E P. 
Berlant, L., 2011. Cruel Optimism. Duke University Press. 
Blanchot, M., 1982. The Space of Literature. Translated by A. Smock. University 
of Nebraska Press. 
Bowdidge, M. ., 2017. stuff. m_bowdidge@hotmail.com. Available in appendix. 
Brennan, T., 2004. The Transmission of Affect. Cornell University Press. 
Bruzzone, R., 2012. Statues, Celibates, and Goddesses in Ovid's Metamorphoses 
and Euripides' Hippolytus. The CLassical Journal, 108(1), pp.65-85. 
Busch, K., 2009. Artistic Research and the Poetics of Knowledge. ART & 
RESEARCH, 2(2). http://www.artandresearch.org.uk/v2n2/pdfs/busch.pdf. 
Chapman, J.a.D., 2007. Jake & Dinos Chapman Interview. Royal Jelly Factory,. 
http://www.royaljellyfactory.com/newartupclose/chapman-iv.htm. 
Clement, O.A., 1960. Exhortation Of The Greeks. Loeb Classical Library. 
 284 
Comay, R., 2014. Defaced Statues: Iconoclasm and Idealism in Hegel's 
Aesthetics. October Magazine., pp.pp. 123–142. 
Comay, R., 2015. Body Building. Catalogue essay for Antony Gormley exhibition, 
"Expansion Field," . 
Corbin, J. & Strauss, A., 2008. Basics of Qualitative Research 3E. Sage. 
Damasio, A., 2010. Self Comes to Mind; Constructing the Conscious Brain 
Pantheon. New York : Pantheon (Vintage Press). 
Damasio, A., 2003. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. 
Harcourt Books. 
Damasio, A., 2011. The quest to understand consciousness (TED Talk). TED. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LMrzdk_YnYY. 
Danto, A., 2014. After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History. 
Princeton University Press Classics. 
Davis, M., 1999. Poetry of Philosophy; On Aristotle's Poetics. Carthage Reprint. 
Deleuze, G.a.G.F., 1994. What Is Philosophy? Translated by T.b.H.T.a.G. Burchell. 
Columbia University Press. 
Dewey, J., 2005. Art As Experience. London: Penguin. 
Eschelbacher, A., 2016. Resisting Death's Finality; Jules Dalou’s Blanqui Tomb 
and the Dialectics of Memorialization. 32017th ed. Brill On line Books and 
Journals. European History and Culture E-Books Online, Collection 2015-I. 
Fitzgerald, F.S., 1936. The Crack Up. Esquire Magazine , February-April. 
http://www.esquire.com/lifestyle/a4310/the-crack-up/. 
Fortin, J., 2017. Toppling Monuments, a Visual History. New York Times (on 
line), p.World. 
Frayn, M., 1998. Copenhagen. Anchor Books. 
Freud, S., 1925. The Standard Edition Of The Complete Psychological Works Of 
Sigmund Freud. Translated by J. Strachey. Hogarth Press and The Institute Of 
Psycho-Analysis. http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/freud1.pdf accessed 
5/2015. 
Freud, L., 1996. Some Thoughts On Painting (1954). In Stiles, K.S.P.E. Theories 
and Documents of Contemporary Art. University of California Press. pp.219-21. 
Gallagher, S., 2015. Self and Narrative. In Malpas, J.a.G.H.-H. The Routledge 
Companion to Hermeneutics. Routledge. pp.403-14. 
Getsy, D., 2004. Body Doubles; Sculpture In Britan 1877-1905. Yale University 
Press. 
 285 
Getsy, D., 2005. Privileging The Object Of Sculpture: Actuality And Harry Bates’s 
Pandora Of 1890. Art History, 28(1), pp.74-95. 
Getsy, D., 2010. Rodin: Sex and the Making of Modern Sculpture. Yale University 
Press. 
Getsy, D., 2011. Tactility or Opticality, Henry Moore or David Smith: Herbert 
Read and Clement Greenberg on The Art of Sculpture, 1956. In Peabody, E.b.R. 
Anglo-American Exchange in Postwar Sculpture, 1945–1975. J. Paul Getty 
Museum. pp.105-21. 
Getsy, D.J., 2014. Acts Of Stillness: Statues, Performativity, And Passive 
Resistance. Criticism, 56(1), pp.1-20. 
Getsy, D., 2015. Abstract Bodies: Sixties Sculpture and the Expanded Field of 
Gender. Yale University Press. 
Glaser, B., 1992. Basics Of Grounded Theory Analysis. Mill Valley, CA, USA: 
Sociology Press. 
Glaser, B.G. & Strauss, A.L., 2006. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies 
for Qualitative Research. Aldine Transaction. 
Gonzalez, A., 2006. Alberto Giacometti Works/Writing/Interviews. Translated by 
J. Watson. Ediciones Poligrafa. 
Graham Harman: Anthropocene Ontology. 2017. [video] Graham Harman. 
Paradiso, Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Sonic Acts Published on Jun 27, 2017. 
Gregg, M.&.S.G., ed., 2010. The Affect Theory Reader. Duke University Press. 
Grosz, E., 2010. Elizabeth Grosz Keynote Address at the 2007 Feminist Theory 
Workshop. Duke Women Studies. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwHoswjw5yo. 
Grosz, E., 2012. CHAOS, TERRITORY, ART Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth 
(The Wellek Library Lectures). Columbia University Press. 
Hall, J., 1999. THe World As Sculpture, The Changing Status of Sculpture from the 
Renaissance to the Present Day. London: Chatto & Windus. 
Haraway, D.J., 1992. The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for 
Inappropriate/d Others. Cultural Studies, pp.pp. 295-337. 
Harman, G., 2005. Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of 
Things. Chicago: Open Court. 
Harman, G., 2010. The Quadruple Object. Zero Books. 
Harman, G., 2011. The Road To Objects. Continent (journal), Volume 1(Issue 3), 
pp.Pp 171-179. 
 286 
Harman, G., 2012. Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-Human. 
Naked Punch. Accessed on line 2/2015 
http://www.nakedpunch.com/articles/147. 
Harman, G., 2012. The Third Table. Documenta (13): 100 Notes - 100 Thoughts / 
100 Notizen - 100 Gedanken) Paperback, pp.4-15. 
Harman, G., 2013. Graham Harman on Metaphysics, Art, & Speculative Realism. 
Philosophy Overdose. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ck-fRgNUOAs. 
Harman, G., 2015. Graham Harman: Anthropocene Ontology. Amsterdam: Sonic 
Acts. https://vimeo.com/122388895. 
Harman, G., 2016. Dante's Broken Hammer. Repeater Books. 
Harman, G., 2017. On Knowledge in the Arts and Taste in the Sciences. 2nd ed. 
UVA School of Architecture Published on Jul 14, 2017. Lecture given 16 
February 2017 at University of Virginia School of Architecture.  
Harvey, A. & Mortimer, R., eds., 1994. The Funeral Effigies Of Westminster Abbey. 
Boydell Press. 
Heidegger, M., 2006. Origin Of The Work Of Art. 215th ed. Translated by 
T.b.R.B.a.P. Nonet. Academia (on line). 
https://www.academia.edu/2083177/The_Origin_of_the_Work_of_Art_by_Mart
in_Heidegger. 
Hersey, G., 2008. Falling In Love With Falling in Love with Statues: Artificial 
Humans from Pygmalion to the Present,. 
Hohl, R., ed., 1998. Giacometti A Biography In Pictures. Hatje. 
Howell, A., 2015. The Dehumanization Of Art (1925) Jose Ortega y Gasset. 




dehumanization-of-art-1925-jose-ortega-y-gasset/  [Accessed 2 February 
2016]. 
James, H., 1883. Foreign Parts. 03rd ed. Leipzig: Bernard Tauchnitz. 
Jenkins, I. & Turner, V., 2009. The Greek Body. Los Angeles: The J. Paul Getty 
Museum. 
Johnson, M., 2010. Embodied Knowing through art. In M. Biggs & Karlsson , eds. 
The Routledge Companion To Research In The Arts. Routledge. pp.141-50. 
Kageki, N., 2012. AutomatonRoboticsHumanoid Robots An Uncanny Mind: 
Masahiro Mori on the Uncanny Valley and Beyond. IEEE Spectrum. 
Keith Wilson, N.M.M.S.H.M., 2011. The Trouble With Sculpture. 5th ed. ICA. 
 287 
Kelly, M., 2003. Iconoclasm in Aesthetics. Cambridge University Press. 
Kenaan, H., 2014. Touching Sculpture. In Dent, P. Sculpture as Touch. Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd. pp.45-60. 
Kerr, D., 2016. What Is Object-Oriented Ontology? A Quick-and-Dirty Guide to 




Kosuth, J., 1969. Art After Philosophy (1969). 
[http://www.lot.at/sfu_sabine_bitter/Art_After_Philosophy.pdf] * Reprinted * 
from Studio International. 
http://www.lot.at/sfu_sabine_bitter/Art_After_Philosophy.pdf. 
Kozel, S., 2013. Phenomenology in five acts. Malmo, Sweden: Medea TV, Stanford 
University. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mv7Vp3NPKw4. 
Krauss, R., 1979. Sculpture In The Expanded Field. October, 8, pp.30-44. 
Lakoff, G. & Gallese, V., 2005. The Brain’s Concepts: The Role Of The Sensory-
Motor System In Conceptual Knowledge. ￼Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3), 
pp.455-79. http://old.unipr.it/arpa/mirror/pubs/pdffiles/Gallese-
Lakoff_2005.pdf. 
Latimer, Q., 2009. Thomas Schütte at Haus der Kunst. 3rd ed. Munich, Germany: 
Frieze.com. 
Levinas, E., 1989. The Levinas Reader. Malden: Blackwell Publishers. 
Levinas, E., 2000. Otherwise Than Being: Or Beyond Essence. Translated by A. 
Lingus. Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press. 
Levinas, E., 2011. Totality and Infinity: An Essay On Exteriority. Translated by A. 
Lingis. MA: Nijhoff Publishers and Duquesne University Press. 
Levi-Strauss, C., 1966. The Savage Mind. 62015th ed. Translated by Weidenfeld. 
Hertfordshire : The Garden City Press Limited. 
https://archive.org/stream/Ebooksclub.orgTheSavageMind/ebooksclub.org__T
he_Savage_Mind_djvu.txt. 
Lord, J., 2015 reprint. Gacometti Portrait. Forgotten Books. 
Louise Bourgeois: The Spider, The Mistress And The Tangerine. 2008. [Film] 
Directed by Marion Cajori & Amei Wallach. 
MacLeod, K., 2000. The functions of the written text in practice-based PhD 





Meillassoux, Q., 2009. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. 
Translated by R. Brassier. Continuum Books. 
Mian, A.A., 2011. Turn To Affect (blog). http://fhi.duke.edu/blog/turn-to-
affect.html ed. The John Hope Franklin Humanities Institute at Duke University. 
Available at:   HYPERLINK "http://fhi.duke.edu/blog/turn-to-affect.html"  
http://fhi.duke.edu/blog/turn-to-affect.html  [accessed 2014]. 2/2014. 
MoMA, 2017. MoMA Learning Joseph Kosuth. [Online] Available at:   HYPERLINK 
"https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/joseph-kosuth-one-and-three-
chairs-1965"  https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/joseph-kosuth-
one-and-three-chairs-1965  [Accessed 9 October 2017]. 
Moore, H., 1934. Statement For Unit One. In H. Read, ed. Unit One: The Modern 
Movement in English Architecture. London. pp.29–30. 
Moore, H., 2002. Henry Moore: Writings and Conversations. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Moore, H., 2015. Henry MooreSome Notes of Space and Form in Sculpture 1970. 




moore-some-notes-of-space-and-form-in-sculpture-r1145426  [Accessed 12 
October 2017]. 
Mori, M., 1970. The Uncanny Valley. Energy, 7(4), pp.33-34. Translated by Karl 
F. MacDorman and Takashi Minato. 
Morris, D., 1969. Primate Ethology. Anchor Books. 
Morton, T., 2013. Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the 
World. University of Minnesota Press. 
Morton, T., 2013. Realist Magic. Open Humanities Press. 
Noë, A., 2009. Out of Our Heads. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Noë, A., 2013. Why is Consciousness so baffling? In Kuhn, R.L. Closer To Truth. 
PBS. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1aPeWc7Um1A. 
Noë, A., 2015. Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature. Hill and Wang. 
Ortega y Gasset, J., 1972. Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays On Art, 
Culture, and literature. Princeton University Press. 
Ortega y Gasset, J., 1975. Phenomenology and Art. Translated by P. Silver. 
Toronto: Norton. 
 289 
Osborn, L., 2015. Emee Statue Interview 3/8/2015. LA: Lisa Osborn. Audio 
Recording. 
Osborn, L., 2015. Osborn Transart notebook 2015. 
Osborn, L. & Maynor, D., 2016. Interviews at Evidence of Practice Show. 
Lafayette, LA: (Opening), Evidence of Practice. 
Ovid, 1983. Metamorphoses. Translated by R. Humphries. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 




[Accessed 12 October 2017]. 
Paska, R., 1990. The Inanimate Incarnate. Fragments For A History Of The 
Human Body: Part one ed. MA: Zone MIT Press. 
Paska, R., 2009. Dead Puppet Talk. Kostic Films LLC. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S-9muBCkAFg&t=1s. 
Paska, R., 2016. Fear of Puppetry. 22016th ed. International Conference on Live 
Interfaces. 
Perry, G., 2012. Interview with Grayson Perry. 12th ed. The Gaurdian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/video/2012/apr/11/grayson-
perry-crafts-video. 
Perry, G., 2013. Lecture 3: Nice Rebellion: Welcome in. Londonderry: BBC Reith. 
Transcript Lecture 3: Nice Rebellion: Welcome in. 
Perry, G., 2013. Nice Rebellion: Welcome in (Transcript- 20 pages). transcript of 
lecture. Londonderry, uk: Reith Lecture 2013 #3. 
Pierre, C.Y., 2010. The Pleasure and Piety of Touch in Aime-Jules Dalou's Tomb 
of Victor Noir. Sculpture, 19(2), pp.173-85. 
Plato, 1992. Laches and Charmides. Translated by R.K. Sprague. Hackett 
Publishing. 
Polanyi, M., 2009. The Tacit Dimension. University of Chicago. 




Read, H., 1977. The Art Of Sculpture. Princeton University Press. 
 290 
Ricoeur, P., 1992. Oneself as another. Translated by K. Blamey. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Rugoff, R., 2014. The Human Factor; The Figure In Contemporary Sculpture. 
Hayward Publishing. 
Schön, D., 1983. The reflective Practioner: How Professionals Think in Action. 
Basic Books. 
Schön, D.A., 1995. Reflective Practice: its implications for classroom, 
administration and research. Public Lecture. University of Melbourne. 
Searle, A., 2012. Thomas Schütte: men, monsters and self-portraits. 201224th ed. 
The Gaurdian. 
Sedgwick, E.K., 2002. Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Series 
Q). Duke University Press. 
Segal, N., 2006. Words, bodies and stone. Journal of Romance Studies , 6(3), 
pp.1-18. ISSN 1473–3536. 
Shusterman, R., 2008. Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and 
Somaesthetics. Cambridge University Press. 
Shusterman, R., 2012. Thinking through the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, S., 2011. Fig Leaf: The Biggest Cover-Up In History. BBC. 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x42raup. 
Sontag, S., 2001. Against Interpretation and other Essays. Picador. 
Spinoza, B., 1955. Ethics, part II. Translated by R.H.M. Elwes. New York: Dover 
Press. 
Stewart, P., 2003. Statues in Roman Society: Representation and Response. 
Oxford University Press. 
Stiles, K.S.P.E., 1996. Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A 
Sourcebook of Artists' Writings. University of California Press. 
Stoddart, A., 2014. Representational art - the original sin. In TEDxUWS., 2014. 
YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QAVd0yZB4XY. 
Stoichita, V.I., 2008. The Pygmalion Effect: From Ovid to Hitchcock. Translated by 
A. Anderson. University of Chicago Press. 
The Sculpture Diaries. 2007. [Film] Directed by Waldemar Januszczak.: zcz films. 
Tomkins, C., 2015. Meaning Machines, The sculptures of Charles Ray. New 
Yorker Magazine, 11 May. pp.56-63. 
 291 
Trelawny, E.J., 1858. Recollections of the last days of Shelley and Byron. 
001222nd ed. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 
Turchi, P., 2004. Maps of the Imagination: The Writer as Cartographer. Kindle 
ebook edition ed. Trinity University Press. 
van der Tuin, I.a.D.R., 2012. New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies. 
Open Humanities Press (Michigan Publishing). 
Wei, L., 2014. Claytime! Ceramics Finds Its Place In The Art-World Mainstream. 
Art News, JANUARY. http://www.artnews.com/2014/01/15/ceramics-enters-
art-world-mainstream/. 
What Do Artists Do All Day. 2014. [Youtube Video] Directed by Art 
Documentaries.: Art Documentaries. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QENTGC0a3qs. 
Whips, Death and Madonnas (Renaissance Unchained). 2015. [video] Directed by 
Januszczak. UK: ZCZ Films. 
Wilde, O., 1997. The Happy Prince. 902902902nd ed. The Project Gutenberg 
eBook. 
Williams, B., 2006. Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline. 7921st ed. Princeton 
University Press. 
Wollheim, R., 1980. Art and its Objects. Kindle Edition. ed. Cambridge University 
Press. 













                                                        
 292 
















9/12/2018 AW: Permission to use images  
 294 
                                                                                                                                                            
From: Stiftung Ernst Scheidegger-Archiv <stiftung@ernst-scheidegger-archiv.org> To: lbosborn 
<lbosborn@aol.com>  
Subject: AW: Permission to use images Date: Tue, Apr 24, 2018 5:18 am  
Dear Lisa,  
I am geng back to you on your request to use two photographs of Ernst Scheidegger for your thesis. Since it is 
for a scienfic, non‐publishing use, we grant permission of reproducon without charging any fee.  
Please use the following copyright noce:  
Photograph by Ernst Scheidegger © 2018 Sung Ernst Scheidegger‐Archiv, Zurich. Good luck with your thesis 
and best regards, Olivia Baeriswyl  
Olivia Baeriswyl  
Sung Ernst Scheidegger‐Archiv c/o Verlag Scheidegger & Spiess AG Niederdorfstrasse 54 CH‐8001 
Zürich Tel +41 (0) 44 262 16 62 sung@ernst‐scheidegger‐archiv.org www.ernst‐scheidegger‐archiv.org  
Von: lbosborn@aol.com [mailto:lbosborn@aol.com] Gesendet: Donnerstag, 19. April 2018 17:44 An: 
sung@ernst‐scheidegger‐archiv.org Betreff: Re: Permission to use images  
Thank you. Lisa Osborn  
-----Original Message----- From: Stiftung Ernst Scheidegger-Archiv <stiftung@ernst-scheidegger-
archiv.org> To: lbosborn <lbosborn@aol.com> Sent: Wed, Apr 18, 2018 5:20 am Subject: AW: 
Permission to use images  
Dear Lisa,  
Thank you for your academic interest in the work of Ernst Scheidegger. I will have a look into your request and 
get back to you soon.  
Best regards, Olivia  
Olivia Baeriswyl  
Sung Ernst Scheidegger‐Archiv c/o Verlag Scheidegger & Spiess AG Niederdorfstrasse 54 CH‐8001 
Zürich Tel +41 (0) 44 262 16 62 sung@ernst‐scheidegger‐archiv.org www.ernst-scheidegger-archiv.org  
Von: lbosborn@aol.com [mailto:lbosborn@aol.com] Gesendet: Samstag, 14. April 2018 03:57 An: 
sung@ernst‐scheidegger‐archiv.org Betreff: Permission to use images  
Hello,  
I would like permission to use two images from the Ernst Scheidegger Archive in my thesis. This 
document will be archived in the Plymouth University library in the UK.  
The images I would like permission to use are:  
Traces of his sculpting with plaster  
Paris 1960  
Giacometti working on the plaster sculpture for "L'homme qui marche" ("The Walking 
Man")  
Paris 1958  
Thank you,  
Lisa Osborn  
PO Box 39 Avery Island, LA 70513  
https://mail.aol.com/webmail-std/en-us/PrintMessage  
 
 
